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EDITORIAL

"MAN is born free, and everywhere he is in chains," said Rousseau. This, however, puts the cart before the horse. It is truer to say that man was born in chains, and everywhere he is struggling to be free. Notwithstanding, however, his long history, man has not yet got rid of his chains. Indeed, it would seem that nations sometimes, after having enjoyed for a period a large measure of freedom, return to their fetters when confronted with a crisis. Faith in a generous toleration and in the light of Reason is temporarily lost, and primitive forces once more rise to the surface and dominate the lives of men. Thus the tortures of Prometheus are renewed. But Reason, though exiled, cannot be slain. So long as there is life at a high conscious level, Reason cannot indefinitely be denied her proper function of guide and friend to the human soul, for without the wisdom which is her gift man cannot survive as a civilized being.

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Freedom for adventure in the realms of thought and practice would seem to be a necessity for human life. There can be no lasting satisfaction with any static order of affairs, however momentarily excellent. Life's insistent demand is for scope to advance to novel forms of achievement and expression. Its denial engenders restlessness in the soul and a deep discontent. Moreover, since living consciousness is essentially creative, it cannot be imprisoned in any permanent and unchanging form without ultimately sickening of the malaise *taedium*, and entering upon the path of decay.

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At the present time the creative soul of the world whose essence is freedom is sorely maimed. And this impairment of health is not

wholly due to the antagonisms of man with man. These, indeed, play a sinister rôle enough in hindering the growth of freedom. But the massive habits of physical nature also contribute their quota in the frustration of human purposes. Heat and cold, birth and death, disease and famine, earthquake and storm, constitute the background to the human drama which is being played throughout the ages. Further, the growth of applied physical science in our day has brought added dangers, making us acutely aware that the more complicated civilization becomes, the more it is open to attack.

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The essence of human freedom is the power to accomplish practical purposes, to achieve ends which satisfy deep-rooted human needs. But it is just this freedom of action which is so difficult to attain. Economic forces have played no insignificent part in this frustration. Hence to-day the primary demand made in the name of freedom is for economic security and a reasonable degree of social order. But since man cannot live by bread alone, freedom also demands an environment in which certain ideal ends bearing intrinsic values can be pursued. It is this blending of ideals and economic policies which constitutes the web of human history. One of the most pressing questions of to-day is whether economic freedom for the masses can be purchased without a large sacrifice of political liberty. Herein lies the significance of those experiments which are to-day being made in certain countries.

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Since in every modern state there are many types of individuals and groups, each having its own character and its own worth, freedom for all is impossible without mutual toleration. But intolerance is the besetting sin of every society. Times without number it has defeated the pursuit of freedom and brought disaster and ruin. In the modern state there cannot be freedom without a generous toleration of diversity. What is to be aimed at is not the destruction of different groups with their specific character in the interests of a false ideal of homogeneity, but room for each to make its contribution to the common life in its own way.

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This form of social freedom is the ideal of all great statesmen. Fortunately in the wide field of human activity represented by professional institutions it has been largely attained. The modern State has come to realize that it is not within its competence to decide upon matters which fall within the province of learning, art, and even religion, but only to provide opportunities for learning and

ability to flourish. Thereby it expresses its belief that sound knowledge can be trusted to banish error, a belief that has been increasingly justified. In many regions of human thought Reason has thus won a strong foothold, bringing as its gift a wider freedom to man.

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But beyond the ideal of social freedom, Plato teaches us there is a deeper freedom which the individual soul needs for its peace. This freedom lies beyond all temporal circumstances good or bad, being based on an intuition of the eternal order of things, and upon the conviction that human life is grounded in a realm of values changeless in the midst of change. This deeper freedom, according to Whitehead, can be enjoyed by all who, through understanding, come to learn that as individuals they are partners in the supreme adventure of the universe as a whole, an adventure which is concerned with the realization of all possible values. The possession of such an intuition is, in his words, "the reconciliation of freedom and the compulsion of the truth."

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Finally, it may be asked if the notion of freedom is justified by the constitution of Nature. In every human society there has been some liberty and some compulsion, and the values of human life have been won in an environment constituted by a synthesis of both in some compatible proportion. Is freedom as well as compulsion an operative factor in Nature as a whole? If this be the true view, then Nature is not merely the product of an inevitable causal process, but is also that which issues from the exercise of spontaneity; and if self-creativity be an ultimate metaphysical principle, we have here the ground for the conviction that the idea of freedom is not merely an idle play of the emotions, but is a belief justified by the ultimate constitution of reality.

THE PRESENT NEED OF A PHILOSOPHY

MY DEAR EDITOR,

Your invitation to continue the correspondence opened by Sir Herbert Samuel in the last issue of the JOURNAL is one which I cannot in honour refuse; and I am the less reluctant to accept it, because the President's letter has expressed so many of my own convictions that I can follow his lead where I should have hesitated to venture alone. That philosophy ought in some way to help our generation in its moral, social, and political troubles; that epistemology and the theory of value are not directly contributing to that end; and that in this respect some special significance attaches to the idea of evolution—all this I fully and gladly accept; and I will try to say, as briefly as I can, what it is that in my opinion philosophy can do.

But first, there is something which it cannot, and must not be tempted to do. It cannot descend like a *deus ex machina* upon the stage of practical life and, out of its superior insight into the nature of things, dictate the correct solution for this or that problem in morals, economic organization, or international politics. There is nothing in a philosopher's special work qualifying him to pilot a perplexed generation through those rocks and shoals. If a mariner finds himself at sea without navigator, chart, or compass, the Astronomer Royal himself, discovered among the passengers, could do little for him; he would be wiser to hail some coastwise fisherman. Even Plato did not think otherwise. He never proposed that professional philosophers should be dragged, blinking, from their studies and forcibly seated on thrones; only that expert knowledge of political life and its practical difficulties should be illuminated by philosophical reflection on its ultimate end.

If nowadays we should hesitate to go even as far as Plato, it is not because our opinion of philosophy is lower, but because our opinion of the plain man is higher. Christian theology holds that the faith of a simple peasant, without any tincture of theological learning, is sufficient for salvation; modern philosophy, of whatever school, follows its example in holding that non-philosophical thought in all its forms—moral and political, scientific, religious, or artistic—is able to do its work without asking philosophy's help and to justify itself without awaiting philosophy's verdict.

In this opinion there lurks an opposite danger. It may seem that philosophy's only task is to analyse knowledge we already

possess, and theorize about activities we are already able to perform; that it is no more able to influence the processes which it describes than astronomy can influence the movements of the stars; that the only motive to pursue it is a pure disinterested curiosity, the only good to be gained from it, pure theoretical knowledge; and that Plato, Spinoza, and all others who have thought this knowledge somehow serviceable to our well-being were victims of a gigantic and inexplicable illusion.

The truth seems to me to lie somewhere between these two extremes. If the philosopher is no pilot, neither is he a mere spectator, watching the ship from his study window. He is one of the crew; but what, as such, is his function? In order to find an answer to this question, I suggest that we should look back three hundred years or more, to the infancy of modern science. At the beginning of the seventeenth century no one could foresee the triumphs which science was one day to achieve. It was not, therefore, a foreknowledge of these triumphs that encouraged innumerable men to persevere in almost incredibly detailed inquiries concerning the laws of nature, in a corporate effort shared by all parts of the civilized world and extending over many generations. The will to pursue those inquiries was not based on any conception of their future outcome, but it was based on something: it was based on the belief that nature is a single system of things, controlled throughout its extent by a single system of laws. In adopting this idea, civilized man was setting aside his immemorial belief in demonic agencies, magical influences, and the inscrutable caprices of individual things, and accepting a new view of the world, not received on faith, and not arrived at by scientific induction, but thought out and stated in a systematic form by the philosophers of the sixteenth century.

The notion of a uniformly law-abiding natural world is so familiar to ourselves that we are apt to forget how recent a thing it is in the history of thought, how hardly it was won by Renaissance thinkers —for example, with what difficulty sixteenth-century thought gave up Aristotle's doctrine that the law of gravitation holds good only in the sublunary sphere—and how dramatic was its verification by one scientific discovery after another. This philosophical conception of nature has played the part, in relation to scientific research, of a constant stimulus to effort, a reasoned refutation of defeatism, a promise that all scientific problems are in principle soluble.

There is a certain analogy between the state of things at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when the special problems of civilized life were concerned with man's control over nature, and the state of things in the modern world, whose special problems are concerned with human relations. Sir Herbert Samuel justly enumerates them: "personal and social morality, economic organiza-

tion, international relationship." These problems, like the problems of natural science, can be solved only by detailed and patient investigation, exhaustive inquiry, skilful experiment. But this arduous and slow labour, if it is to be undertaken at all, must rest on two things: a conviction that the problems can be solved, and a determination that they shall be solved. Of these two, the first is, I think, capable of being provided, in a reasoned form, by philosophy. Apart from such a reasoned conviction, the will to solve them is so handicapped by doubts within and opposition without, that its chance of success dwindles to vanishing-point. There is always a vast mass of opinion (and very respectable opinion) in favour of allowing established institutions to stand firm for fear of worse to follow; there is always a dead weight of inclination, however bad things may be, to enjoy what good we can snatch for the short time allowed us; but, more dangerous than either of these, there is the defeatist spirit which fears that what we are aiming at is no more than a Utopian dream. And this fear becomes paralysing when, not content with the status of a natural timidity or temporary loss of nerve, it calls in the help of philosophical ideas, and argues that the evils admittedly belonging to our moral, social, and political life are essential elements in all human life, or in all civilization, so that the special problems of the modern world are inherently insoluble. The philosophical ideas underlying this argument are connected with certain aspects of the idea of progress; especially the false conception of progress as due to a cosmic force which can be trusted to advance human life automatically, without the active co-operation of human beings, and (the natural reaction from this) an equally false denial that progress is possible at all.

As the seventeenth century needed a reasoned conviction that nature is intelligible and the problems of science in principle soluble, so the twentieth needs a reasoned conviction that human progress is possible and that the problems of moral and political life are in principle soluble. In both cases the need is one which only philosophy can supply. What is needed to-day is a philosophical reconsideration of the whole idea of progress or development, and especially its two main forms, "evolution" in the world of nature and "history" in the world of human affairs. What would correspond to the Renaissance conception of nature as a single intelligible system would be a philosophy showing that the human will is of a piece with nature in being genuinely creative, a *vera causa*, though singular in being consciously creative; that social and political institutions are creations of the human will, conserved by the same power which created them, and essentially plastic to its hand; and that therefore whatever evils they contain are in principle remediable. In short, the help which philosophy might give to our "dissatisfied, anxious, appre-

hensive generation" would lie in a reasoned statement of the principle that there can be no evils in any human institution which human will cannot cure.

This cannot be done in a day. But it has already been well begun. I will mention three writers whose work, taken as a whole, seems to me unmistakably converging upon a conception of man and his place in the universe which would justify that principle. There is Mr. Alexander's *Space, Time, and Deity*; there is General Smuts's *Holism and Evolution*; and there is Mr. Whitehead's series of books grouped round *Process and Reality*. These, with others hardly less important, seem to me the firstfruits of a new philosophical movement in which epistemological discussions and the old controversy between realism and idealism have fallen, as Sir Herbert desires that they should fall, into the background; in which the central place is taken, as Sir Herbert wishes it should be, by the idea of development; in which philosophy feels itself a collaborator with science, neither its enemy nor its slave, but having its own dignity and its own methods, while it respects those of science; and in which man is conceived neither as lifted clean out of nature nor yet as the plaything of natural forces, but as sharing, and sharing to an eminent degree, in the creative power which constitutes the inward essence of all things.

Yours faithfully,

R. G. COLLINGWOOD.

OXFORD.
April 24, 1934.

MY DEAR EDITOR,

A man is naturally disinclined to consider a theory important, unless it presents itself to him as a solution of a problem which troubles or once troubled him. I believe it is with some such notion in mind that Sir Herbert Samuel, in a letter to the Editor of this Journal,[1] suggests that contemporary philosophers leave epistemology "in the background." What troubles the average intelligent man most in the year nineteen hundred and thirty-four is not the problem of how he can perceive Sirius which is eight light-years from our planet, or of how he recognizes a friend's face, or of the basis of his inductive beliefs about existing things. He is far more concerned about, say, the problem of economic and political relations between men and nations. These, to him, lie near the heart of humanity, and in the aggravated form which they have now assumed are likely to touch off something which might irretrievably shatter the dignity—even the existence—of the human race. To him, that theory will appear important which throws light on such a problem. Any other kind will be "divorced from life."

[1] Vol. IX, No. 34 (April 1934), pp. 134–136.

I think the professional philosopher must admit the timeliness of Sir Herbert's invitation, and the truth of his main conviction. But he cannot help being somewhat bewildered by it, nevertheless. It gives rise in his mind to perplexing questions. If that philosophy is important which is in revolt against abstractions and against realities which transcend human experience, what about pragmatism? Why not refer the serious student of the present international situation to the writings of James or Dewey or Schiller? If philosophical humanism is needed, then certainly the emaciated intellect in search of *vital* pabulum should sit down to pragmatic meat. Now if pragmatism leaves the thoughtful economist or statesman cold—and it usually does—then perhaps we can turn to the philosophy which so describes human relations as to impress one with a warm sense of the integral unity of all men, their spiritual kinship in a universal order. Such an impression might yield the intuition that the good of a man or a nation lies in the good of other men or other nations, and would not such a theory throw light on the world-problem of to-day, in the sense of resulting in enlightened international agreements and attitudes? But if so, what about contemporary objective idealism? What about its theories of the state and its doctrine that the essence of any individual is not self-contained but implicated with the being of all others? This is a magnificent and stirring view of human nature and of the order of existence. Now if this is not what our average intelligent man wants—and he usually does not, granting he is a man of affairs, political or economic—then the professional philosopher begins to suspect that what this man considers important is economic or political treatises about specific subjects, such as, say, the gold standard or the present Anglo-Japanese relations. Of course, not any treatment of these subjects would satisfy his need. I believe that Sir Herbert's plea is, unwittingly, for such treatises where these are *enlightened by world-perspectives* or are engendered against a philosophic background. But is there not much in contemporary philosophy which, if patiently assimilated, will give a man a philosophic background? One could hardly expect philosophy itself to consist in enlightened economic or political treatises dealing with current problems. The production of such treatises is—if I may play with words—the business of the business man, taking "business" in its best and broadest sense.

Now if numerous and varied philosophic theories of human relations are being and have been formulated, such that the world-spirited and philosophically hungry individual has much to choose from, why not permit, even encourage, the philosopher to theorize about *any* class of problematic relations—as, for example, the epistemological? The difficulty is not that we have an insufficiency of philosophies about men and nations, but that too few men of

affairs care about becoming philosophical. Unfortunately, this is true of the average intelligent student of political and economic crises. But the student of world-affairs who does have a genuine hunger for that detachment and that integral understanding of human relations which the philosopher deals with, can well satisfy it by the assimilation of books written since the beginning of this century. (Just why our student generally demands *recent* books of this kind is not clear to me. Of course new attempts are always valuable, inasmuch as something better than ever may be achieved. But, philosophically considered, they will not be better merely for dealing with specific current problems. If they possess greater merit on a philosophical plane, it will be because they express more adequate solutions for the same problems that troubled Plato or Descartes or Kant.) And let no such serious student turn away from philosophy because the first book he picks up, or the first philosophical lecture he attends, is on epistemology. The theory of knowledge is by no means the whole of philosophy, not even of present-day philosophy, though it is an important part.

In conclusion, I shall attempt to justify that phrase "important part" by making what might be called a counter-suggestion. Though Professor Montague is correct in his contention that "philosophy's primary interest is in the ways of things rather than in the ways of knowing them"[1]—and Sir Herbert is evidently of the same opinion—yet there is a sense in which the typical modern temper urgently needs epistemology. Who has not sensed that widely prevalent apathy among our contemporaries with regard to anything theoretical? And what is one major reason for the consequent intellectual dilletantism? It is, it seems to me, the underlying "feeling" that either (1) human knowledge is through and through a pretty shoddy and futile gesture, or (2) if it is not, at least no one seems capable of giving a straightforward description of it which does not violate common sense, so the less said about it the better. Now, confronted with this situation, I am strongly inclined to believe that the greatest philosophical geniuses of our time should be enlisted in the field, not of the theory of social relations, but of the theory of knowledge. To clear the atmosphere at that point by a simple yet scientific account—such does not yet exist—of how men lay hold of reality in cognition and, by truly knowing it, find themselves in an intimate and ever-growing control over it—to do this would be doing yeoman service to the average intelligent man. Eventually, it might give him more zest even for dealing with international problems. It seems plausible that even pensive statesmen, or, let us say, delegates of the League of Nations, would think and live with an abandon which to them would be impossible had they not

[1] *The Ways of Knowing*, p. 413.

first arrived at something they could take to be the solution of the epistemological problem.

And if the patient for whom we are prescribing epistemology makes a wry face and says, in the words of Callicles, "Well then, proceed with those little cramped questions of yours," we shall remember the reply that Plato put into Socrates' mouth and say with Socratic irony, "You are fortunate, Callicles, in having been initiated into the Great Mysteries before the Little: I did not think that was the proper thing."

VIRGIL C. ALDRICH.

THE RICE INSTITUTE,
HOUSTON, TEXAS.
May 24, 1934.

MY DEAR EDITOR,

By putting bluntly the vital question of whether philosophy, like the natural sciences, has a message for the comfort and encouragement of millions, or whether its sole legitimate function is to quench the speculative thirst of the few, I feel that our President has done a signal service to philosophers and laymen alike. Although I shall venture to disagree with much of the answer he proposes, I am none the less grateful to him for raising so fundamental an issue.

There would, I think, be little disagreement about the plain historical fact that the great philosophers seem, as a rule, to have regarded themselves as specially entrusted with the piloting of their fellow-men towards the haven of spiritual achievement. One remembers—calling to mind only a handful of the intrepid band—how Socrates followed his conscience against inexorable Athenian law, how Plato abandoned contemplative ease for a despot's court, how Aristotle became a schoolmaster to save an empire, how Rousseau prophesied the dawning of democracy while Condorcet sketched the lineaments of its educational system, how Fichte fired the patriotism of the German nation before Hitler and without reviling the foreigner or the Jew. How often, indeed, have philosophers sallied forth from their ivory tower into the dust and conflict of national or international turmoil; and even after withdrawal to its tranquil chambers, have they not beckoned others to share with them the wider sweep its balconies command, the purer delights and the more abiding peace that visit all those its walls embrace?

This sense of mission may, of course, have been an empty illusion bred of megalomania, but its generality among philosophers of the highest standing is at any rate a presumption in favour of authenticity. There is, however, one feature of philosophy common to both

Oriental and Occidental thinkers, that occurs as regularly among ancient cultures as in post-Renaissance Europe; and it is this, I believe, that constitutes the most essential bearing of philosophical thought on the day-to-day problems that confront and perplex the ordinary man.

For the attitude of mind cherished by the sage, and exemplified as much in his manner of existence as in the substance of his speculative conclusions, has been always and everywhere the same; his heart is filled with an unshakable conviction that the only life really worth being lived is a life resplendent with scientific truth, with religious vision, with moral and artistic beauty, and that, however crushing the weight of ignorance and however powerful the sway of selfish or destructive instincts, reason and love must ultimately prevail wherever humans dwell. Prometheus, according to the legend, snatched fire from heaven in order to bring warmth and comfort to the chilled bodies of men; philosophy is a second Prometheus, but the torch it bears was kindled in the flame of the ideal, and the invigorating warmth it engenders thaws the numbness of the questing spirit. I cannot for my part agree with Sir Herbert that philosophers are sufficiently unanimous on epistemological, ethical, or metaphysical issues to be able to present the public with a body of doctrine as unassailable as the discoveries of exact science, or that philosophy should be content to relate itself "directly and deliberately to the needs of life"; the former step would invite pronouncements on many delicate questions that are still *sub judice*, while the latter would degrade a purely theoretical investigation to the level of a mere technique. It is the temper of philosophy, rather than its actual findings, that should count in the world at large; in an age when men desire as never before to heap up riches, to gratify the passing whim, to subjugate their weaker brethren, to satisfy their dreams of personal ambition, and to hear the applause of the multitude in their ears, the supreme indifference of the sage to such pursuits and his single-minded devotion to the highest cultural values are the most precious gift he can bestow.

Yours faithfully,

LISTOWEL

LONDON.
May 1, 1934.

TRUTH AND MODERN DICTATORSHIP

I. DONSKY, Ph.D.

THE Epistemology of dictatorship! This expression couples terms which seem to be utter strangers to each other. How could a political régime which is an eminently practical, often violent, hard-striking thing be concerned with a science which is an essentially unpractical, introspective business of secluded and subtle contemplation?

It could, however, be shown that it is natural for political régimes to be interested in the theoretical views of the populations they control, and even in the express or implicit epistemological views of the said populations.

Any political régime is interested in the loyalty, respect, and even love of the people for the government, for the form of government (the constitution), for the country, for the nation. Any political régime desires the citizens to be patriots and loyalists, monarchist, republican, fascist, or bolshevik, as the case may be. Now loyalty, respect, love imply formulated or vaguely felt judgments of value. And the judgments of value presuppose theoretical judgments, distinct or implicit. Supposing I hold the real quality α to be a value and the real quality β to be a disvalue. Then if anyone wants to obtain my positive valuation for an object O, he is interested in evoking my theoretical belief that O possesses the quality α and does not possess the quality β. If a political régime is interested in judgments of value, it is also interested in theoretical judgments which could serve as a foundation for the judgments of value.

The interest of the State in the views of the subjects assumes various forms. There are two fundamental and extreme types of State attitude in this matter; most States, however, occupy intermediary positions between them.

Tolerant, free, democratic States try to obtain loyalty and patriotism only by peaceful, non-coercive means. They use coercion only in exceptional cases of extreme danger. And their peaceful persuasion is of an unobtrusive, uninsisting character. It is also noteworthy that their attempts at influencing and determining the popular mind are usually restricted to special and somewhat reserved subjects. Large fields of thought are left free from any State interference. In dictatorial, intolerant States, loyalty is imposed coercively, although persuasion of a most obtrusive character is very largely used. Here State interference usually tends to embrace very wide fields of thought and even to control the popular mind in its totality.

It may be remarked that coercive opinion-control under intolerant régimes may assume both positive and negative forms. Positive control imposes the views the State holds to be desirable. Negative control prevents the diffusion of undesirable views. Positive control imposes some thought, negative control tries to obtain abstention from some thought. Sometimes the undesirable views constitute genuine knowledge. In these cases negative control means an attempt to promote ignorance.

Another remark. The interest of the State in the views of the citizens must be distinguished from its interest in education. The second is an interest in the acquisition of true or useful ideas. The first is an interest in the absorption of ideas, the assent to which serves the cause of the rulers. But there are possibilities of coincidence. The State may diffuse ideas which serve both aims. It is worth noting that the purely political, intrinsically non-educational thought-diffusion by government most often takes the form of education.

Later on we shall return to the State attitudes just sketched. Meanwhile the following question arises. The State seems to be interested in the contents of the popular views. But how is one to prove a State interest in popular epistemology which is not concerned with the contents of any thought, but deals with the formal problems of the truth or falsehood of thought? The State wants me to hold the thought that A is true. But is it interested in my holding particular views as to the nature of truth? And is there any popular epistemology? Are large popular masses concerned about the problem of truth?

Now the attitude of the spirit towards thoughts held to be absolutely certain differs from the attitude towards thoughts held to be doubtful. Generally our attitude towards our thoughts is influenced by the assumed truth-value attributed to them. These attitudes constitute an epistemology which must be rough and loose in untrained minds. This epistemology is inherent in the lowliest steps of the human mind and deserves to be called the popular epistemology. And this often hardly conscious epistemology may find expression in differences of behaviour which are at times of great importance to the State. Recognition of absolute truth may engender a kind of behaviour different from that bred by the denial of absolute truth. Here lies the practical relevance and the political importance of mass epistemology.

It is, therefore, quite intelligible that political régimes should try or tend to foster or to favour definite epistemological attitudes; that there should be a correspondence between the atmosphere of a political régime and the patent or latent epistemology it is inclined to encourage on the territory under its sway.

Let us try to outline the epistemology favoured by free democracy. Then we shall endeavour to delineate the epistemology of its opponent: dictatorship.

Free democracy is a régime where all kinds of thoughts are allowed to circulate freely. This is what a liberal régime really means. Now it is often suggested that the granting of the liberty both to say and write that A is B, and to say and write that A is not B implies the denial of absolute, objectively valid truth. If contradictory statements are equally admitted, so one may argue, it means that both are equally true and that truth is only relative. Does liberal democracy really imply relativist epistemology which teaches the relativity of truth?

It is very difficult to find out what relative truth really is. One may claim that any truth must be absolute truth because to be true means to be absolutely true. One may even claim that the affirmation that both "A is B" and "A is not B" are true does not depart from the principle of absolute truth because it pretends, for better or worse, undismayed by logical contradiction, that both these statements are absolutely true. The declaration that truth is true only under some special presuppositions and false under others does not imply relativity of truth: it seems only to affirm that truth is absolutely true, given this or that special presupposition. One may suggest that relativity of truth is included in the affirmation that judgments are held to be true by some and to be false by others. But this affirmation only claims the relativity of the recognition of truth, not the relativity of truth itself.

Despite the difficulty of defining relativity of truth, we cannot dispense with the use of this rather ambiguous concept. It could not be doubted that absolute truth is sometimes denied; and this denial may be held to be equivalent to an admission of relativity of truth, whatever that may mean. And although, as we have tried to show, even the affirmation of mutually contradictory statements is not necessarily tantamount to an affirmation of relativity of truth, such a defiance of the Law of Contradiction seems to be at variance with the notion of absolute truth and to suggest relative truth.

Now democratic régimes allow the free adherence to and the free exchange of mutually incompatible, mutually exclusive views. But this does not mean that the State accepts logical contradiction and denies logically self-coherent, non-contradictory, absolute truth. If I allow people to emit and to diffuse the mutually incompatible statements "A is B" and "A is not B," it does not mean that I hold both to be equally true, each in a relative way. To leave the utterance of a statement unimpeded does not mean to take it up as one's own.

Two possibilities are to be discerned. In some cases the State does not know which of the admitted alternative statements is true. Then it leaves the decision to free discussion. The free comparison of the arguments in favour of each of the conflicting propositions is likely to lead to the removal of the uncertainties, to the emergence of absolute truth. "Du choc des opinions jaillit la vérité." The untrammelled consideration of the various opinions is the necessary prerequisite of the discovery of the only truth. The admission of free discussion is not opposed to absolute truth; on the contrary, it serves the cause of absolute truth. In other cases the State knows the truth. It is aware of the absolute truth of the judgment "A is B." Even then it may allow free discussion and leave contradiction unrepressed. It assumes that free discussion will clear up the doubts and dispel the errors. Finally the hitherto unrecognized truth will triumph and win general assent. Moreover, the State may hold public adherence to the false statement "A is not B" to be politically and socially harmless. In no case does the liberal attitude imply the relativist denial of absolutely valid truth.

Yet, on the other hand, it must be recognized that the free admission of logically incompatible statements may spring also from a creed of Relativism. The very fact that a multiplicity of statements is allowed to circulate irrespective of their mutual agreement or disagreement suggests the possibility that the broad-minded government which is responsible for these liberties holds the conflicting statements to be of equal value, a value which is not that of absolute truth.

Now we have to take into account the fact that liberty of opinion in free democratic States is more or less limited in actual practice. There are "reserved subjects" the State takes special care of. The dissemination of some privileged views is enforced by compulsion. The utterance of statements in which the privileged views are exposed to doubt or denial is resented, discouraged, and in some cases prohibited and made impossible. The views in question are usually those in which the external and internal stability of the State is engaged. Patriotism and loyalty to the State are the keynotes of the regions of thought the State chooses to withdraw from the sphere of unfettered liberty. The more liberal the State the less place it leaves to this exceptional intolerance. But a fringe of intolerance exists even in the most liberal States.

When the State is in external danger, the compulsory enforcement of loyalty expands. The field of State-reserved thought grows very considerably; in some cases it may invade something like the whole of the intellectual life of the nation.

These developments have curious consequences. The obedience to some ideas is claimed as an unbreakable duty. It must be absolute.

In so far as this obedience presupposes assent to some propositions, the propositions must be adhered to without any wavering, doubt, or limitation. These State-protected, State-backed propositions are imposed as an absolute truth. But the same phenomena have another aspect too. The State-imposed propositions are to be held true independently of free investigation, independently of being tested by the standards of objective, absolutely valid truth. Such testing is excluded as dangerous to the absolute stability of the State-decreed beliefs. In so far the attitude of the State denies absolute truth in its logical necessity. The epistemology implied in this attitude is quite peculiar and utterly different from the normal and regular epistemological ways of the free democratic State. This epistemology is only an exception in democratic communities, although it is, as we intend to show, the ordinary rule in the modern dictatorial State.

The dictatorial State of our days claims absolute power over the whole of the lives of its subjects, and, first of all, over their minds. The dictatorship is firmly resolved to make any kind of opposition impossible and to guarantee the unlimited durability of its complete mastery over the minds. Accordingly, it must enforce a permanent and general adherence to a State-favoured system of thought. It must tend to subdue the whole horizon of popular thought to the supremacy of the dictatorial interests.

The State-imposed system must extol and glorify the nation and its dictatorial rulers, including the political party from which they sprang. The devotion of the nation to itself must coalesce with the devotion to the dictators, the latter being described as the superior incarnation or quintessence of the nation. In so far extreme respect for the rulers must appear to the mind of the people as the best expression of national self-respect. The State-desired devotion must find itself favoured by views in which the ruling group appears as the possessor of qualities implying perfection. These views deemed favourable by the dictatorship expand into a system of thought which is imposed as an unshakable, unquestionable, absolutely valid truth. But we shall see that dictatorship, at the same time, ascribes to the statements it lays down and to which it commands belief—only the value of a non-absolute, relative truth.

It is forbidden to doubt, to question, to criticize, to investigate, to test the dictatorship-imposed beliefs. The dictatorial ideas must be accepted independently of rational and empirical testing. In democracies the admission of rational and empirical thought-testing is the rule. Even the fitness of the government is subject to such testing under normal conditions. Under dictatorship both the perfection of the government and any other State-favoured object of belief are to be accepted blindly.

This untested dictatorial belief may remind us of traditional religion where we are exhorted to believe independently of Reason and Experience. There is, however, an essential difference. In religion the object of belief is transempirical. In dictatorship it is empirical, at least to a very considerable extent; the dictatorial government and its work are located in the world of common experience, and not among hidden noumena, not in a necessarily veiled intelligible world. And these empirical dictatorial realities are to be believed in unempirically.

This curious unempirical belief in empirical realities bears some analogy to a phenomenon in another field. The German psychologist N. Ach has noticed that sensuous presentational phenomena (images) can be thought of (*i.e.* judged about or remembered) without any sensuous imagery. I can remember a past sense perception without experiencing any images resembling the sense phenomena of the remembered perception. This non-sensuous representation of sense phenomena reminds us of the unempirical belief in empirical realities under dictatorial régimes.

It might be objected that the dictatorships do not exclude experience and do not rely on mere belief without empirical corroboration. We know that the dictatorial régimes indulge in spectacular display, in loud and gaudy advertisement, thus supplying their populations with experience likely to confirm the merits of the government and the veracity of its affirmations. Popular belief is in so far being given an empirical foundation.

But this experience is not a free experience. Only favourable instances are open to inspection and admiration. Their official description is often exaggerated and sometimes delusive. It is made impossible to question or to verify the State-recommended experience. The unfavourable experience is withheld, withdrawn from the public eye. To try to make it known is a punishable offence. These conditions hold for any views the State is determined to impose upon the popular mind; only exceptional, one-sided and strictly controlled experience in favour of these views is admitted. Free observation is excluded.

It could be remarked that the situation is not exceptional. In religion, too, we find corroboration of unempirical beliefs by some empirical evidence: the miracles. The miracles, too, are an experience which has to be accepted uncritically, without the possibility of free examination. There is, however, an unmistakable difference between religious and dictatorial belief: the miracles are empirical manifestations of a transempirical reality, whereas the objects of dictatorial belief could claim no such transempirical character.

What was said about experience is applicable to any other kind of proof, *e.g.* to reasoning. Dictatorships aspire to confirm their

views by all sorts of reasoning. To this end they encourage journalists, publicists, and scientists to be their spokesmen, regarding their offices as existing to support dictatorial views by reasoning. Here, too, reasoning is unfree. Only favourable trains of thought are admitted, and their impartial examination is impeded. Unfavourable reasoning is banned.

Again we find here a resemblance to some religions which admit reasoning within the boundaries of apologetic corroboration, but ban it in so far as it may question or contradict the tenets it is only allowed to confirm. But once more we must keep in mind the difference: religion deals with transempirical objects, while in dictatorship no such transcending of experience is involved.

Dictatorship excludes free reasoning and free experience. But it uses both reasoning and experience in its own work. *E.g.*, it uses them in its diplomacy, sometimes with much subtlety; and in its internal policy, often with much cunning. It favours natural sciences and their technical applications in which it sees a promise of increased economic and military power. And natural science, pure or applied, implies a very vast and intricate interplay of experience and reasoning. All this many-sided practical use of Reason and Experience in dictatorship does not alter the fundamental opposition of dictatorship to Reason and Experience as absolutely valid, universally recognized, and freely accessible sources of truth.

Dictatorship affirms and proclaims the absolute truth of its views. The absolute validity of this dictatorial affirmation is connected with the proclaimed absolute worth of the dictatorial State, with its veracity and trustworthiness. The absolute truth is somehow centred or rooted in the absolute worth of the government.

That truth should be held to flow from an assumed privileged authoritative source is a most widespread phenomenon. After all, we assume the truth of many judgments on the ground of our assuming the trustworthiness of those from whom we learn the said judgments. But, as a rule, the assumed trustworthiness is not the *ultimate* source of the assumed truth. Of course, while relying on information supplied by others, we found our assurance on explicit or implicit judgments about the knowledge, the erudition, the truthfulness, the sincerity of the person from whom the information is drawn. But, after all, we assume the trustworthiness of our teachers only because we hold them to be acquainted with a truth, inaccessible to ourselves, which is valid intrinsically and independently of its being affirmed by any set of persons, however qualified. The *ultimate* source of truth lies in its intrinsic nature, not in its being affirmed by authorities. This is our attitude towards scientific propositions we have to "borrow" without examination from those who are scientific authorities in our eyes. The described connection of assumed truth

and assumed authority is quite different from that found in dictatorship. In the latter case the truth is supposed to flow *ultimately* from the assumed value of the supreme authorities: the dictatorial government. There is no question about an intrinsic truth-value as different from that of the authorities. The absolute truth of the State-protected propositions and the absolute worth of the rulers are merged into an indissoluble whole. The official truths are true because they are pronounced by the absolutely trustworthy government; and the government is trustworthy because the assumption of its trustworthiness is one of the absolutely valid truths.

Under such conditions the dictatorship cannot admit any absolute valid truths whose validity is guaranteed by any other criteria but the proclamation by the dictatorship itself. Therefore dictatorship must ban objective logical validity as a criterion of absolute truth. Objective logical value is a source of truth different from that of the dictatorial truth-proclaiming State. The dictatorship is essentially jealous in matters of public epistemology. It cannot admit objectively valid absolute truth because it claims the absolute truth-value for its own propositions independently of their possessing objective logical validity.

The incompatibility of absolute dictatorial truth with logically valid objective absolute truth has various aspects.

First, dictatorship is afraid of admitting truth-standards extraneous to itself because the admission of such criteria does not strengthen the dictatorial prestige and may even weaken it. The prestige must be all-embracing, monopolistic, exclusive. The admission of non-dictatorial truth-sources would mean a sharing of the supreme intellectual authority of the State and might lead to dangerous movements of the popular mind. Some people might test the dictatorially backed propositions in the light of competing criteria, and the testing might lead to the rejection of the said State-favoured propositions. Logically valid, objectively absolute truth is such a competing and potentially dangerous, virtually subversive criterion, that dictatorship must oppose it.

Secondly, the recognition of objectively valid absolute truth may imply its recognition even in the case of its being discovered and propagated by persons or groups different from or hostile to the dictatorship. But dictatorship scorns the recognition of value in individuals or groups outside itself. It declares itself to be the *only* truth-producing or truth-announcing agency. Besides, hostility to other groups is often a very important and sometimes essential part of the dictatorial thought-systems. To recognize that strangers might be sources of truth is a dangerous heresy in the eyes of the dictatorship. We could mention the most violent Bolshevik opposition to any non-Bolshevik, non-proletarian thought, scientific or artistic.

In Germany we witness the same violence of opposition to diverse products of thought on the ground of their being non-Nazi, non-German, non-Aryan. Now, as we said, the recognition of objectively valid, absolute truth may lead to recognition of truths emanating from strangers: objective validity of truth is held to be independent of the personal identity of those who discover or diffuse it. Here dictatorship finds another motive for its hostility to logically valid, objectively absolute truth.

The absolute dictatorial truth is not the logically valid, objective absolute truth. The two absolute truths are in mutual opposition. Objective absolute truth is opposed to political absolute truth. The assumption of a special political absolute truth as different from objective absolute truth is the most salient feature of the epistemology of dictatorship. We must add the following remark: Political absolute truth is the truth whose claims to be such are based on being issued by the dictatorial political authority. This does not mean that the contents of the political absolute truth must be political. The political authority of dictatorship covers also non-political subjects. Propositions of all kinds may be invested with political absolute truth.

The affirmation of political absolute truth means the denial of objective absolute truth. But the denial of objectively absolute truth is an assumption of the objective relativity of truth. The politically absolute truth of the dictatorship is objectively relative. The objective relativity of the dictatorial truth finds expression in its being grounded on the utterances of the chosen dictatorial leaders. The dictatorial absolute truth is relative to the dictatorship which is its source and criterion.

The dictatorial epistemology teaches both an absolute and a relative character of the same truths. And their absolute character (the political one) is logically rooted in their relative character (the objective one). Only the denial of the severe standards of objective absolute truth opens the way for an untested and unhampered display of political truth-creation. Only if objective absolute truth is discarded, political truth can be absolute in its relative way. Only if the dictatorial truth is objectively relative can it be a politically absolute truth.

We have attempted to give a general and rather abstract outline of the epistemology of dictatorship. This outline finds confirmation in the actually expressed attitudes of modern dictatorships.

The most popular epistemology in the Soviet Union seems to imply the repudiation of objectively valid absolute truth. There is, teach the Soviets, no universal truth common to all mankind. There is a bourgeois truth and a proletarian truth. Proletarian truth is to be imposed as an absolute truth. Bourgeois truth is to be rejected.

The search for an objectively valid, impartial, absolute truth is a bourgeois activity of a dangerous character. The exclusively proletarian, but absolutely valid truth is less an attribute of thought than a characteristic of action, of work. Every variety of activity breeds the corresponding truth. The Socialism-building proletarian work of the Soviet State has its own truth, the compulsory, practically absolute proletarian truth. This absolute truth is relative to Bolshevik dictatorship and to its activity.

Italian Fascism, as expounded by its philosopher Giovanni Gentile, declares itself to be a doctrine which tends and claims to control not only politics, but also the will, the feeling, and the thought of the nation. Having its centre of gravity in politics, Fascism deals with moral, religious, and philosophical problems. It denies value to a thought that is not expressed in action. It identifies thought and action. Furthermore, Gentile declares that religion and morals should be subordinated to and fused in the authority of the State.[1] Truth is thus made subservient to politics, to Fascist politics. Thought must obey action, the action of the Fascist State. This means the rejection of objectively absolute truth in the name of what is true on account of its being demanded by Fascist politics. The truth that is rooted in the active will of the State is relative to that will. It is absolutely valid (as a political truth) despite this essential relativity.

One of the leaders of Hitlerite Germany, Alfred Rosenberg, has sketched a philosophy of Hitlerism. Rosenberg denies science that is independent of race. Science must be determined by the blood. Thought and will must be brought into agreement with the German racial soul, with the Nordic tradition. National honour and national freedom must become the highest value, the beginning and the end of thought. These ideas must rule dictatorially; only on that condition could a nation be preserved and become a State. At the same time, Rosenberg declares the national honour, this supreme arbiter of thought, to be a myth. This myth has the character of a volition which must be our reply to all questions and doubts.[2] These views amount to a denial of absolute truth. The criterion of true thought is a will of a national group, rooted in its blood, in its conception of national honour. And this obviously relative truth is to rule dictatorially as an imposed politically absolute truth.

The attempt to give truth a purely practical character which seems to be a peculiarity of some dictatorial epistemologies reminds us of Pragmatism. An indirect influence of Pragmatism on the epistemological views of some dictatorships is not impossible. But there is a striking difference between the epistemologies of Prag-

[1] Giovanni Gentile, *Origine e dottrina del Fascismo*, pp. 35–52, Roma, 1929.

[2] Alfred Rosenberg, *Der Mythus des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*, pp. 22, 117, 139, 236–237, 486–493.

matism and of dictatorship. Pragmatism holds truth to be relative to practice, but does not hold it to be absolute at the same time. Pragmatism does not assume, like dictatorship, the absolute value of the relative truth. Besides, Pragmatism assumes different kinds of practice, different practical interests to which different kinds of pragmatically valid relative truths may correspond. Dictatorship knows nothing of peaceful and tolerant ways. It is essentially intolerant. Its truth is relative to one privileged kind of action, to one supreme practical interest.

One may argue that the dictatorial way of recognizing a statement not to be objectively true and of claiming its absolute value at the same time is a self-contradictory way of thinking. The denial of objectively absolute truth of a proposition and the affirmation of its absolute truth under the aegis of dictatorial politics seem to contradict each other. Now some psychologists (especially M. Lévy-Bruhl) describe primitive man as illogical and prone to contradiction. Primitive man is supposed to assume the same thing to be at the same time at different places. He is supposed to assume that a name is at the same time both identical with and different from the thing named; that a dream image of a person of which we dream is both identical with and different from that person. And one might be tempted to affirm that the attitude of dictatorship which deliberately enthrones contradiction as a foundation of publicly recognized truth is a relapse into the ancient attitude of accepted contradiction.

It is difficult to say whether the dictatorial attitude in epistemology is really contradictory. The denial of absolute truth and its affirmation at the same time is a self-contradictory attitude if the truth affirmed and the truth denied is the same truth. We might, however, assume that politically absolute truth is quite different from objectively absolute truth. In this case there is no logical contradiction in affirming the first and denying the second. At any rate, there is no proof of illogicality being limited to our remote ancestors or savage contemporaries. Indulgence in some contradiction is an attitude or a weakness that seems to haunt us even to-day. While perceiving physical things we both identify our sense percepts with the physical object and distinguish them from it. This is only one instance of our unmitigated logical carelessness. If dictatorial epistemology *is* self-contradictory, it might be a new expression of our perennial inconsistency.

While discussing the epistemological views in liberal democracy we have noticed that the liberal State admits objectively absolute truth as an ideal freely to be pursued, but takes up a different attitude in exceptional cases in which the search for objective absolute truth is hampered or made impossible, while a relative

State-proclaimed truth is given a coercive politically absolute value. We have seen that this situation, exceptional in freely governed communities, is the universal law under modern dictatorship.

The situations in which liberal democracy recurs to this backsliding on its fundamental and usual principles are the situations of alarm and danger, sedition and war. War is the most characteristic occasion, and the last world war was a stupendous example of war-induced deliberalization of liberal democracy. The epistemology involved in such cases is the epistemology of war. In dictatorship the "war-mentality" which is only a tragic and heroic exception in liberal communities invades the very foundations of social life and becomes its natural horizon; dictatorships tend to be militarist. And they quite naturally develop the "epistemology of war" and adopt it as a normal and usual attitude.

Objective absolute truth is denied by mighty leaders and by the vast human masses they conduct. Of course, as pointed out above, objective truth is presupposed even under dictatorship in various branches of practical activity, and especially in applied science. But in deeper, less immediately practical, less technical matters objective absolute truth is discarded. New peoples may add themselves to the formidable multitudes that already embrace the dictatorial creeds and their epistemology. And even the universal adoption of dictatorship with its peculiar epistemology does not seem to be impossible.

But the value of objectively absolute truth is intrinsically inviolable (*e pur si muove*). This truth would retain its unimpaired validity even if there was no human mind to long for it and to recognize it. And the capacity for seeking objective truth and appreciating it after its discovery is an essential and necessary characteristic of the human mind. Human responsiveness to intrinsic values is a necessary counterpart of the validity of these values. And Man is necessarily responsive to logically valid truth, although he is also liable to error and, as we saw, inclined to inconsistency. If the epistemology of dictatorship succeeds in obscuring and oppressing the effectual exercise of this truth-seeking disposition, it will remain a potential and latently lasting possibility. And earlier or later the dormant possibility will blossom into actual fact. The attempt to change human nature by means of coercive decrees must fail even if the decrees are welcomed with continent-wide cheers and applauded by ardent millions. The unchanging intrinsical worth of the valid values will attract chosen heroic pioneers and, perhaps, martyrs of a new freedom that must follow the new wilfully servile age, darker than the Dark Ages of the past. Meanwhile we have to face the possible approach of an era in which human thought might endure the overwhelming pressure of the epistemology of dictatorship.

GREAT THINKERS

(II) PLATO

Professor G. C. FIELD

It is really impossible to say anything worth saying about Plato in general within the limits of a single article. Indeed, the more one studies Plato the more impossible does it become—if the concept of degrees of impossibility may be used in a philosophical journal. The reasons for this are manifold. The first lies in the supreme greatness of Plato as a thinker. Hardly anyone who has made a serious effort to study Plato has escaped receiving the impression of him as probably the greatest thinker of all ages. The difficulty is intensified by the particular form in which his greatness is conveyed to us. One may make a distinction, a relative distinction at least, between different philosophers in this respect. With some, their message is conveyed to us with comparative rapidity, even perhaps on the first careful reading, and subsequent study adds little except in the way of detail. Among these it would perhaps not be unfair to place Hume. Others, on first reading, will appear obscure and difficult, sometimes even repellent. It is only after a much more careful study that their real greatness emerges, and they may go on increasing in stature at every subsequent reading. Such, I believe, to be the experience of the majority of readers with Kant. Plato is almost unique in that he makes his impression in both ways. Almost everyone is captivated by him at first reading, but it is only to those who take the trouble of reading him again and again with the intellectual effort that he himself would have demanded that his full store of riches is revealed, if, indeed, it is ever completely revealed to any one person.

To bring out the true width of range of his thought, we may suggest another distinction between the methods of different philosophers. There are some whose main contribution to thought consists in a few comparatively simple ideas. They take these as the basis of their system and apply them to all the particular problems with which they deal. Once one has grasped these fundamental ideas, it is relatively easy to see how the rest of their doctrine follows. With others, and these the greatest, we find a continually fresh approach from different aspects of experience and a continual readjustment of their theories to these. It is easy to see that this type of philosopher can be discussed from almost every angle of our experience, and that

we cannot really do justice to them until we have done this. Plato is emphatically of this latter type. He was a systematic thinker in so far as he was always striving to make his beliefs coherent with each other. But he continually considers them anew in connection with different particular problems, and to each of these particular problems he has a fresh contribution, from which we can always learn much, independently of his general theory. Thus, for instance, when he discusses the status of sense-perception in the *Theaetetus* or the psychology of pleasure in the *Philebus*, we can, it is true, see the connection of his results with his other theories. But we can learn a great deal from what he has to say on these particular problems, whether we accept his other theories or not. It follows from this that any attempt to summarize Plato within a short compass would inevitably do him a serious injustice.

We are not yet at the end of our difficulties. A further difficulty arises from the character of his writings. As everyone knows, he has left us no systematic treatise in which his doctrines are set out in the manner to which we are accustomed with most philosophers. Instead we have a series of dialogues, or dramatic conversations, dealing with a variety of particular subjects, in most of which Socrates is the principal speaker, and in none of which Plato himself appears at all. The significance of this fact has been very variously estimated. We need not linger here over the well-known Socratic controversy. It is still maintained by a minority of scholars that in most of the dialogues the views put forward are those of Socrates, and not necessarily those of Plato at all. The majority of scholars have not found this convincing. But in any case, pragmatically speaking, Plato and the Platonic dialogues are identical. The only Platonic philosophy to which we have access is the philosophy of the dialogues, and it is that philosophy which has been an influence and an inspiration for subsequent generations of thinkers.

But even allowing for this, to extract a philosophy from the Platonic dialogues is not always so easy. When we examine them we find that they take the form of a series of occasional essays, each in a special setting of its own, and each dealing with its own particular problem. The general points of view from which these problems are approached are very often implied rather than stated, and when stated, very rarely argued at length. I have elsewhere[1] compared the task of extracting a philosophy from the dialogues with the task of tracing the course of a submarine mountain chain by the peaks which appear here and there above the surface. And I still think that this metaphor is accurate, so far as any metaphor can be.

The result of all this is that there must necessarily remain a good deal of room for difference of opinion in the interpretation of Plato.

[1] See *Plato and His Contemporaries*, p. 58.

Still more, of course, is there room for selection of the particular aspects of his many-sided thought which appeal most to each reader. But even the differences and the difficulties of interpretation are themselves instructive and can afford a stimulus to our own thought. It is a tribute to the impression that Plato makes that so many different schools of thought have sought to find something in his writings which would support their own doctrines. They have often succeeded, though in some cases, it must be confessed, not without a good deal of manipulation of the evidence. But just as most doctrines of importance have had some truth on which they base themselves, so those who claim the support of Plato have generally found some element in the richness of his thought which has stimulated them in the direction in which they have gone. Yet it would not be paradoxical to say that Plato has often exercised his greatest influence on those who have misunderstood him. Certainly the schools which succeeded him and which bore his name represented only fragmentary parts of his real teaching. If we feel that we appreciate his thought more to-day than ever before, it is because we have learnt from the mistakes of our predecessors.

The conclusion is that, in an article such as this, it is only possible to indicate some of the chief lessons that the writer personally carries away from the study of Plato, with a warning that this is only a selection from a much larger whole, and that another individual might very likely make an entirely different selection.

I. Perhaps the first impression that we take away with us from the reading of Plato is of his faith in reason. This statement is open to possible misunderstanding, and it would be as well to say a word of what it does not mean before going on to consider what it does. It does not mean that Plato believed it was possible to find out all about everything by sitting in his study and thinking out a theory, without any reference to practical experience or to the observation of observable facts. This point of view has often been ascribed to philosophers, probably untruly in most cases, and certainly without a shadow of foundation in the case of Plato. He was perfectly well aware of the importance of experience and observation in their proper place. But he insisted that it was only by hard and systematic thinking that we could learn how to use them rightly. I have argued this point at greater length elsewhere in this Journal,[1] and I need not repeat the argument here. Nor does it mean that Plato had any exaggerated belief in the reasonableness of human beings. This belief, too, has often been supposed, with very little foundation, to be characteristic of philosophers, but it is certainly the last charge that one could make against Plato. It is clear that he thought that there would never be more than a small minority of human

[1] In an article "Plato and Natural Science," *Philosophy*, Vol. VIII, No. 30.

beings who were capable of reaching complete rationality, and only for them would it be possible after a long and strenuous course of training.

It does mean that he thought that hard thinking was the only way to arrive at truth, and that to arrive at truth was the most important thing for any human being. There was for him no alternative method, no short cut, to this goal. He was not, as has sometimes been supposed, a religious mystic, if by mystic we imply one who claimed to arrive at the highest knowledge by some special and direct kind of experience, different in kind from the experience of ordinary thinking. Still less would he ever have thought that any kind of truth could be revealed by the aesthetic experience, the "fine frenzy," of the poet. Many literary men who have not been over-fond of hard thinking themselves have tried to claim the support of Plato for some such point of view as this. Their knowledge of Plato rarely seems to extend beyond a few brief selections of special literary interest, culled from two or three dialogues. In Plato's own writings there is no vestige of support for this view. If we are to believe that he meant what he said, he would have repudiated it with scorn and indignation.

His belief in reason is one of the foundations of his general view of the nature of reality. He took over from Parmenides the fundamental principle that what is fully real must be intelligible and what is fully intelligible must be real, and he applied this unflinchingly throughout. This is a principle which has often made its appearance in the subsequent history of philosophy. It appears, for instance, in Descartes, in his statement that the clearness and distinctness of ideas was the test of their truth. How Plato developed it we shall see more in detail later. But we may observe here that he was saved from the danger of a too rigid application of this principle by his recognition of a realm of half-reality "rolling about between being and not-being," in his lively phrase. This is the fleeting and obscure world of material physical objects, which will always contain an element inaccessible to pure reason. But even this world we can only understand and deal with in so far as it approximates to the world of scientific and rational thought.

He applies this general point of view especially to the guidance of our own conduct, both in our private lives and in our social and political activities. He was born in an age in which critical examination of accepted standards of conduct was widespread. And the first results of this, as was natural, had been mainly destructive, so that many things which had before been taken for granted without criticism were now being doubted, and there seemed nothing certain left. There were many men in Plato's youth who were saying, as timid minds have said in all ages, that all this criticism was dangerous

and unsettling, and that men ought to go back to the unthinking acceptance of the old standards. It was probably from his master, Socrates, more than from anyone else, that Plato learnt the lesson that the only way to meet the dangers of critical thought was by further and deeper thought. There was nothing to be gained by an attempt to stifle the reasoning powers and to refuse to face the new ideas. His whole treatment of moral and political questions is based on a plea for the application of hard and systematic thinking to the problems of conduct and on faith in the possibilities of this. The advocates of "national planning" in our own day might well return to Plato for their inspiration. But he would have extended his planning very much beyond anything that is proposed by them.

II. There is another characteristic of Plato which is to be found in the thought of nearly everyone who has attained supreme eminence as a thinker. That is the combination of a keen interest in the results of the scientific thought of the time with an equally keen interest in the problems of conduct, and a conviction that our interpretations of both these aspects of human experience must somehow be connected with each other. The special form in which this was developed by Plato was in his famous Theory of Ideas, or, as it is sometimes and more correctly called, his Theory of Forms.

As far as one can judge, he came to this theory by working from two directions simultaneously. On the one hand, he realized that all our moral thinking implies the notion of an ideal of character or conduct to which our individual actions and our individual lives might approach nearer and nearer, but which it was impossible that we could ever completely realize. At the same time, we could not think of this ideal as merely something which we made up for ourselves, for the whole of our moral judgments imply that we are not free to make up our ideals of conduct according to our individual caprice, but that there is a right and a wrong in them; that is to say, they are something there to be discovered. In other words, they have reality, and for Plato the most complete reality possible.

Plato's investigation of the science of his time led him in the same direction. The most fully developed science in ancient Greece was, of course, mathematics, and it was to this that Plato turned for the type of true scientific knowledge. He found that in mathematical thinking also we are dealing with entities which are not completely found in the material world of sense-perception, but which are none the less real objects of knowledge. The most obvious and familiar instance of this can be found in geometrical figures. We know that we cannot draw an absolutely straight line or an absolute circle. We can, of course, make our lines thinner and thinner or straighter and straighter, but we can never reach the

line as geometrically defined. In the same way, in other branches of science, we deal with absolutely rigid bodies or absolutely pure fluids, though no such things are known in what we usually call the real world. Yet we certainly do not invent them. They are there to be found out about.

It is easy to see that we can come to think of the relation between the mathematical object and the approximation to it which we find in the material world as analogous to the relation between the moral ideal and our approximation to it in our own conduct. It was the discovery of this analogy which was the most characteristic feature in Plato's theory. These real ideals, whether found in the objects of mathematical science or in the realm of moral judgment, are called by Plato by a name which is most closely represented in English by our word "form." That is why we speak of the theory as the theory of forms.

This theory received many interesting and some extremely obscure developments at Plato's hands, and a number of points in its interpretation are still matters of dispute. But its main lines are pretty clear and were never departed from by Plato. On the one hand, we have the world of Forms, which Plato calls the world of Being (as we should say, the real world) or the intelligible world. This is the object of scientific knowledge; that is to say, our judgments about it are definite and unequivocal and, if true at all, are absolutely true. It is also permanent, in the sense that it is unaffected by the passage of time; for instance, a fact in pure mathematics is a fact always and everywhere and in all circumstances. And it exists independently of our knowledge of it, as something there to be discovered. On the other hand, we have what he calls the world of Becoming, that is to say, the continually changing world of physical nature, which he also calls the object of opinion or belief. None of our judgments about this world are absolutely and unequivocally true: they have only a limited pragmatic validity. They are approximately true, or true in certain senses, or true enough for practical purposes. But there is only this degree of truth and reality about them because and in so far as their objects approximate to the world of Being. Plato expresses this relationship, which we have here described as "approximation," by various phrases, such as "sharing" or "participating," or in other contexts "imitation."

The possible applications of this theory are numerous. It gives a special turn to the problem of the relation between the universal and the particular, which has interested so many generations of philosophers. For Plato the universal is never something which is completely in the particulars, but always an ideal towards which the particulars approximate, or in which they participate to a greater or lesser degree, without ever quite reaching. We can see, if we try it,

how fruitful this idea can be in our handling of the facts of the sensible world. When, for instance, we are looking for a definition of a class of objects, we shall often go astray if we try to look for a single quality which is fully present in all these objects and nowhere else. We shall find it much more helpful to look for a kind of ideal Form to which the particular objects approximate more or less nearly. Aristotle's philosophy, which was based on the belief that the universal existed in the particulars, broke down when the belief in the absolute fixity of natural species and their sharp distinction from each other had to be abandoned. Plato's theory would have been perfectly capable of dealing with this fact.

Again we may see how this theory was able to set modern scientific investigation on certain lines which it has followed since. For Plato, we can only deal with the physical world at all in so far as we can discover in it approximations to the nature of the intelligible world. And the special form which he gave to the notion was the demand for the expression of the results of our investigations in mathematical terms and the consequent insistence on the necessity of measurement as precise as possible. This is certainly an idea which has played a great part in the progress of science. We must not, of course, fall into the error of talking as if Plato had in any way anticipated modern developments of scientific and mathematical theory, but we may claim that his theory, or something very like it, could have come to terms with these later developments to a degree which would have been impossible for any other early philosophy. It is noteworthy how a thinker like Professor Whitehead, when he attempts to base a philosophical system on the results of modern physics and mathematics, produces, as he fully recognizes, something which is much closer to the system of Plato than to that of any other philosopher.

One of the most interesting special applications of this general theory is to our thought about human conduct, particularly political and social activity. We get the most complete expression of this in the *Republic*. There Plato insists that the first duty of a real statesman is to have a clear and definite conception of the ideal state at which he is aiming. Only so can we have any standard by which we can judge of actual or proposed measures and by which we can guide our practical efforts. But he is perfectly clear that this ideal state is not something which can be applied ready-made to actual conditions. Indeed, it is the essence of his doctrine that the ideal state is never absolutely and completely attained, any more than, to use his own comparison, a picture can be entirely identical with the original. Just as an artist who wishes to produce as good a likeness as possible works with his eye always on his original, so the statesman must always keep his eye on the ideal in order to attain

as nearly to it as the circumstances and material in which he works allow.

III. The third point on which something must be said is on the religious beliefs and attitude of Plato. And here perhaps more than anywhere it is necessary to beware of the temptation of trying to force Plato's thought into modern moulds.

Plato undoubtedly was a man of profound religious faith, but we must not necessarily assume that this faith took the forms with which we are familiar in Christianity. He believed that the existence of God could be rationally proved, and there are plenty of indications in the dialogues of the lines on which he thought this proof must proceed. The proof is based on the general nature of the material physical world. We have seen that he regarded this physical world as only an imperfect approximation to the real world of the Forms. But a further point of great importance is that even the relation to the real world that it has at any one moment is never permanent. In other words, the material universe is continually changing, both in its qualities and in its spatial relations. Now this fundamental fact of change and motion cannot be explained by relation to the Forms. The Forms are the principles of permanence and stability. Nor is there anything in the nature of matter itself which can set it in motion, or account for the fact that a particular material object at a particular time participated in a particular Form. In our own experience we find that it is only animate bodies which have the power of moving themselves, and we therefore come to the conclusion that soul must be working throughout the physical universe to account for the fact of change and motion. Further, this motion and change (especially when seen on a large scale, as in the motions of the heavenly bodies) are found to be orderly, regular, and subject to law. And this is a proof that it is not merely soul, but rational soul, or mind, which is working throughout it. And this rational soul or mind which works throughout the physical universe is what Plato calls God.

Now the activity typical of a rational soul or mind is activity with a purpose directed to some end. We must therefore consider the activity of the soul which is working throughout the universe as animated by a purpose. If we ask what that purpose is, the only reply possible is that it is to bring everything to the utmost perfection of which it is capable. We must add also that in accordance with the most probable interpretation of Plato's statements, the standard of goodness or perfection is to be found in the eternal Forms. These exist in their own right and are not themselves in any sense created by mind, even the Universal mind. They are rather the objects of mind's knowledge and provide an independently existing standard which mind discovers and towards which it directs its endeavours.

The idea that the Forms themselves are the "thoughts of God" is a product of later speculation, and according to the best modern scholarship is not Platonic.

Be that as it may, it is clear that for Plato all the processes of the physical universe are in some sense an expression of God's purpose, that is to say, they are controlled and directed by a mind or spiritual principle working through them. The lesson for us is that we have for our own sakes to co-operate with, or conform ourselves to, the working of this purpose. For Plato, as I should interpret him, there are two fundamental elements in the religious attitude proper to man. There is firstly the sense of our own insignificance and of the unimportance of our own private and personal desires as compared with the purpose of the whole; and secondly there is the sense that by the conduct of our own lives we are taking part in a great enterprise in which the soul throughout the whole universe is engaged.

We get the impression in certain passages that Plato believed that this attitude was to a certain degree fostered and expressed by various religious ceremonies. It is clear, however, that he did not think the particular form which these observances took mattered very greatly. Indeed, as far as we can judge from his writings, the whole matter of forms and ceremonies took a very secondary place in his mind. The primary and fundamental expression of this religious attitude was for him to be found in right conduct, the pursuit of virtue and the avoidance of vice in our daily lives. And this found its highest form in the activity of the true statesman. The highest good of which man is capable is to co-operate in the realization of the ideal community. This is, for him, the supreme expression of religion, and he nowhere assigns to religion any great importance apart from its expression in conduct. We may say that in general for him religion is not a form of activity distinct from morality, but a spirit in which morality is pursued.

It must be admitted that this interpretation of Plato's religious views would not meet with universal acceptance. There are certainly individual dialogues in which he appears to be taking a rather more other-worldly view. Yet, be it noted, when he does speak, in terms which suggest the language of religious mysticism, of a possible experience which has an independent value beyond that of practical morality, such language is used not of a specifically religious experience, but of philosophical and scientific understanding of the Forms. There is little or nothing in his writings about the personal relation of man to God which is such an important element in Christian religious experience. Such, at any rate, is the impression left if we read his writings as a whole, without letting our judgment be too much influenced by modern preconceptions.

These then are some of the impressions which are left most strongly on the mind of one reader at least by a study of Plato's dialogues. But, of course, they are only a small selection from a much larger whole. And no brief summary can do justice to the wealth of stimulating suggestions on almost every philosophical problem that anyone can derive from a reading of the dialogues. We may conclude with yet a further suggestion about the necessary incompleteness of our understanding of Plato.

It has been suggested above that Plato for us necessarily means, before all else, the author of the Platonic dialogues. Though we are well enough informed about the main events in Plato's life, and have a few precious indications of his personality from his letters, yet it remains true that as compared, for instance, with our knowledge of any modern philosopher, we know very little indeed about Plato apart from his writings. We know enough, however, to realize that for Plato himself and for his own contemporaries the writings would have seemed a comparatively minor part of his services to the world. He tells us more than once in his letters that the most important part of any man's teaching is what cannot be expressed in any single treatise or collection of treatises.

If Plato himself had been asked what part of his activities he regarded most seriously, he would, there is very little doubt, have named the establishment of the Academy, the school or college which he founded when he was about forty and presided over for the remaining forty years of his life. From the longest and most important of his letters we learn that his early interests and ambitions were primarily political, and though as time went on he found that there was no place for a man such as he was in the practical politics of his time, yet he always maintained the belief that some contribution to the welfare of society was the highest duty of any man. It is clear that his primary purpose in founding the Academy was to provide a training which might eventually produce a number of men of the type that he felt was really needed for the government of the state. As far as one can judge, there was no previous institution of exactly this type, and Plato may fairly claim to be the originator of the whole idea of the organized educational foundation.

How much actual practical effect Plato's work had on the political life of his time is very difficult to estimate. But one may say with confidence that the popular idea of him as a mere theorist, whose ideas had no actual or possible effect on practical politics, is founded on nothing but ignorance. We have excellent evidence that in many states in Greece Plato's pupils were recognized as expert advisers in questions of legislation. Plato's own intervention in the political affairs of Syracuse, the story of which has been told too often to need repetition here, was doubtless not very successful. But the

suggestion which is often made, that this was only one more example of the inability of the theoretical philosopher to apply his ideas with any effect in practice, is quite baseless. Plato himself, as is evident from his letters, never expected that very much good could come of it. The fact was that the practical men had got the situation in Syracuse into such a hopeless position that there was really no way out, and Plato's failure was no more conspicuous than that of anyone else who intervened in the affairs of that unfortunate city. But there is every evidence that in the object which he really did set before himself, namely that of educating the kind of man who might, when the opportunity arose, do really valuable service, Plato attained a considerable degree of success.[1]

At any rate, this may serve as a reminder that so far as our knowledge is restricted to Plato's writings, we only know half of Plato. It is interesting to wonder whether his stature would be increased or diminished in our eyes if his personality had been presented to us as vividly as, for instance, he himself has presented the personality of Socrates. Doubtless we might find in him, as in every human being, certain small weaknesses which would not show themselves in his writings. In one of his letters, for instance, there are traces of a not unamiable fussiness about small details. But this, as we can see from many modern examples, is quite compatible with the greatest intellectual attainments and moral elevation, though some scholars have been so shocked by the suggestion that a great philosopher could have any human weakness at all, that they have declared the letter must be a forgery. As far, however, as we can judge, the feeling he aroused in those with whom he came most closely into contact was one of almost religious veneration. At any rate, there is nothing in anything we know about him which need in any way detract from the profound impression that his writings make on all those who study them seriously. Indeed, they gain in their effect when we realize that they were written by a human being and not by a mere personification of philosophical and literary virtues.

[1] I have discussed this more fully in *Plato and His Contemporaries*, chapters ii and iii.

CHANGE[1]

G. R. G. MURE, M.A.

I

§ 1. Of all the subjects which for well over two thousand years have remained the more or less constant topics of philosophical discussion, I can think of none which has not at some time by some philosopher been dismissed as a nonentity or an illusion. The history of philosophy seems to show that we cannot begin fairly to estimate the nature of any element in the universe until we have steadily contemplated a universe from which that element has been hypothetically eliminated.

§ 2. The theory that change is an illusion came very early in the history of Western thought—almost as soon as change ceased to be an unquestioned assumption and men began to wonder what it was. Parmenides' defiance of the senses, and his conception of the universe as a solid plenum without variety or change, were the main stimulus provoking classical Greek philosophy. Some consideration of them ought, I think, to preface any discussion of change, for the Greeks discovered most of the difficulties of the subject.

§ 3. Parmenides reached his paradox by pressing to its logical conclusion the general principle of his predecessors' thought. The monists of Miletus had each posited a single permanent substance as constituting the essential nature of the universe. It is commonly called a material substance—Thales, of course, said that it was water, Anaximenes that it was air—and they are commonly called materialists, but one must remember that within their substance, or in respect of their substance, there was for them no distinction of matter from form or from spirit. They were not materialists or atheists such as to rouse the indignation of a Berkeley; they were even ready on occasion to give their substance the name of "God." Perhaps "corporealists" would be a better name for them. The point here is simply that they regarded this substance as eternally underlying and explaining all the qualitative differences which display themselves to sense-perception at any moment, and from moment to moment unfold themselves in endless fresh diversity. They set out to explain the world in terms of what they thought

[1] The substance of two inter-collegiate lectures delivered at Oxford in January 1934.

it was made of, assuming that such an explanation would be final; the process of the world's making, its transition from permanent substance to unceasing sensible diversification, they merely took for granted.

§ 4. Heraclitus, however, the last of the monists, was not quite so innocent. The ever-changing face of nature excited his imagination as it had failed to excite that of his predecessors. He took fire for his substance, but he put forward a relativist theory of diversity and change which is not really at all consistent with the notion of an eternal underlying substance. Almost one might say that in the hands of Heraclitus the underlying substance which had been posited to explain change became change itself. He remarked that one can never step twice into the same rivers, but he might have said even more plausibly that the flames which leap and fall continually, as they consume fuel and pass into smoke, have no bond of sameness in them to make them one.

§ 5. After this the retort of Parmenides was inevitable. If, he said in effect, what is fundamentally real is single and eternally the same with itself, then (*a*) it cannot be a unity of variously characterized elements, nor be in itself in any other way variously characterized; and (*b*) it cannot *become* diversified. For (*a*) we can only think what *is*; what *is not* is unreal and therefore unthinkable. If, then, x differs from y, we have to say that x is not y. But to predicate not-y of x is to predicate not-being of x, which amounts to saying that x is unreal, is not itself; for if x is real it is *ex hypothesi* eternally itself. Hence the one real substance cannot be one as a unity of different elements each of which is none of the others; for it would then be a unity of unrealities. And it cannot be a unity of various characters; for to affirm any one character of it would be so far to deny its other characters of it, i.e. to predicate not-being of it.

In respect of (*b*) the argument is essentially the same. If the diversified world of sense is what the one substance comes to be, then the one substance comes to be other than itself. But that is again to predicate not-being, unreality, of what is *ex hypothesi* absolutely real. Parmenides actually puts this by arguing that whatever comes to be must come to be either out of what *is not* or out of what *is*. But it cannot come to be out of what *is not*; that is patently absurd. And out of what *is* it cannot *come* to be; for there is nothing but what *is*.

§ 6. Now the theory of the negative judgment on which these arguments are based will seem obviously untenable to us all, but it paralysed philosophy for nearly a century. Efforts were made to meet the charge of deriving change *ex nihilo* by multiplying the primary substance, or by positing a mass of corporeal atoms differing

only in size and shape; but they failed to overcome the fundamental objection against the very nature of diversity. Finally Plato in the *Sophist* showed that sameness and difference, so far from being incompatible, are only intelligible if taken together. He pointed out that the not-being which is predicated in any significant negative judgment is not unreality, but just that character of otherness which belongs as fundamentally as does sameness to anything in the universe, and indeed to the universe itself. As the Latin phrase *aliud aliud* aptly expresses, everything is just as much *not* anything else as it is itself: it is other just as much as it is self-identical.

§ 7. This immensely important advance in the analysis of negation does not, however, constitute any refutation of Parmenides as a critic of the eternal substance theory. Parmenides' logic is the logic proper to that theory, the only logic by which it can claim to be judged. If you maintain that the real essential nature of the universe is an eternal homogeneous stuff out of which it is made, then you will in the end be forced to admit that your stuff not only cannot contain diversity but also cannot transform itself into diversity. For your substance is fully real *as such*. It only *is*, and is self-identical: it cannot also be other. Plato's solution, on the other hand, makes the real as fundamentally other as it is self-identical. It implies that so far as the universe is a corporeal whole, change is no more secondary and derivative than is rest. Where they appear, the two characters are co-ordinate and inseparable: whatever changes rests from change—or at least, as is the case with the eternally revolving heavens, has in it a correlative stability—and whatever rests is *eo ipso* liable to change. The eternal substance theory in its present shape collapses, and the problem must assume a fresh form.

§ 8. This fresh form we shall shortly have to consider. In the meantime there is one last point to be emphasized in connexion with Parmenides. He held the universe to be one solid, motionless, corporeal plenum. But if we examine his view as a positive theory and not as a mere piece of criticism, it becomes clear that he has no right to assert even so much as this. For example, rest, or immobility, and corporeality are two diverse characters, and they are, moreover, general characters of sensible objects. How, then, can they be attributed to a real One, which, whatever it is, is at any rate not the object of our illusory sense-perception? Parmenides leaves us in no doubt that the One *is* corporeal, and he argues that it does not move because a necessary condition of motion would be void, and void would be not-being. But to call the One either corporeal or motionless is on Parmenidean premisses quite unjustifiable. Indeed, it cannot on his principles be the bearer of diverse characters at all, sensible or otherwise. If you push the One to its logical

conclusion, it must turn out to be a mere "thing-in-itself"; in fact, just nothing at all.

§ 9. We can now perhaps conveniently sum up what we seem so far to have learnt about change. Three closely connected conclusions emerge:—

(1) The problem of unity and diversity is one problem, whether it arises as the question how one substance can be the bearer of various qualities, or whether it comes before us as the problem of change, *i.e.* as the problem how a thing can *become* diversified and yet retain self-identity. That this is a single problem is what the multipliers of the primary substance, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and also the atomists, failed to see, but Parmenides makes it quite clear.

(2) It is one and the same in principle to attempt to explain what anything really is by analysing it in terms of an ultimate simple constituent or constituents, and to attempt to explain it by tracing it back to its temporal origin in something simple out of which it has come to be—or, if you like, which has come to be it. And in either case the effort is bound to fail: the simple constituent or the simple original source will inevitably turn out to be not a fundamental reality but simply nothing at all.

(3) Rest and change are characters which are inseparable in whatever they characterize. You cannot, therefore, derive change from rest: you cannot explain it in terms of that which is static. What has, in fact, to be explained is a world of alternating and correlated rest and change. Change implies a permanent which changes, but the permanent persists in and through the change; it does not underly it as the reality of which change is the secondary and perhaps illusory manifestation. This is so wherever there is change. If we praise the constancy of a lover or the enduring quality of a great idea, we do not thereby mean to extol a rigid fixity rejecting and refusing change. A passion or an idea which cannot renew itself does not constantly endure: it suffers the change of death. When we use such language we are taking the half to express the whole: by constancy we mean consistency, by endurance a continuance of fruitful vitality. And I think we can make no exception in favour of a material universe. Unless we steadily maintain this reciprocal implication of change and rest, we must either with Parmenides posit an ultimately static reality which will on closer inspection turn out to be nothing at all, or else we must deny the permanent altogether, as Heraclitus came near to doing, and put our faith in an absolute flux within which there is no tie of sameness to hold together its fugitive phases.

§ 10. Now we might suppose ourselves to possess in these results a satisfactory solution of the problem. The universe, we might be

tempted to say, is unity in and through diversity. And this unity in diversity in its essence is not the mere unity of a substance in a fixed diversity of qualities. So to view it would be to take it in abstraction from its own full nature. It is, in fact, both the outcome and the source of change in which it is throughout immanent. It *is* in its essence concrete change. In concrete change, we might go on to say, there is not mere flux or transiency, masking a purely static real from which it emanates in some mysterious and probably illusory fashion; nor in the world as concrete change are there static and transient elements co-ordinate and juxtaposed—a relation, incidentally, which I do not know how to express intelligibly at all. Rather, as Mr. Collingwood would put it, the two concepts overlap: what would by itself be merely static, and what would by itself be mere flux or successiveness, are fused in one nature, and that one nature is the essential nature of the universe.

§ 11. All this we might be encouraged to say, but should we have explained what change is? I think not. For if the universe were concrete change in the sense which I have tried to give the words, flux and permanence would be so fused in every phase of that change that there could remain no difference of phase from phase. The whole universe would, on this hypothesis, enter as a self-identical whole into each and every phase of itself. Perhaps in the end we shall find that in some sense it does, but on our present hypothesis it would so enter that its self-sameness would be total and consummate in each phase. It would contain no principle of differentiation in itself, and its phases would collapse helplessly into one phase, which would not be a *phase* but a changeless state—if, indeed, it would be anything at all. And the same would hold good of a limited subject of change, if it were possible on this hypothesis to distinguish any limited subject of change.

It seems, then, that we must cast back. We cannot maintain the complete fusion of permanence and flux in every phase of change.

§ 12. It might now be suggested that within each phase of any change there is partial fusion or overlap, but that the subject of change is complete only in all its phases taken together.

Here we must be careful. I think the first part of this suggestion is true, and perhaps also the second; but I do not think that the second part follows directly from the assumption of the first. It doubtless would follow if we could say that each phase contributed a part, and that the whole, the subject of the change, is gradually constructed of such mutually complementary parts. But that is impossible. It would mean that there was no whole until the last phase was reached. It would mean that there was neither any limited subject of change nor any universe until change was over, and that is scarcely what experience suggests. What our experience

of change does suggest is something different, and I confess that it is a paradox. It suggests that the subject of change does somehow fail to manifest its full nature in any given phase, and does require all its phases for its complete self-expression, but that it yet does enter into each and every phase as a whole. The phases are in some sense conplementary, but they are not complementary parts; for each of them is a phase which the subject assumes *instead of* the previous phase, so that in every stage of change the subject is present as a whole, and yet in every stage it appears to have suffered a gain or a loss in completeness.

§ 13. This view of change, according to which the phases are in a sense complementary and yet in a sense alternative, does imply the partial overlap of permanence and flux in each phase. But it does not directly explain how the subject of change can be complete—if it is complete—in all its phases taken together. It is not easy to see how a whole can be a whole of phases which are at once complementary and alternative. It suggests something like a woman who possesses a complete wardrobe of clothes for all the day's occasions, and tries to attain the perfection of dress by wearing them all at once. Yet, difficult as this view is in itself and in its consequences, we seem to accept it every time we call a thing by the same name both before and after it undergoes a change; for we do then imply that the whole and not a mere part of the thing is present throughout the process. Therefore I think we must examine this notion of partial fusion or overlap more closely, and not at once reject it for its seemingly self-contradictory character.

§ 14. Certain corollaries, I think, follow obviously from this paradox of complementary yet alternative phases, for which we have had to relinquish the hypothesis of a completely concrete change. (*a*) If the phases differ from one another according to the less or greater completeness of the subject of change in each of them, then these differences will fall into an order of degree. (*b*) The ordered series of phases may proceed from less to greater completeness, or from greater to less; and this at any rate suggests that all change is transition to or from a climax, a culminating phase of completeness. In other words, we have reached the familiar notion of development. We are to work with a teleological hypothesis in respect of all change: to endeavour to explain it wherever it occurs as an ascent towards, or a decline from, the self-consummation of the subject of change.

§ 15. Now I wish to try to expand this interpretation of change for a few minutes, but I do not wish to give the impression that I find it easy. I will point out one obvious objection to be met which may in the end compel us to modify, if not reject, the whole hypothesis. It will be said that if at its climax the subject of change

is fully perfect and complete, then the comparatively imperfect phases must lose their aspect of complementation and with it all meaning and reality. They will become utterly otiose, and change will turn out to be no less illusory than Parmenides believed. We might perhaps evade this criticism in respect of any finite subject of change by saying that just because it is a finite thing it can never have a climax which is a complete perfection, but in the case of the universe considered as the subject of change that would be no answer. For if the universe at its climax is incomplete, if never and in no sense is it fully perfect, the problem is merely postponed: we shall be asked by what right, by what standard, we judge it to be always and in all senses incomplete. And if at any moment or in any sense it is complete and perfect, then that it should require complementation by lesser stages of its own perfection looks like a flat contradiction.

§ 16. However, let us for the present persevere. That all change is development or decay was the solution propounded by Plato, but elaborated in more definite detail by Aristotle. Aristotle's position is roughly this. All change is to be viewed teleologically. Any changing thing, animate or inanimate, is at a given moment either at a zenith of maturity in which its essential nature is fully expressed, or else it is either ascending to or declining from such a zenith. If you try to define a maturing or decaying thing, it is only by reference to its zenith that you can do so; so that what you are then in fact defining is just the essential nature, and all you can add to your statement of that essence is the mere negative reservation that the thing has not yet reached, or has already passed, its zenith; which is to say that it does not yet possess, or that it has now lost, its essential nature. A child and a dotard, so far as they have positive reality, are just that essence of manhood which the dotard once embodied, and the child gives promise of embodying. Thus potential and actual are on this theory strictly correlative terms. Potential being—as when a child is said to be potentially a man—is, as it were, a loan, a reality borrowed from actual being; but it is a loan on good security. At any stage of change before or after its climax the developing or decaying thing is actual in so far as it is not at maximum distance from its climax, *i.e.* in so far as its essential nature might be less fully realized than it is; the thing is potential in so far as it is unrealized and fails to embody its own essential nature. Thus the essential nature, which Aristotle calls the form, is (*a*) that in terms of which the changing thing must be defined; (*b*) it is the end, or final cause, which motives the development of the thing from imperfection to perfection. So Aristotle's teleology is an explanation of things strictly in terms of value. A thing can be defined only in terms of its own characteristic excellence, and this

characteristic excellence is the only cause which can be rationally assigned to a process of change.

§ 17. Moreover (*c*) this perfection which is at once the formal cause of the developing thing and the end, or goal, of its process, its final cause, is also the efficient cause of change, inasmuch as nothing begins to develop until a mature, actual, embodiment of the form sets the change going. *E.g.* a child develops into manhood, which is at once its essential nature and the end of its process of development. But the process cannot start until an actual adult man initiates it in the sexual act. In the realm of explicitly purposive change, *i.e.* the sphere of action, the principle is the same. An end to be actualized is the final cause of action, and the action is definable as good or bad according to the goodness or badness of that end, which is therefore the formal cause also of the action. Moreover the end, as a vision ideally present to the agent's mind before the action, is his motive, the efficient cause of his action.

§ 18. Even in the inanimate world an analogous teleology holds good. In all inorganic change which occurs necessarily and intelligibly Aristotle sees final and formal as well as purely *a tergo* efficient causation. When there is no apparent final cause, either our insight has failed—as is to be expected in the relatively imperfect and undeveloped world of inanimate nature—or else, as he sometimes seems to allow, something in its own nature really contingent has changed really accidentally. But such a contingent event, if it does occur, is not rationally explicable. It is no matter for science. In general, inorganic process, even where it is not obviously teleological, as it is where it subserves organic process within a living body, nevertheless does manifest final cause. I will spare you the details of an obsolete physics, and take only one example. According to the Aristotelian theory of gravity, earth, the heaviest of the four elements, falls because its essential nature is to move towards the centre of the universe. That is its *natural* place, and it most fully manifests its true form, its real nature, when it reaches the centre of the material world.

§ 19. One last point will connect this theory with Parmenides. According to Aristotle, if you analyse a changing thing at any given stage of its process, you can distinguish in it its matter and its form. So far as it is actual and developed it is form; so far as it is merely potential it is matter. Thus matter and form are simply the respective static aspects of potentiality and actuality. Matter is not a positive something at all: it is the element of potentiality which dwindles as a thing develops and increases again as it decays. It is called by Aristotle the material cause of the changing thing, and it is a necessary condition of change. But such positive character as it appears to possess is really only conferred upon it by form. Thus

you may analyse a living body into (*a*) the form of life, the unity of function which makes the living being what it essentially is, and (*b*) the material body which subserves life, and you appear to have reached two positive factors. But the material body is itself a union of matter and form, and upon further analysis into matter and form will reveal simpler and simpler constituents. Hence *logically* the ultimate term of this analysis will be what Aristotle calls primary matter, a matter bare of all form, a potentiality quite unactual; i.e. a logical limit and not a positive physical constituent at all.

Thus by Aristotle the corporealist eternal substance theory is exactly reversed. It becomes evidently useless to seek the essence of things in an ultimate constituent or a primitive condition—Aristotle realizes clearly that the principle is the same in either case—for that path leads not to reality but to nothingness, to primary matter. The real nature of things is revealed only in their climax.

§ 20. In this way Aristotle, developing Plato, replies to Parmenides with a thoroughgoing teleology. It can only be judged fairly in the light of his whole metaphysical system, and I do not suggest that even when so elucidated it offers a solution which wholly satisfies. I have sketched Aristotle's conceptions of potential and actual being, and of all change as necessarily a development or a decay, only for the purpose of indicating in outline how one may set about explaining change on a teleological hypothesis. I propose now, not to elaborate this quite general hypothesis, but to endeavour to test it in a sphere in which it seems *a priori* most unlikely to be verified. This will compel me, much against my will and far beyond my competence, to hazard some remarks about modern physics. For, if there be worlds in which there appears to be change without development, worlds whose elements apparently are in process, but do not in that process realize less or more of an excellence which is their own essential nature, one of them at any rate would seem to be the world of classical, or pre-quantum theory, physics. It is a world I come to as a stranger. Yet sometimes the impressions of a tourist have a vividness which continued residence tends to dull. In the hope that such an impression may be mine, and with the proverbial insolence of tourists, I shall dare to pass comment on some of the sights which may have grown too familiar to the natives.

(To be continued)

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICAL EMPIRICISM

Professor A. C. FOX

The bearing of certain psychological doctrines upon ethical theory is important, and has been made use of especially by those who espouse empiricism in Ethics. It is the purpose of this paper to examine some of these leading doctrines and the ethical theory which has been connected with them. In doing so, it is appropriate to select for examination the views of Professor W. McDougall, as expressed principally in his *Social Psychology* and *Outline of Psychology*; and this for two reasons. One is, that these views are significant of much more than the opinions of one man. They may be taken quite fairly as representative, in the main, of a definite body of doctrine concerning the nature and development of moral experience. This doctrine inevitably contains much psychology, and in the hands of Professor McDougall it is expounded by a psychologist of eminence and with a good deal of detail; moreover, he often makes large excursions beyond the bounds of psychology into the domain of Ethics. The second reason is to be found in the widespread circulation which McDougall's writings (chiefly his *Social Psychology*) have enjoyed. I am aware that his position has often been criticized, notably and at some length by Dr. H. Rashdall; but I hope that what follows will be more than a going over old ground once again.

I

It may be assumed that Professor McDougall's accounts of the nature of a sentiment and of the development of self-consciousness are so well known as to require no more than an outlined description. A sentiment is the organization of emotions (or instinctive dispositions) around the idea of some object, the idea being the nucleus of the sentiment. In this connexion we may notice the clear separation which he makes between cognition and conation. He refers to "the obvious fact that the development and organization of character, or of the conative side of the mind, is largely distinct from and independent of the development and organization of knowledge, the cognitive side of the mind." But if cognition and conation are largely independent, and if a sentiment is a system of conations, by what means is this system formed? One might be tempted to say that the bond of union is the nuclear idea, especially if every conation

is excited by a cognition, and if the energy of an evoked sentiment does not flow towards the idea but away from it.[1] This is not McDougall's explanation, however; rather does he say that "the oftener the object of the sentiment becomes the object of any one of the emotions comprised in the system of the sentiment, the more readily will it evoke that emotion again, because, in accordance with the law of habit, the connections of the psycho-physical dispositions become more intimate the more frequently they are brought into operation." This is an explanation in terms of frequency and habit. Frequency, however, is not indispensable, as a single experience of striking character may create a firm bond between idea and emotion.[2] In any case, we have here an appeal to principles of association and habit; but in the *Outline of Psychology* McDougall is careful to tell us that "I now see clearly that motor habits are not in themselves springs of action"; and that the only other form of association (*i.e.* other than neural, which produces motor habit) is "mental" association or association by meaning, which involves "the true thought factor."[3]

If, then, habit *does* nothing and neural association is ineffective, we must evidently explain the systematizing of emotion in a sentiment by "mental" association, the "true thought factor," which works in virtue of that continuity of interest which Stout also has emphasized. This means that there is a unity within which diverse items are associated together, and apart from which there could be no association. This unity has the character of "true thought," whatever other character it may possess. Why not admit that it is the original unity of the mind displaying itself in *cognitive* oneness? McDougall comes very near to this, not only when he relates thought to "mental" association, but also in his indictment of Associationism for its exclusion of "subject" or "self" as a necessary explanatory postulate. We must therefore come back to that which presented itself as the *prima facie* source of system in the sentiment—the nuclear idea, or (as McDougall in his later book prefers to name it) the cognitive disposition or system. If "cognitive system," by what means is this system formed? And does a sentiment now show itself to be made up of two systems, one cognitive the other conative? If so, how is the conative system formed, if simple association and neural habit must be ruled out? If it is formed by the activity of the subject, is this a different subject from that which is active in forming the allied cognitive system? But if it is the same, and if a sentiment is not two systems, but one, yet having two aspects, it may be claimed that systematizing activity belongs properly to the cognitive aspect

[1] *Social Psychology*, p. 126 (references throughout are to the 16th edition).
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 127; pp. 163–4.
[3] *Outline of Psychology*, pp. 218 and 393.

rather than to the other. The various emotions are able to enter indifferently into an indefinite number of sentiments. If it be said that they are not precisely the same emotions in varying sentiments, then the only way of differentiating them is by their cognitive aspect. It is evident that there is no organizing power in the emotions if they are separate from cognition; and if they are not separate, it is because they have a cognitive element that they are susceptible of organization. It is to the cognitive activity of the subject (which McDougall admits is the one agent in all forms of mental activity) that we must trace the organization of its mental life: system lies there or nowhere.

Turning to McDougall's description of self-consciousness, we learn that to be self-conscious is to have a sentiment organized around the idea of the self. The distinctive thing about the self-regarding sentiment is in "self" and not in "sentiment": there are many other sentiments which in principle are the same as this, but there is only one self-sentiment. It is also clear that the system of this sentiment will be of a peculiar kind. Every sentiment is organized around and by a cognitive system, but that which lies at the centre of this sentiment is itself the active subject of all mental organizing. That is, the essence of self-consciousness is the cognitive system which the subject more or less, explicitly, elaborates. This has an important bearing on volition, which is closely related to self-awareness, and on the nature and origin of moral judgment, as we shall see. In the meantime McDougall's intention is to introduce order into the emotional and instinctive life by showing the unity and complexity of emotions in the sentiment; but he also aims to show that this unity is imposed from without, in true empirical fashion: how else are we to interpret his express statements as to the way in which a sentiment is formed? He desires also to exhibit the genesis of self-consciousness in the same empirical way, only here the matter is a little more complicated. Self-awareness is closely related to a certain sentiment. The sentiment grows in the prescribed way, but the *consciousness* of self is presumably a distinguishable element which (since it is "obvious" that the development of cognition and conation are largely independent) has to be separately accounted for in its growth. Particularly has it to be given an empirical origin: cognition is not peculiar to self-conscious beings.

But this empirical intention fails of success in several ways. (i) The systematizing of emotions into a sentiment fails of accomplishment unless there is an internal, and cognitive, basis of the system: an *experienced* unity or system cannot possibly be created purely *ab extra*. If it be objected that the unity need not be experienced—it is a disposition—what point is there in claiming that sentiments deliver the emotional life from chaos to order? Doubtless

the chaos would be experienced, and therefore also the order. Further, the peculiar nature of the cognitive system which lies at the centre of the self-sentiment—a system elaborated by the subject —means that it must arise from within and cannot be taken over from without, or even receive its chief causal influence from without. This leads to the remark (ii) that the derivation of cognition of self from a cognitive condition in which there is no native readiness for it can succeed only on the supposition that selves (and things) are already fully constituted objects, and in their own right, upon the first attempted awareness of them, and that the mind displays no activity in this awareness. But this twofold supposition cannot be made. Before the mind can draw upon selves and things it must have consciously separated itself from them, and have become self-aware before and as a clue to awareness of them. Moreover, there is no such thing as passive knowing. In a word, there may be a genetic account of self-consciousness as to its content but not as to its form. To be sure, form and content are inseparable, and one may not be known without the other; but (*a*) it is certain that the *form* of self-awareness is not derived from without—it is known immediately and "internally" or not at all; (*b*) the very first *content* of self-awareness is derived internally; and (*c*) although an externally originating provocation may be necessary to (*a*) and (*b*), and so be part of their cause, it cannot be the essential part of the cause, else would it provoke a similar result in all other things whatsoever upon which it could have influence, *e.g.* stocks and stones. The essential part must be a native readiness to be a self: and this is formal. (iii) The separation between the cognitive and conational factors in self-consciousness will not march. For one thing, it savours too much of that atomistic psychology which McDougall rightly reprobates. For another thing, it is admittedly impossible to have either cognition or emotion *in vacuo*: are not the emotional qualities "the cognitive basis of self-knowledge"? The impossibility of sustaining the separation is so far acknowledged when with self-knowledge is closely associated a sentiment of self-regard, *i.e.* a number of impulses and emotions with their related cognitions.

Apparently the meaning of this is—or should be—that self-awareness is of a varied mental content displaying a certain form or system. Conceivably there could be the content without the form, under penalty of chaos—types of which are given and analysed in the *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*; so that it is the form which is the "self" element. It is well to remember this when we turn, with Professor McDougall, to consider the nature of volition. Facing the question why a weak impulse can be willed into action in the teeth of a stronger contrary impulse, he answers that the explanation is to be found in the sentiment of self-regard, which joins itself to

the weak impulse and secures its triumph. This is one more victory for order over chaos, since the life of a person who gives way to strong impulses continually is disorderly, and there is lack of order even on occasional giving way. But in volition "the man himself is thrown upon the side of the weaker motive"; to exert will and to be a man are identical, and will is character in action. Conscience is moral character, and character is "the system of directed conative tendencies": "the better organized and richer the intellect, the more efficiently will character work towards the realization of its goals."[1] In the light of these statements we have to understand—or challenge—certain others, to wit: "in considering the genesis of moral conduct and character we need concern ourselves with the empirical self only"; "the empirical self, the idea of his self which each man entertains, plays an essential part in volition"; "the effort of volition is . . . only a more subtle and complex interplay of those impulses which actuate all animal behaviour"; "it differs from other conations not in kind but only in complexity."[2]

We may accept the general account of volition, and be ready to accept the self in volition as the empirical self, *i.e.* "the idea of his self that each man entertains"; but taken in their context these words might imply the existence of atomistic selves, each of whom has a distinct idea of himself, and between whom there may be nothing common. Now the empirical content of the self may vary widely, as between one period and another of the one person's life, and as between one person and another. It is this content which is strictly empirical; but if we are to speak in this strict sense of the empirical self which plays an essential part in volition, we get no explanation of the matter at all. Volition surely means some degree of steadiness: it means action which expresses to some extent a policy; but there is no guarantee of getting steadiness or a policy out of "impulses which actuate all animal behaviour," or out of the kaleidoscopic variety of the empirical content of mind. Moreover, moral conduct admittedly has a reference beyond the self to other selves, and implies commonly acknowledged or valid standards—a common world of conduct to which the self has to conform. In this common world there must be a thread of identity: each self must treat other selves as selves. The essential identity lies not primarily in contents of empirical kind, but in oneness of the form or general "go" of the minds, or more correctly, in the contents as ordered by this form or "go." It is only if we disregard this form, or believe that man does not differ in kind from the animals, that we can assert that "the effort of volition is . . . only a more subtle and complex interplay of those impulses which actuate all animal behaviour." Professor McDougall

[1] *Social Psychology*, p. 240; *Outline of Psychology*, ch. xvii.
[2] *Social Psychology*, pp. 181, 246, and 237.

admits that we have no clear evidence of the exercise of volition on the part of animals. We for our part may go so far as to admit, for the sake of argument, that there is empirical identity between the higher animals and man, *i.e.* identity of instinctive material at the disposal of the will, so that, if animals do not will, the difference cannot lie in content but in something else. But what else is there, except that element which we have mentioned almost *ad nauseam*?

II

McDougall does not claim, however, that the self-regarding sentiment is sufficient (though it is necessary) for moral conduct. He speaks also of moral sentiments, which are sentiments of dislike or liking for abstract objects, viz. moral qualities such as dishonesty, untidiness, justice, or truth. These "abstract sentiments alone enable us to pass moral judgments of general validity. . . . (They) are the specifically moral sentiments." The self-regarding sentiment of itself would not necessarily lead to moral conduct, *i.e.* to right conduct, since it might perfectly well consist with overweening self-regard in the bad sense. Neither are moral sentiments for abstract qualities of themselves sufficient; if they are not backed by resolute will they leave the person an ineffectual idealist. The best result is reached when these two sentiments unite under the master sentiment for a completely moral life. This sentiment is apparently an extension of that of self-regard, or is its qualification by the moral sentiments. We are brought back, therefore, to the rôle of the self in morality.

But what exactly do the moral sentiments do, and how do they do it? In themselves they are permanent emotional dispositions towards generalized moral qualities. McDougall's explanation would have us believe that they provide a thorough identification with the social point of view (including in the best type of case what society *should* require), and a conviction that action in accord with these qualities is right or wrong. It is also in keeping with his general genetic standpoint that we should believe the one to be the cause of the other, and in the order named, *i.e.* that conviction of social approval is the source of conviction of rightness, so that if the one comes definitely to us the other will inevitably follow. No doubt there is an intellectual process in forming the abstract sentiments, but this is irrelevant to their main functioning. After all, they are still sentiments, and are created and operate like any other sentiment. They are complex conations, but are only a more subtle and complex interplay of those impulses which actuate all animal behaviour; they differ from other conations not in kind but in complexity. And the intellectual process concerned must be discounted, in respect to its efficacy, in accordance with the general principle that "all the

complex intellectual apparatus of the most highly developed mind is but . . . the instrument by which instinctive impulses seek their satisfaction."[1] The intellect is the slave of the passions. We are brought then to this position: it is not enough to have sentiments in order to accept the social point of view and to possess the sense of rightness, nor can any intellectual process bring about this acceptance and possession. There must be some further factor which effectually socializes the self-regarding sentiment and endues the moral sentiments with their imperative control over one's conduct. Otherwise volition is egoistic and bad, and the moral sentiments involve at best a detached awareness that society declares certain actions to be right or wrong. This further factor McDougall will have to find on the conational side of our nature.

The missing link is supplied by "active sympathy." It is this which brings effective identification with the social point of view and produces the imperative sense of rightness. It gives the sentiment for self that which in its native egoism it lacks and the moral sentiments their hold upon our conduct. What, then, is this active sympathy, and how does it act? It is "that tendency to seek to share our emotions and feelings with others which is rooted in primitive or passive sympathy and in the gregarious instinct. (It impels a person) to bring his feelings and emotions into harmony with those of others."[2] It thus works to produce sensitiveness towards moral approval and disapproval, and it is this which "leads on some men to the highest plane of conduct . . . regulated by an ideal." Further inquiry elicits the information that active sympathy is peculiar to persons; and this means, if anything, that it is not one of those impulses which actuate all animal behaviour, and that if it is rooted in passive sympathy and the gregarious instinct, it is a plant which does not produce any flowers until it discovers the congenial atmosphere of human nature—in short, that it *is* a new factor in man as compared with the animals. Also we are told that it is egoistic, in that it is a seeking of one's own satisfaction. Quite so: how could it be otherwise if it is rooted in simple instinct, and if it is to be, *ex hypothesi*, something which is not an intellectual process? In view of this naïve admission it is hardly necessary to labour the point that a tendency to share our feelings and emotions with others has, as such, no ethical character in it, nor has the gregarious instinct or passive sympathy. To want to cease from loneliness may have no more ethical quality than to want the cessation of hunger or coldness; and there is no necessary moral character in the feeling of someone else's emotions—it comes by "passive" sympathy and simply cannot be avoided. Out of the simple impulse to be with others and the necessity of feeling their emotions, active sympathy is somehow

[1] *Social Psychology*, p. 44. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 200.

derived. But if we remain with others and have our own emotions, the others will feel these in any case, in virtue of their passive sympathy, and we will feel theirs. The only alternative that I can think of is that we should desire, *as a result of thinking*, to bring our emotions into harmony with those of our group. This, however, gives an entirely new turn to the matter, in that it introduces the despised intellectual process, and makes active sympathy logically subsequent to thinking, and also to volition. But this cannot be an alternative, as it is non-empiricist. As to what is meant by an egoistic active sympathy which makes one take the point of view of society and distinguish between right and wrong, it is hard to fathom. No doubt there is a bond of feeling between members of a society, who are held together by something more than a coldly intellectual assent; but is equally without doubt that feeling, like patriotism, is not enough. It provides, as it were, an opportunity or a material, good for social cohesion up to a point, but requiring to be seized and amplified by clear-eyed purpose if it is to yield a human community.

In one place Professor McDougall refers to still another element in the mind as the source of disinterested judgment, viz. the tender emotion, which is the affective aspect of the parental instinct. This is the most powerful of the instincts (we are told), stronger even than fear, since it works directly for the conservation of the species. It is the central element in the sentiment of love and is its main support. Accordingly it is the mainspring of altruism, and McDougall points out, no doubt correctly, that in making this emotion a part of the native endowment of animals and men he is giving altruism its rightful place as an original and not an artificial feature of human nature. To derive altruism from egoism is certainly absurd; but why did he not notice this in dealing with egoistic active sympathy? But perhaps he means that sympathy becomes altruistic when joined with the tender emotion. It is more than doubtful, however, whether a simple instinct of parentalism, admirable though it may be, can function in the required manner. Parental tendencies in themselves are not sufficient to make a right relationship between parent and child, or between children themselves; it is enough to mention unwise parents and spoilt children. And if these tendencies produced harmony within one family, they could not guarantee that there would be harmony between that and all other families, *i.e.* communal harmony. It is the family with a strong sense of its own interest which social reformers have so often viewed with suspicion, and not the family which is such only in name. But any "sense of interest," good or bad, is much more than emotional, even though it include emotion. Disinterested beneficence and moral indignation—in so far as the latter is different from simple anger—demand that emotion be qualified by an attitude more detached and impersonal than itself;

If it be said that it is the sentiment which supplies the deficiencies of the tender emotion, then we are back at a problem which has already been discussed.

The problem which has been before us recently in this paper is that of the achievement of disinterestedness and the universal point of view in morality. It is the question how the idea of the self and the moral sentiments may be bound together so that each affects the other. We may see the problem most clearly by contrasting two persons, in one of whom there is the self-sentiment and therefore volition, and also the knowledge that society acknowledges certain moral qualities as right or wrong, and in the other of whom there is all this, together with the recognition that the right should be willed by him and the wrong avoided. I assume that the description of the second of these persons represents in a general way a person fully moralized. It would not be enough that the first person exercise volition merely, and be unaware of the standards of the community around him. For one thing, this would be to depict a thoroughly unreal person and make our problem artificial. For another thing, it is not the question to which McDougall seeks to give an answer. That question is more properly formulated in the general way mentioned, and in detail in the following manner:—

There will be certain respects in which the two persons will go together; and to begin with we will describe their states of mind in terms which are identical for both. Imagine either of them saying to himself: I am in a situation in which a certain act may be performed by me; this act will be irksome, and in itself makes me averse from its performance. Shall I will this act? (or perhaps our first person would more likely say, Why should I will it?—we must remember that he is a person who can exercise will). The persons about me call it a just act, and say that just acts are right; moreover they declare that right acts should be done by me. So far the mental processes of the two would be substantially similar, but at this point differences begin. The second will say: I recognize this social judgment as binding on me, and so I will perform the act; the first will say: I do not recognize this social opinion as binding, therefore I will not perform the so-called just act. (The case, however, would be different with this latter person if he believed that society would punish him for his omission; even so, his performance would not be properly moral: he would not do the act because he deemed it right.)

Why is it that the one man wills the act while the other does not? McDougall holds that moral judgments of general validity are based on the moral sentiments, and this apparently would govern his answer to our question. The one man possesses moral sentiments, the other does not, even though he may be aware that other persons possess

them. This, McDougall might say, is the kind of situation which arises precisely when you make moral judgment simply a matter of cognition, for has not the delinquent full cognition of the moral standard which he refuses to accept? No, he has not. What he knows is, that *other persons say* that just acts are right and ought to be done. What he does not know is, that this opinion is valid for him, or more simply, that just acts are right. He does not know the meaning of the terms "right" and "wrong," but confuses them with the expedient and pleasant, and the reverse; or else he misconstrues these terms as used by others, taking the one to mean that which is usually undesirable (to him) and the other to connote that which is generally desirable (to him). He has failed to establish a common measure between his own standards, according to which he wills, and those of society. What he calls right others call wrong, and *vice versa.* There is an absence of rationality somewhere, and if in this case society is in the right, it must be in this dissenter. (It would be in society if it were wrong, *i.e.* if the dissenter were a genuine reformer who could see ahead of current standards.) It is through this absence of rationality that he lacks *moral* sentiments, though he may have other kinds in plenty—though even this is doubtful. His standard is not the rational, as is that of society (or as his would be were he a moral reformer), but the desirable—that which brings agreeable emotions and feelings;[1] nor could the operation of "active" sympathy—which is "a seeking of one's own satisfaction"—make the case otherwise; active sympathy has nothing to say on the question of rightness.

If we inquire as to how society gets its common measure, we may get an answer by turning back to the other person in our illustration, the one who wills to do the just act. He does the act that society requires, not because it is a matter of opinion but because it is a matter of right. This means that he has not stopped at the

[1] For these reasons it may seem improbable that he can exercise volition at all. True, he has a self-sentiment, but the idea of self is "a social product," while this man appears to think of his self without contributory relations to other selves—a likely result if selfhood is a purely psychological and non-logical production. He may be willing to speak of the rationality or "reasonableness" of his actions, but as an egoist he restricts the empire of reason to himself, and so empties it of meaning. On the other hand, if willed action expresses a plan, he may be able to have a plan for his life and to suppress some desirable actions which do not fulfill it (cf. Gideon Sarn, in Mary Webb's *Precious Bane*). This certainly looks like volition expressive of reason. Perhaps the solution lies in the acknowledgment that there are degrees of selfhood and volition, and that there is not only the one total self which is fully rational, but there are also partial selves within this: so that a willed act may proceed from the self in a restricted form. The man in question will then be rational, but fail to see—perhaps from emotional causes—the implications of this in a wider rationality.

common judgment but has measured it by a further standard. He is implicitly or explicitly aware of the fact—highly significant—that the common judgments themselves may have the predicates "right" and "wrong" attached to them. And as a further point in Logic as applied to Ethics, if the proposition "this ought, or is right, to be done because everyone does it" were a valid ethical definition, it should be susceptible of simple conversion to "that which everyone does is what ought to be done"; and not even McDougall would assent to this. We have to admit that the moral sentiments attach themselves to ideas, and moreover to general ideas, *i.e.* to ideas which are the result of an intellectual process. We have to insist that these general ideas must exist first—in logical priority at least—before there can be anything to which the sentiments can attach themselves. And the intellectual process is much more than that of "discriminating and naming the abstract qualities of character and conduct,"[1] for the interest in which these qualities are discriminated and named is *already* a moral interest in right and wrong; for what other reason would the process ever be carried out? If I decide that some acts are just and others are courageous, it is because I have in mind a *summum genus*—right acts—to guide my classification. Even if we discern rightness and wrongness first of all in particular acts, we afterwards make classifications with some clue in mind, and it is the *summum genus* which acts as the clue. If we classify in inductive fashion, as no doubt we do to begin with, the clue will be more or less vague; but it will be none the less dominant, even though its fullness of content is increased as the classifying process proceeds. There is no need to deny the presence of emotional elements in all this, provided we take them as *signs* of the passing of moral judgments and not *criteria* of rightness and wrongness themselves. The obvious fact of progress from defective to more adequate criteria, and the related fact that both kinds of criteria have been accompanied by equally strong emotions, should be sufficient to remove the formation of criteria from the emotional to the rational sphere. Of course, reason may be at fault also in its detailed judgments: we admit its close connection with emotion; but it is not at fault in its major and most general judgment, that which makes the simple and ultimate distinction in ethical character; and we may be thankful that although emotion is able to blur this judgment in individuals here and there, it has not been able to do so in the race as a whole.

III

We must now consider the part played by cognition in moral judgment. Professor McDougall, despite his separation of cognition

[1] *Social Psychology*, p. 219.

from conation, admits that it takes some part and that even reason has something to do in the matter. But these admissions are qualified in two ways: (i) by assigning to reason a subordinate position: it follows upon and does not direct instinctive tendencies; (ii) by showing that reason itself may be empirically derived from cognitive elements which are to be found in non-rational beings. The first of these qualifications has been dealt with, and we must now turn to the other.

McDougall's quarrel with Rationalistic Ethics is on the ground that it implants reason in the human mind *ab initio*, whereas it is the product of the slow processes of evolution. One of the main defects of this Rationalism, he says, is that it is incompatible with the principle of the continuity of evolution.[1] Presumably this principle requires that the apparently new features which emerge during the course of mental development are not really new, in the sense that they are different in kind, but are simply more complex forms of the more elementary processes which preceded them. So we are told that "the essence of all reasoning is that judgment and a new belief are determined by beliefs already established in the mind."[2] The beliefs already established have come through perception on the plane of "intelligence"; and we gather that reasoning comes about through, as it were, the clash of two or more of these perceptual judgments. This clashing is the only new feature in the business: the induction or deduction of the new belief is still brought about by the working of the old factor, intelligence. McDougall seems to make the nature of induction the cardinal question here, since he regards deduction as the combination of an inductive generalization with a perceptual judgment.[3] In regard to induction he says that "selectivity or sagacity, which is the all-important factor in reasoning of this kind, is not a new factor. It is the same kind of factor which, on the plane of trial and error, makes the process, whether in men or animals, other than a purely random process. It is the factor which at all levels, from amoeba to man, is the essence of intelligent adaptation."[4] Again: "the tendency to inductive generalization is fundamental, and is exhibited at all levels of mental life. At the lower levels, it is merely the tendency to react to similar things, things presenting similar sensory cues, as though they were essentially the same thing over again."[5]

The question for decision is whether reason reduces without remainder to intelligent adaptation, and is no more than a trial and error process on the perceptual plane. It is important to notice what exactly is the question to be decided, lest we waste our time over a question which is not relevant. We misrepresent the situation

[1] *Social Psychology*, p. 378. [2] *Outline of Psychology*, p. 402.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 409. [4] *Ibid.*, p. 405. [5] *Ibid.*, p. 408.

if we think of it as an issue between continuity which discounts novelty and novelty which discounts continuity. McDougall stands for the first of these and represents Rationalism as standing for the second: but he misunderstands its position. The Rationalist has no need to deny that there has been a process of development, or to maintain that the coming of new factors means the denial or disappearance of the old. The old factors persist, and so far there is continuity; but they become subordinated to the working of the new, which makes (or may make) use of them for its new purpose rather than *vice versa*. In being so used they suffer a change which, however, does not mean entire alteration. They remain recognizably themselves and yet become different; the novelty into which they enter can be analysed so as to show their presence in it. Our quarrel with Professor McDougall is because he wishes to analyse novelty simply into old factors and nothing else. In point of fact, he does not succeed.

One of the prominent features of his general exposition is his insistence on the all-pervasiveness of purpose: he names his psychology "hormic." He is in rebellion against mechanistic explanations of behaviour. Conformably with this we recall his statement that intelligent adaptation (to which reasoning is equivalent) is other than a random process even at the beginning. We may admit the general claim and sympathize with the motive; but we may ask, what of the principle of continuity? Is not the intelligent behaviour of lowly animals continuous with the preceding stage of presumably mechanical action? If not, why deny the possibility of discontinuity at some succeeding stage in the history of intelligence itself? But if so, may we not expect that the evolution of intelligence, if it is a real and not a nominal evolution, will show a process of development from stages in which mechanism is present and predominant to stages in which, though still present, it is very subordinate? If this expectation is realized, it will be legitimate to describe the earliest stages of behaviour as mainly mechanical and the latest stages as mainly teleological. Now this is exactly the kind of description that McDougall gives. He speaks of "advance from action of the type of immediate response to the impressions made on the sense organs, and an approximation towards complete self-determination. . . . This advance involves also a progress from predominantly mechanical to predominantly teleological determination, a continuous increase of the part played by final causes relatively to that of purely mechanical causes in the determination of the behaviour of the individual."[1]

According to this, we must admit that behaviour has a mixed character, and that in its earliest forms it is more heteromatic than automatic. It is teleological, but not markedly so. By teleology is

[1] *Social Psychology*, p. 263.

meant "that power of mind to foresee the future in accordance with past experience and to govern action in the light of that foresight"; this is mind's fundamental nature, just as its primary attitude is prospective. Now, while man lives largely within a world created by mind, the animal lives almost entirely in a world constituted by external nature. The one therefore can, the other cannot, be mainly moved to action by causes internal to the mind. It is in this fashion that McDougall indicates imagination as the differentia between the two, for "most of the behaviour of animals is initiated and guided by perception." Imagination in turn gives rise to desire in the strict sense, and this is not possessed by animals. "The animal in which any instinctive impulse is excited does not suspend action, even though the action be remote; the impulse probably always expresses itself in action. In this respect our natural man would show his superiority to the animals. He would be capable of the higher form of desire, viz. impulse toward or away from a remote object, with suspension of action. . . . Such suspension of action . . . is the essential condition of all higher intellectual activity, of all thinking in the fuller and more usual form of the word."[1] Notice that action is suspended because thinking is in operation; perception is in abeyance in favour of a "higher intellectual process." And it ought to be plain that this is a description of the beginning of volition, which therefore cannot be explained in terms of the laws of appetition as these operate in the animals. It is a law of appetition in man that he looks before he leaps, and this looking makes all the difference.

This conclusion is reinforced when we consider the nature of thinking, taking it as McDougall presents it to us. He insists that perception is a veritable form of thinking: "to know, to recognize, to be aware of, any object is to conceive it, even when our knowledge is a perceptual knowing. To mean an object is to conceive it. . . . Perceiving is one mode of conceiving."[2] And he speaks of "the error of supposing that the primitive mind perceives particular individual objects, and that development proceeds by the coalescence of particular 'ideas' to form general 'ideas.' . . . The universal is already implicit in the thinking of the burnt child who dreads the fire, and in that of the animal who flees from all men after maltreatment by one." This reference to implicit universals is very significant; it is made in another way, in the remark that "we begin by cognition of the highly general and proceed gradually to the cognition of particulars." The universals which were implicit at first (in such wise that there is reaction to "things presenting similar sensory cues, as though they were essentially the same thing over again") become explicit as cognition grows. The animal perceives things as objects of certain kinds and as marked by some relatively simple

[1] *Outline of Psychology*, p. 207. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 254.

feature or sensory pattern. Man's knowledge, *per contra*, comprises a multitude of cognitive dispositions which do "not merely coexist, but form a logically ordered system."[1]

How can we explain this difference, whereby knowledge which is logically ordered supervenes on that which is not? And is not the logical, therefore, something new? What do we mean by the logical? It is evidently more than a dealing with universals; or rather it is dealing with them in a way that knows them for such, which knows their particulars as details in their systems, and not as though they are the same things over again. Perhaps we cannot explain how this difference comes about, but it is enough for our purpose to recognize it as having come about and as something distinctive. The primary universals are blurred and highly general, because they have not been thought into separation from their particulars, or *vice versa*. The animal who flees from all men because it has been maltreated by one does so because it does not suspend action in favour of cognition; and it fails to do this because it is unable to exercise imagination (to retain the word previously used). That is, imagination creates a mental world connected with, yet vastly amplifying, the perceived world, and within this new world the working of "intelligent adaptation" takes on a new character. Arrived at this point, the mind is freed from the necessity to confuse particulars with one another; it is able deliberately to compare them, *e.g.* to compare the one now present with others previously known, and in the interest of future action. In this way the mind comes into possession of the three temporal distinctions; and it is able to think, to form plans, and to will. But this is no other than the capacity which we call reason, theoretical or practical; and McDougall admits its correlation with logical capacity. In itself it is timeless and is able to transcend time, as we have seen, in the sense that it can grasp past and future in one thought-scheme; it is not tied down to the present and very near the present. It is able therefore to traffick with final causes, to survey its impulses in the light of a policy and choose amongst them, and thus to become predominantly teleological. All this because it has become rational and follows, not the laws of appetition simply, but those peculiar to its own human status. It is and yet is not continuous with the past, since it not only contains but *knows* the past.

This attribution of a *sui generis* character to reason has obvious bearings upon the nature of moral judgment. The impossibility of an empirical derivation of reason from non-rational elements is one with the impossibility of a similar derivation of morality from non-moral elements. Reason is inherent in the moral judgment, and is expressed in the predication of rightness which is the differentia

[1] *Outline of Psychology*, p. 382.

thereof. To judge morally is to take an impartial point of view, to relate a particular impulse to its universal of volition. Reasoning is not incidental to all this but is its very soul. It is of no value, therefore, to be told that reason "plays a part in all our moral judgments, though reason alone, without the aid of moral experience, of moral tradition, and of the moral character, is incapable of leading us to true moral judgments." This becomes, in the light of the preceding exposition, almost nonsense: moral experience, etc., themselves can come about only by the operation of reason, otherwise how are they made *moral*? On the other hand, it is not nonsense if it merely means that reason does nothing *in vacuo*, that in the moral sphere its occupation is with the whole economy of the mind, which includes instinctive tendencies and related sentiments as well as relatively detached cognitions. And we can assent to the claim that reason is not a conative energy; it is not one item amongst others, just as the moral end is not one end amongst others. Were it so, there could be no possibility of freedom, since there would be no one factor standing out from all others which could give a determinative turn to the course of events; reason would become just one more amongst the multitude of efficient causes. As it is, it is not an efficient but a final cause. It is related to all the other effective energies, not horizontally, as it were, and as they are related amongst themselves, but vertically, in such a way as to survey and embrace them all, and call them all into its service. It is indeed, like its congener volition, the man himself, his central self, and when this real man acts his conduct proceeds from himself and is free. It is reason that should be in mind when it is said that "by a long series of creative acts on the part of men, both small and great, the moral tradition—the highest product of organic evolution—has been painfully and slowly evolved. . . . The belief in a certain creative power of original determination is a necessity of our moral nature."[1]

Thus McDougall's attempt to give a purely empirical account of morality has not succeeded. In one way it has failed because it is not empirical enough. In professing to take account of all the relevant facts it has overlooked the most important bit of evidence—the testimony of our moral nature to an element which is other than appetition or perceptual trial and error. In another way it has failed just because of its empiricism. It has not escaped the principal defect of genetic explanation when this is applied to the human mind. Despite McDougall's disclaimer, he really explains human conduct in mechanical fashion, and has not worked out the full implications of the teleological principle to which he pays lip homage. In working for simplicity he achieves falsity of description; and in reacting against reason as utterly transcendent he has gone to the impossible

[1] *Outline of Psychology*, p. 448.

extreme of relegating it to an unimportant position, after having misconstrued its nature. It may have been noticed, however, that much of the criticism in this article has made use of his own words, which are sometimes available in such a form as to suggest self-contradiction, and to create the suspicion that he may have had qualms as to the validity of his exposition. This becomes more definite when, on the last page of the *Outline of Psychology* he asks, by way of indicating an *unsolved* problem: "Is there any innate basis of intellectual development other than the instincts, the plasticity of the nervous system, and that general power of adaptation to novel conditions which in these pages has been called Intelligence, or in its higher manifestations, Sagacity? . . . Is there anything in our innate endowment that in any manner or degree justifies the old doctrine of innate ideas?" This becomes more definite still in the last chapter of the *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, when, in reviewing the facts of multiple personalities, he asks: "How can we interpret this evidence if not by assuming with Kant and Driesch that the forms of knowledge or of thinking, the categories of thought, are innate in every mind, a character or possession of mind which is not acquired through experience, but is given in the very nature of mind and to which mind owes its capacity to order the data of sense-experience in the form of time and space and causation?" Had this been made a working assumption in the two earlier books, they would almost certainly have come to very different conclusions about volition, self-awareness, reason, and moral judgment.

CAUSALITY

Y. H. KRIKORIAN

THE image of nature as causality has been a major theme of science and poetry. It has been a symbol of hope and fear, of progress and futility. Yet its meaning has seldom been clear. Prior to any statement about the relation of causality to physical nature, life, and mind, its meaning should be established. I shall therefore first define causality, and I shall then discuss its applicability to nature.

I

Causality, like all other types of explanation, is a correlation of given phenomena. To understand the nature of causality, therefore, two questions need to be answered: (1) What are the characteristics of causal relation? (2) What are the properties of causal entities? These two questions are only relatively independent of one another. In our final interpretation of causality the two questions should not be too sharply separated, since the characteristics of entities and of relations are exhibited in their interrelations.

1. *Causal Relation.*—The simplest procedure to determine the nature of causal relation will be to analyse the major characteristics of instances of the causal order. There are different types of order or process. Certain processes are called causal, others casual, and still others purposive. Instances of causal order would be the following: fire melts ice; water quenches fire; bodies gravitate towards one another; a billiard ball strikes another, and the second ball moves. In more precisely stated instances of the causal order one observes that at a given temperature the volume of a given quantity of gas varies inversely as the pressure it sustains, and that the strength of an electric current varies directly as the electromotive force and inversely as the resistance.

There are three characteristics of the above instances of causal relation which are of special importance for the present discussion. Causal relation is non-anthropomorphic, it exhibits uniformity, and is deterministic.

In causal explanation, whether one considers the relations or the entities, anthropomorphism is eliminated. Causal relation is a name for a certain type of order of events, and not a name for the activity of an agency behind events. Causal correlation does not disprove purposes, ends, or wishes, but simply disregards them. It may very

well be, as great historic religions and idealistic systems have claimed, that the anthropomorphic interpretation of nature is a more fundamental and truthful one, and that anthropomorphism gives a deeper insight into the nature of things than causality; but this claim does not alter the fact that while limited to causal correlations one should not refer to wish, desire, and purpose.

The second characteristic of causal relation is uniformity. Causality refers primarily to the constant features of the given phenomena. The illustrations of causality which were mentioned earlier are all statements of uniformities or constant features which exist between phenomena. The uniformities of causal relations, however, do not deal with the universe as a whole but with specific processes under certain limited conditions. Before one can determine a specific causal relation there must be an isolated system within which it holds. The isolated system may be very broad, as the one in the first law of motion, which includes every particle of matter under all conditions; or it may be more restricted, as in the second law of motion, which is limited to bodies falling under specific conditions. But whether the scope of isolation should be broad or narrow, causal relation applies to limited spheres. There is no causal relation between the infinite whole and its parts. Causality refers to a relation between one part and another.[1] It should also be noted that uniformity or constant relations are sought in terms of numerical relations. In ordinary experience, and in the early stages of a science, the described uniformities are of a general character, such as that all unsupported bodies fall, fire burns paper, etc.; but causal explanation, in its advanced stages, is not content with such vague statements of uniformities. The uniformities which are sought are the ones which can be correlated with precise, numerical relations.

A third characteristic which has often been associated with causality is the concept of determinism or necessity. This third trait of causality has been violently criticized. From Hume to Russell it has been a common contention that necessity is a fiction and that causality merely means invariable connection of uniformity of processes. For the present, without analysing the objections raised to the necessity or determinism of causal relations, I shall limit myself to brief comments on the meaning of necessity, and on the specific sense of necessity in the causal relation.

Though necessity, or determinism, should be a fiction or a myth, it is certainly not a meaningless concept. Hume, who presents the most effective objections to the concept of necessity, was quite certain that the concept had a meaning, since otherwise his criticisms would have been of no importance. What then is necessity? Briefly, necessity refers to deductive systems where from self-evident, postu-

[1] S. Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity*, vol. i, p. 288.

lated, or "convenient" concepts other concepts are derived. The clearest illustration of the notion of necessity is the concept of classes where the implicative relation is that of inclusion, or that of from species to genus.

Causal relations are deterministic in the sense that cause and effect contain implicative relations. Causal laws connect the elements of experience in terms of some logical or mathematical pattern, and these mathematical patterns are fundamentally assertions of mutual implications between the parts of an equation. Causal laws assert something more than the sequence of events. Day follows night, but we never consider night to be the cause of day. Or cloven-footedness is co-existent with ruminance, but we never interpret this co-existence in terms of causal relation. In causality there is the assumption that a given result is due to, or is determined by, the existence of some other factor. This factor is the principle of identity. To say that the same thing may act on the same thing under the same conditions, yet produce different effects, is to say that a thing need not be what it is. But this is an untenable position. For a thing to be at all it must be something, and it can only be what it is. When we assert that there is necessity or determinism between A and X, what we mean to say is that A acts as it does because it is what it is.[1]

2. *Causal Entities.*—Most liberally, causal entities may be defined as perceptual entities. Causality begins with perceptual experience and attempts to make it intelligible. The entities of this stage may be called the pre-analytic entities.[2] The pre-analytic entities of causality are the events of the perceptual world. These events offer problems. How does wood float? How does reproduction occur? What is the nature of the movement of the heavenly bodies? Another way of stating the pre-analytic stage of causal entities is to consider them as the elements of nature, when nature means that which is "disclosed in sense-perception,"[3] and when at the same time it is assumed that nature is something that can be thought of as "a closed system whose mutual relations do not require the expression of the fact that they are thought about."[4] It is usual, however, to define the perceptual diversities as physico-chemical entities. This second stage is the post-analytic stage of causal entities. Is it possible to frame a definition of causal entities to include various kinds of entities? To select any one of them would be rather arbitrary. What is necessary is to present the most general traits of the different kinds of causal entities.

[1] H. W. B. Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic*, p. 408.

[2] J. Loewenberg, "Pre-Analytical and Post-Analytical Data," *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. xxiv, pp. 5–14.

[3] A. N. Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature*, p. 4.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

First of all, causal entities, both the pre-analytic and the post-analytic types, have their status within the space-time continuum. Causal entities are not purely logical entities; they are existences, that is to say, they can be located in space and dated in time. The spatio-temporal habitat of causal entities differentiates them from other types of entities, such as the logical or psychical. What, then, does status within the space-time continuum mean? For the present we need not settle the question whether space-time categories should be interpreted in terms of the absolute theory or the relational theory; nor is it necessary to determine the further metaphysical question whether space-time is, as Whitehead holds, merely an abstraction from events, or, as Alexander argues, the stuff of which all finite things are made. It is sufficient to say that causal entities have *position* in the space-time continuum. An example of spatial position would be: *A* is to the left of *B*. An example of temporal position would be: *A* stands in the relation of simultaneity or succession to *B*.[1] Causal entities require a system of reference; and whatever one's theory of space-time might be, these categories are taken to be a system of reference; and this is what is important for the present discussion.

Causal entities, in the second place, are physical quantities. By quantity, I do not mean the unchanging reals of the classic physics, but rather entities which are sufficiently constant to have numbers assigned to them by measurement. Causal explanation is functional correlation between variable physical quantities (numbers). Causal entities are therefore measurable. There are, of course, different theories as to what the fundamental physical quantities are. In the traditional mechanical theory of nature the physical quantity was the mass; in the electrodynamic theory it is the electric charge, or the electromagnetic field. The question as to how the property of the physical quantity represented by mass differs from the property of the physical quantity represented by charge is unanswerable in terms of immediate experience. Operationally, however, the difference between matter and electricity is that "the number called the mass of a body is assigned by methods which differ from those by which the number called the charge is assigned, and the mass and electric charge enter into different functional relations with other quantities."[2] Causal entities as physical quantities are symbols represented by matrices. Causal entities exclude, therefore, vitalistic or non-physical entities; but they should be interpreted with sufficient breadth to include heterogeneous physical entities.

A definition of causality can now be made. In a most general way *causality is a type of explanation which employs only functional*

[1] V. F. Lenzen, *Physical Theory*, pp. 50–84.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 283.

correlations and only physico-chemical entities. Should one prefer a more specific statement about the nature of causal relations and causal entities, the definition of causality would be the following: *causality is constituted in the non-anthropomorphic, uniformitarian, and deterministic correlations between sets of entities which are physical quantities within the space-time continuum.*

II

In the preceding section the meaning of causality was analysed. We now come to another problem related to causality. Is causality applicable to nature? The question concerns the ontological status of causality. To claim the applicability of causality to nature is meaningless unless we can verify our claims. At the present stage of experimental science it is impossible to verify the universal applicability of causality. One has to wait with patience for this verification, should such a stage ever arrive. In absence of empirical verification, however, it is possible to strengthen the case for causality by meeting some of the arguments against it. This method is at best an indirect one. I shall not discuss all the possible objections to causality. Such an attempt would mean practically the rewriting of the history of philosophy from Anaxagoras to Whitehead. I shall limit the discussion to two current arguments raised against causality. For convenience the first may be called the argument from history, and the second the argument from uniformities of natural laws as statistical.

1. *History.*—The general claim of the argument from history is that causal or scientific knowledge presents merely a description or abstraction, whereas historical or appreciative knowledge gives a concrete insight and understanding of reality. Causality is, at best, only a useful and practical scheme in dealing with experience. "The world of appreciation is the . . . deeper reality," writes Royce. "Its rival, the world of description, is the result of essentially human finite outlook."[1] Scientific description is necessary, but abstract and inadequate; but as it is "anybody's world" it gives unity to experience. To make our description valid for all human beings, the fashions of causal or scientific description have to be universal. We cannot describe, however, "the unique, *e.g.* Shelley's 'sense that at the winds of spring,' etc. That we have to appreciate."[2] For Ward, too, it is history not science or mechanism which can give us reality in its concreteness. "With the experience in the concrete, we can deal satisfactorily in no other way," writes Ward, "and no competent thinker dreams of interpreting the history of the world by means

[1] *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 411. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 398.

of a scheme of universal laws."[1] In history "we find no mere repetition, no absolute fixity, small scope for measurement or for mathematics, the indispensables of all scientific *conception*; yet, though affording thus little foothold for positive and exact science, the historical is what we *understand best* and what concerns us most."[2]

The claim of the argument from history does not seem to me a well-founded doctrine. It may be granted that existing beings, animate and inanimate, are individuals, that they are concrete and unique. This belief, however, need not lead one to a sharp separation between the historic and the causal types of knowledge. All significant assertions about the individual or the concrete are in terms of universals and abstractions. No historical knowledge can possibly dispense with the disparaged abstractions. Take any historical event which is individual, unique, and unrepeatable, such as the invasion of Russia by Napoleon. Each incident and happening in this campaign, such as Napoleon's march through Poland, his encounter with Russians at Borodino, the setting on fire of Moscow by Russians before Napoleon's entrance, the enormous loss of men in the campaign, etc., is unique and unrepeatable. All these happenings, however, are described in terms of concepts and universals. Apart from universals, such as "encounter," "fire," "entrance," "loss," terms which are applicable to many other situations, the understanding of these unique events would be impossible. The proposition that reality is historic, individual, concrete should not be identified with the untenable doctrine that the individual is real apart from concepts or abstractions.

On the other hand, scientific knowledge, which is discredited because of its abstractions, does not dispense with the concrete or the individual. The aim of natural science is to understand the nature of the actual world, and not to construct the laws of all possible worlds. The geologist who is trying to determine and analyse the various stages of the evolution of the earth is dealing with something which is specific, unique, and individual. The incidents here are almost as unrepeatable as Napoleon's Russian campaign. In a more limited sense, the same is true with the physicist. The physicist in his laboratory experiments with individual objects. The fact that he is interested in laws, or causal connections, should not lead one to the belief that he has no concern with the individual or the concrete. The discovered laws are laws of specific realms of existence. It should also be noted that the historian, not unlike the scientist, is engaged in determining certain uniformities and laws of the human race. The acceptance or rejection of alleged facts, the weighing of evidence, is often determined in terms of these laws. In this respect

[1] *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. II, p. 280. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 280.

the method of a critical historian is very similar to that of an exact scientist.[1]

Yet one might agree on one point with Ward's and Royce's contention. It might be reasonably held that the same situation or object may be described from different points of view. Logicians have been long conversant with the peculiarities of the principles of classification, of which many are available for arranging objects of our experience. The smallest book in size in one's library may be the biggest in value. An object may exhibit different characteristics through its relation to different types of classification. To claim, as the materialists do, that existence should be classified only in terms of one *fundamentum divisionis*, namely, causality, shows, to say the least, a lack of metaphysical imagination. It is much more fruitful to assume the possibility of a number of principles of classification, and to determine in terms of empirical verification which are most relevant, fruitful, and enlightening in their application to experience. An object may be a model of causality, yet at the same time exhibit characteristics of purpose. In a situation like this there is no necessity to consider causality as appearance, or as merely practical. Causality is an objective aspect of existence, though existence may have other aspects.

2. *Uniformities as Statistical Averages.*—As a second objection to causality it is argued that the uniformities expressed in laws are only approximately exemplified, and never with rigid exactness. The relations between phenomena are constant in the sense that they hold within very narrow limits. We have no warrant, it is claimed, for saying that they are absolutely constant. The so-called uniformities of nature are only statistical averages. The actual course of events may conform to these uniformities within certain limits, but to claim absolute uniformity is to go beyond empirical knowledge.

The ground for the view that uniformities are of the statistical type is based first of all on the fact that the so-called rigid, causal relations are never verified in our experience. Taylor, for example, points out that "the undeviating conformity of the actual course of any concrete process to scientific law 'cannot be verified as an empirical fact by observation or experiment.'[2]" Similarly, Royce writes: "What we verify are more or less permanent rules relating to the routine of nature phenomena. In other words, our common experience discovers states, more or less persistent."[3]

Secondly, it is pointed out that the view that uniformities of nature are only statistical averages is strengthened by the consideration of the actual method of the scientists. In many cases,

[1] M. R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature*, pp. 12–15.
[2] *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 223.
[3] *The World and the Individual*, vol. ii, p. 186.

if not in all, uniformities have been obtained by statistical method. The measurements of molecules are all made in bulk. What is really measured is "the combined effect of millions, or it may be of billions, of molecules."[1] As we cannot deal with individual atoms but only with the aggregate or bulk, the fluctuations, if very small, are considered as non-existent. The physicist, like the sociologist, is confined to the statistical method. The only difference between the two is that the former deals with less striking individuals.

It is interesting to observe that the doctrine that nature is relatively indetermined and that the uniformities of nature are only statistical, a view which would have been violently criticized by most of the physicists not many years ago, is a fashionable and popular doctrine since the recent developments of the quantum theory. Eddington, for example, writes: "It is a consequence of the advent of the quantum theory that *physics is no longer pledged to a scheme of deterministic law.*"[2] Similar views are expressed by Weyl, Heisenberg, and Reichenbach, to mention but a few. One suspects that the willingness of the modern mind to accept the doctrine that nature is indetermined is not solely based on the consideration of facts, nor mainly on the traditional motives for making place for God, freedom, and immortality. Our age dislikes strict laws of all types. We dislike strict laws in government, in morality, and in aesthetics. Our emotional lives are chaotic for innumerable reasons: we love primitive dances, unintelligible poetry, bizarre paintings, noisy music, and vague concepts. It is not strange, therefore, that we should also carry the same attitude into our descriptions of nature. A chaotic and indeterminate nature would be in harmony with chaotic and indeterminate experience. I do not mention these considerations to discard the doctrine I am considering. I admit the possibility that nature may be relatively, or wholly if one likes, indeterminate and chaotic. I see no reason for the impossibility of the doctrine. It should be noted, however, that the claim that uniformities are ultimately statistical is not a verified fact, but rather a certain interpretation of certain accepted facts. The very same facts have a different possible interpretation.

That measurements and physical comparisons are never exact, that uniformities have been attained by statistical methods, and that the invariant relations have never been completely verified, are facts which one should admit readily; these facts, however, are explicable without the denial of causality. The inexactness of measurements and physical comparisons may be due not to any indeterminism in nature but to the lack of finer instruments or precise formulation of the physical problems; in short, to the lack

[1] Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. i, p. 100.

[2] *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 294.

of knowledge. Even in the quantum theory, where, at the present stage of its development, the very nature of the problem demands the principle of indeterminacy, as the simultaneous determination of the momentum and of the position of the electrons are impossible, it should be noted that indeterminacy does not mean indeterminism in the sense of uncaused happening, but rather in the sense of immeasurability. As Turner points out, the implications of Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy are often confused, owing to the ambiguity of the expression to "determine."[1] Determinism usually means "unvarying causation." In the principle of indeterminacy "to determine" means not "to cause," but simply "to ascertain."

There is no conflict whatsoever between causality and the use of the statistical method. In physics, for example, the statistical method was first developed to deal with problems related to microscopic entities. Although molecules may be causally determined, recourse is made to the statistical method because of the crudity of our senses and the complexity of mathematical problems. Similarly, in meteorology and in social sciences complexities demand the use of the statistical method. Here again one need not forgo causality. Though the traits of the group are described by statistical laws, variations may have specific causal connections, and one may gradually ascertain these connections.

Theoretically we must admit the possibility that the ultimate laws of nature may be statistical. Causality, however, is equally compatible with the given facts, and pragmatically preferable. If statistical laws are ultimate, there is then no theoretical reason to find the causes of variation; but progress has been attained by looking for the causal connection of these variations.

[1] Turner, E., "Determinism," *Nature*, December 27, 1930, p. 995.

THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE AND THE GOLDEN RULE

E. W. HIRST, M.A., B.Sc.

Is the assimilation of these two formulations of the moral principle by Kant and some of his expositors justified?

In the *Analytic of Pure Practical Reason* Kant claims that his view of morality agrees with the ancient command that man should love his neighbour as himself. Also in the *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals* he regards the Golden Rule as a deduction, though with several limitations, from the second version of the Categorical Imperative.

Abbott in his Memoir of Kant (*Kant's Theory of Ethics*, p. lii) assimilates to the Categorical Imperative both the Golden Rule and Clarke's principle of Equity. William Wallace in his small book on Kant does the same. Henry Sidgwick is very definite on the matter. After quoting Clarke's Rule of Equity ("Whatever I judge reasonable or unreasonable that another should do for me, that by the same judgment I declare reasonable or unreasonable that I should in the like case do for him"), he observes that it is the Golden Rule precisely stated, and adds that it appears to him to coincide to a considerable extent with Kant's fundamental principle of duty. Sidgwick's own formulation of the Rule of Equity is as follows: "If, therefore, I judge any action to be right for myself I implicitly judge it to be right for any other person whose nature and circumstances do not differ from my own in some important respects." He arrives at the truth of this by considering the relation of the integrant parts to a whole and to each other, and finding it thereby self-evident that the good of any one individual is of no more importance from the point of view of the universe than the good of any other. This seems to mean that difference of persons makes no difference to the reasonableness of any action that may be pronounced right in a definite set of circumstances.

We contend that there does exist after all a difference of meaning in the three formulations of the moral principle just mentioned. The Categorical Imperative seems to us to be *uni-personal*; the Rule of Equity appears to be *extra-personal* in the sense that the personal factor can be disregarded in judging what is reasonable in action; the Golden Rule, on the other hand, seems to be essentially *inter-personal.*

At this time of day further discussion of the Categorical Impera-

tive is apt to be wearisome; it might be thought that there existed general agreement as to its meaning. And yet as recently as last year (1932) Professor Field felt it necessary to give Kant's first statement of the Imperative a serious re-examination in the pages of *Mind*. Field agrees that in that statement Kant is saying not merely that if I think that I ought to do any action, I must also believe that anyone else ought to do the same action in the same circumstances; but is implying in addition that I definitely *will* that other people should act similarly in similar circumstances. This interpretation does not seem to us to mean more than that I wish that everyone else should be moral in the Kantian sense. The existence of other people does not seem to be essential to my own morality in any other way.

We ourselves take the first version of the Categorical Imperative to mean no more than that, if I can conceive my action universalized without contradiction, then the action is right. Morality depends upon a certain ability to will, i.e. to will without contradiction: what is universalizable is right. If this interpretation is correct, how exactly on this view is my morality related to other persons? The reference to other persons, we submit, is only indirect and instrumental in order to find out what is duty for myself. Consider Kant's own illustration—that of promise-breaking. Promise-breaking is wrong, according to him, not because of any disrespect, or lack of regard, or love, for other people, but because such a practice could not be universalized. Universal promise-breaking would, as a matter of fact, be impossible, not because of any contradiction of a logical kind, but because, human nature being what it is, an inevitable reaction would take place: faith in all promises being lost, promises would not be made. Now it is true that other people are in the picture all the time, but they supply nothing more than a background, and otherwise are not needed. Other people are even less conspicuously in the picture when Kant illustrates his position by the immorality of suicide. For the wrong of suicide, according to him, has nothing to do with the selfish disregard of the claims which others have on a man's life and service, but arises out of a kind of contradiction, viz. the contradiction of using the impulse which should secure the preservation of life for the purpose of its destruction. Again, the reason why it is wrong not to help others in their need is merely that we should by such conduct land ourselves in inconsistency when we required and called for help for ourselves. Here again wrong seems to rest upon a species of contradiction, the attitude to other persons being a subordinate consideration. Kantian morality is really uni-personal.

It might be thought that in the second version of the Categorical Imperative the social reference is direct and essential, inasmuch as

the formula runs: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another, in any case as an end withal, never as a means only." Here, of course, the individual is definitely regarded as being in some relation to others: we are called upon to treat other persons as "ends." It will, however, be noted that Kant regards the individual as an end "*in himself.*" "Rational beings," he says, "are called persons, because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves." . . . "Every (other) rational being regards its existence similarly." Surely the point of view is monadistic, and the type of morality uni-personal. Consider Kant's instances of breaches of the maxim. Suicide is wrong because the suicide, who should regard himself as an end in himself, uses himself as a means —as a thing. But, says Kant, "a man is not a thing, that is to say, something which can be used merely as means, but must in all his actions be always considered as an end in himself." The wrong of promise-breaking is declared to consist in using another man as a means, and failing to treat him also as an end in himself. Here the point of view does seem to be inter-personal rather than uni-personal. But it is scarcely *positively* inter-personal. There is inculcated the sound negative principle that we must avoid using other people merely as means. But the implication is that the positive task of realizing one's rational nature as an end is each man's own affair. The single self can be as truly moral as the self in association with other selves.

The third formula of the Categorical Imperative runs: "Act as a member of a Kingdom of Ends." By "kingdom," said Kant, "I understand the union of different rational beings in a system by common laws, i.e. a kingdom which may be called a kingdom of ends, since what these laws have in view is just the relation of these beings to one another as end and means." Here, again, it seems as though Kant had advanced beyond the uni-personal view of morality, inasmuch as he conceives of a social community of individuals each of whom is reciprocally end and means to the others. We find, however, that this system of selves is such only because of having common laws. There is no suggestion that selves are united in any sense other than that they are alike subject to the same idea of duty. Kant still regards the self monadistically, able to attain ethical perfection by itself. In the words of Edward Caird, "Kant implies that each individual, as a moral or rational being, is alone with himself, and that it is only through his sensuous or outward life that he comes into contact with others. . . . In spite of his idea of a kingdom of ends, reverence before the abstract law is still treated as the essential and necessary form of the moral standard."

In the *Critique of Practical Reason* there is at least one clear statement which definitely excludes from the nature of morality

any interpersonal regard or devotion. For Kant there declares that other persons are never in any case an object for our "respect." The object of "respect" or reverence is not, strictly speaking, another person, even though the situation may be a social one, but rather the "law" which the example of another person exhibits. Some might say that such a view of morality is not even uni-personal, but extra-personal, inasmuch as other persons possess only instrumental value as exhibitors of something considered in abstraction from themselves.

When Kant likens his own view of morality to the Jewish and Christian principle of love to one's neighbour, it turns out that what he means by love is "practical love," which, he adds, is "liking to practise all duties" towards the neighbour. But since Kant regards "liking" as suspect on the ground that inclination is tainted with hedonism, and therefore heteronomous, the love of our neighbour from the Kantian point of view reduces down to the practice of social duty, not from any regard for our neighbour as such, but from reverence or respect for the Moral Law. In the Preface to the *Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* Kant makes it clear that he has no other conception of love than that of a merely emotional or sentimental type, called by him "pathological." He definitely states that it cannot be a matter of will or volition.

Here we may interpolate a few words about Clarke's Rule of Equity, which according to Sidgwick is obtained by considering the similarity of the individuals that make up a Whole. The standpoint, we suggested, is really *extra-personal* in view of the fact that acts are considered apart from agents, and situations in abstraction from persons. The Rule of Equity appears to mean no more than that similar situations require similar acts. Indeed Clarke's whole attitude to moral questions was mathematical, or quasi-mathematical, as the following quotation from his works makes clear: "All wilful wickedness and perversion of right is the very same Insolence and Absurdity in Moral matters, as it would be in natural things for a man to pretend to alter the certain proportions of numbers, to take away the demonstrable relations and properties of mathematical figures." According to Clarke, individuals are merely so many units in a whole, who, because of their similarity as units, should practise similarity of behaviour in similar cases. On such a view morality is not a question of the direct attitude of one person to another; it is rather a quasi-mathematical problem.

When we pass to the Golden Rule we go beyond this extra-personal and abstract standpoint; we transcend even uni-personal morality; we definitely arrive at an inter-personal formula. The Golden Rule is, of course, a far more ancient formulation of moral principle than that attained by any ethical theorist. Indeed, it is

widespread as well as ancient, being found in Zoroastrianism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Hellenism, and in Christianity. A formulation so widespread, and so ancient, demands serious respect from the theorist in morals. Any theory of conduct that runs counter to its implications assumes a great responsibility, and risks being unreal.

The Golden Rule implies more than an equality of consideration as between one individual and another; it makes the direct attitude of individuals to one another central and essential. It does not say merely that what is reasonable for one man to do to another is reasonable for any other man in the same circumstances. It does not primarily teach impartiality of judgment on acts considered in abstraction from the agents; rather does it inculcate impartiality of regard between the agents themselves. So long as we use the ideas of similarity and equality which pertain to the maxim of Equity, we relate acts and situations rather than persons. The Golden Rule relates to persons, and involves the idea of unity. Clarke's Rule of Equity could, we think, be applied by persons whose attitude to each other was one of indifference, or even animosity. All it requires is equality of treatment; whereas the Golden Rule implies community of interest, and teaches impartiality of regard.

The logic of the Golden Rule was appreciated by the ancient seers and prophets. Confucius interpreted it as reciprocity. A successor of his drew out the full implication about two hundred years later. Mo Tzu, as he was called (born about 468 B.C.), traced all evil to the one root of selfishness. The following is an extract from his principal treatise entitled, *The Love of All*:

> "The source of disorder in a State lies in the lack of mutual love. . . . A thief loves his own family, but because he has not a similar love for the families of others, he proceeds to steal from their homes to add to his own. . . . Rulers of States love their own territory, but having no love for other States, they proceed to attack them in order to increase their own possessions. What is the remedy for this state of things? . . . If we were to regard the property of others as we regard our own, who should steal? If we were to have the same regard for the territory and people of another State as we have for our own, who would conduct aggressive warfare? . . . If we were to have the same regard for others as we have for ourselves, who would do anyone an injustice?"

That the real meaning of Mo Tzu's teaching was understood by his contemporaries may be guessed from the remark of one who reacted against its idealism in these words: "Excellent Sir, your theory is sublime, but it is impracticable"!

According to Mo Tzu the problem of conduct is essentially interpersonal, not merely in the sense that others are inevitably affected by our actions, but in the sense that the aim of morality is the unification of the wills of men. At an earlier date than that of Mo Tzu, advanced thought in Judaism had arrived at the idea of duty or righteousness as meaning the love of self and neighbour, albeit the term "neighbour" was for a long time limited to fellow-Jew, or resident alien. Jesus, in summarizing the teaching of the Law and the Prophets enunciated the Golden Rule in its then traditional form, and also the principle of love to our neighbour. So the presumption is that to Him these were not opposed or contradictory, but virtually equivalent.

The Golden Rule has met with plenty of criticism—some of it too subtle to be convincing. Kant observes that many a one would gladly consent that others should not benefit him, provided only that he might be excused from showing benevolence to *them*. It is a question whether we could really "will" such independence, which in any case is quite impossible as a matter of fact. If, again, it be said that a criminal might use the Golden Rule to argue against the judge who punishes him, the reply would be that such a use of the Rule would be naïvely literalistic. The Rule does not teach that, as between two persons there must be similarity in the details of behaviour, but rather impartiality of interest; from that point of view the criminal must endorse the verdict of the judge, as the judge must expect and approve the same verdict were he the criminal.

A common form of criticism of the Golden Rule is that it permits reciprocity in evil. Kant instances the example of a married couple bent on ruin, with the comment: "O marvellous harmony, what he wishes, she wishes also"! There is also the familiar illustration of fellowship among a band of thieves. "If," says Mr. Carritt, "we are to take seriously the contention that it is coherence which makes acts right, surely it must be actual coherence with actual desires and wills of actual people—even conformity with the ways of mankind, including among mankind the most barbarous tribes and races."

In our view the Golden Rule does teach a doctrine of coherence; it implies, to use T. H. Green's language, "a will of all which is the will of each." But it precludes a merely sectional coherence between a few, which, because it is sectional, is no more than an example of co-operative egoism, such as we can see in a selfish family, in a band of thieves, in an aggressive nation, or empire.

If we use the idea of coherence with which Professor H. J. Paton has made us so familiar, then we should maintain that the coherence inculcated by the Golden Rule is:

(1) Not sectional, but *universal* in its range. We are to do, not simply to a few selected individuals just the particular things we

wish them to do to us, but we are to do unto man as man what we would have any and every man do to us. In other words, it must be coherence with humanity as a whole which must inform and inspire every human attachment of narrower range.

(2) In the next place, the coherence implied by the Golden Rule is scarcely coherence with the "*wills*" of men. "Wills" suggests actuality and concretion; it implies the historic rather than the ideal aspect of volition. He indeed would be an optimist who looked to find morality in every phase and institution of social life. The quality of the sociality behind social institutions varies greatly from the ethical point of view. Some of it is largely of the instinctive type; some of it rises no higher than is necessary to realize the aim of mutual convenience. The object of coherence is more than the "wills" of other men; that is too abstract a conception. If we substitute the term "love" for that of "coherence," it will be at once realized that we cannot love a "will." Strictly speaking, we can love only *persons*. And to "love" a person is far more than to agree with his volition; it is to achieve a fundamental unity of life which may be quite compatible with disagreement with actual volition.

(3) Finally, the Categorical Imperative and the Golden Rule differ in regard to the nature of their dependence on Religion. The former is an autonomous principle; it is a law of reason which we impose on ourselves. "All moral conceptions," Kant tells us, "have their seat and origin completely *a priori* in the reason." Religion is thus far not essential as a basis for morality. Kant does introduce the idea of God, but only as a postulate for the purpose of making his theory complete. And "if there is no more profound and ultimate reason for my reverence for the good will than that it is my own will, does not absolute reverence for the good will and its law of duty degenerate into self-worship?" (A. E. Taylor: *The Faith of a Moralist*, i, p. 152). Now the Golden Rule, in its Christian setting and Jewish tradition (not to speak of other Faiths), relates the love of self and neighbour to the supreme love of God. Conduct and worship merge. To speak in terms of coherence, our coherence with each other is mediated by our coherence with the Whole regarded as Conscious, Intelligent, Personal, and Loving. Few would deny that the Universe is in some way a coherent Whole which maintains itself from moment to moment. Included in this Whole are the millions of rational beings whose own maintenance from moment to moment depends upon their connection with the Whole. Within this Whole they are able to introduce the kind of incoherence which we call evil, which, however, does not mean incoherence in the realm of fact. Evil is quite coherent with the Whole conceived as mere Matter or Energy. But if there are reasons for thinking that the Whole is the expression of Mind, if further this Mind is integrative in purpose and trend,

then so far as rational creatures can do so, they should themselves, in harmony with the Universe so understood, integrate their own lives with each other and with the Whole. If this seems like circular reasoning, if we are interpreting the Whole as Love in analogy with human experience of integration, and then resting the obligation of human love on the nature of the Whole conceived as loving, such circularity of thought is but the movement of faith. Deep calleth unto deep. The Divine without us and the divine within us act and react the one on the other.

THE HEGELIAN ABSOLUTE AND THE INDIVIDUAL

P. T. RAJU, M.A.

THE aim of this paper is not to enter into a detailed discussion of the nature of the Absolute and the Individual, but to show that on the Hegelian conception of the Absolute the individual self is not saved. Hegel is fond of reiterating that his Absolute is not a bare one, but a one in many, an organic whole, a perfect and harmonious system of an infinite number of individual selves. The individual, as in Spinoza and Schelling, does not lose itself in the Absolute. The latter is not a lion's den into which all animals enter but from which none returns, not a mere darkness in which all cows are black, but a system of different individuals.

To say that the individual self is preserved in the Absolute is more an arbitrary dictum than a reasoned conclusion. From the fact that every existent thing is an identity in difference, we cannot argue that the Absolute too is so. Our world is a bundle of contradictions, but the Absolute is not such a bundle. Even one of the earliest Greek philosophers, Anaxagoras, arrived at the conclusion that his oiomerae, or the original particles, contained something of everything in themselves. If his solution is too physical, Hegel's is too logical. And if life is more than logic, the Absolute must be certainly much more.

It is still a controversial point whether Hegel held the view of personal immortality. Some like McTaggart believe that he did, but others do not. Says Stace: "It is a matter of dispute whether Hegel believed in immortality in the *literal* sense. I have only space here to indicate, without reasons, my own opinion, which is that he did not take it literally, but regarded it as a *Vorstellung* for the infinitude of spirit and the absolute value of spiritual individuality. Immortality is a present quality of the spirit, not a future fact or event."[1] Lord Haldane holds the same view. Dr. Haldar, too, expresses a similar opinion, though not exactly the same, in his *Philosophical Essays*.[2]

On one of his principles, it is true that Hegel could not have held the view of personal immortality. Dr. Haldar points out that, according to Hegel, the relation of body and mind is very intimate. One implies the other. So, when the body is destroyed, it inevitably

[1] *The Philosophy of Hegel*, p. 514.

[2] The chapter on "Hegelianism and Immortality."

follows that the mind ceases to exist. If so, how is the individual self preserved in the Absolute? Are we to be nothing after the continuous warfare of a whole life? Is our destruction a mere dissipation into elements to be reorganized by the Absolute into a new whole? Immortality cannot be a mere *Vorstellung* for the infinitude of spirit. It is absurd to contend that the spirit which is eternal will cease to exist after the death of the body.

Yet, on another of his principles, Hegel cannot deny personal immortality, though, unlike Rāmānuja, he is not explicit on the point. Western philosophers do not make any distinction between mind and self. And, according to Hegel, mind, as it is here, is a product of illusion or *Tauschung*. The final end is eternally attained in the Absolute; all our strife is due to illusion; mind is actually in strife here; hence mind as it appears here is due to illusion, and must have another aspect, which is perfect. From the absolute point of view mind is eternally liberated. So when mind realizes this state, it becomes immortal.

But even then it is impossible to retain the individual self in the Absolute. The latter, or Īśwara, as it is called by Rāmānuja, is an organism. The innumerable selves are its members. But then, in the liberated state, how are we to distinguish one jīva from another? We can find no differentia. The paradox of relations, which Bradley raises, is not new to Indian philosophy. Sankara raises the same difficulty. And in the Absolute no contradiction can be left unsolved.

Here it may be objected that, when Hegel asserted that he has saved the individual, he means that the self, which is regarded as unreal by Sankara and others, is really the individual. Even then his position is not tenable. Besides the paradox of relations, and the objection that the striving self, according to Hegel, must be an illusion, there are many difficulties in his view. The theory of internal relations is a corollary of the organic conception. In a system any act of one member necessarily affects others. Its relations to the other members are constitutive, and therefore internal. As Bradley says, even spatial and temporal relations have to be regarded as internal. If an individual changes his place, there arises a change in his very nature, though imperceptible to our finite view. Thus individuality becomes only "a matter of content." The individuals "are only pipes through which the Absolute pours itself, jets, as it were, of one fountain." Each of them is only a "conflux of universals or qualities," mere adjectives of the Absolute. But then we cannot see how the individual is saved.

We can now understand why Bosanquet is forced to the conclusion that in the Absolute there is a blending of the individual selves, or, in Bradley's phrase, an "all-pervasive transference." The contents and qualities of the different selves are, as it were, shaken up together

and neutralized and supplement one another. But as the end is already attained in the Absolute on Hegel's view, the individuality of the individual must be a mere illusion, for the contents of the different individuals are already shaken up together and neutralized. The conclusion is necessarily implied in the premise that the Absolute is an organic whole.

Royce seems to have striven very hard to save the individual. Individuality is not merely a "matter of content," but has some uniqueness in it. It is impenetrable. It is not a conflux or system of universals only. If otherwise interpreted, it loses its very nature. Royce lays emphasis upon its uniqueness and indescribability in other terms. Thus far he seems to be very near the truth. But when he falls back upon the Hegelian conception of organism, and says that the individual, as a unique purpose, forms a member of a system of such purposes, he loses the ground he has gained. To be a member of a system means to be interpretable in terms of others. Though in society some of our actions can be interpreted thus, our ultimate nature cannot be. Royce thinks that the Absolute too is a purpose, though a system of our finite purposes and in realizing our aims we are realizing the Absolute aim. But as Aliotta pertinently remarks, if what seems our aim is the aim of the Absolute, it cannot be truly ours, and *vice versa*. If the individual is preserved, the Absolute is lost; and if the Absolute is preserved, the individual is lost. The conclusion is inevitable.

Pringle-Pattison, in criticizing Bradley and Bosanquet, says that the individual should be a substance in the Aristotelian sense, though not in the Spinozistic.[1] But if Pringle-Pattison remains a Hegelian, we do not understand what advantage can be gained by making the individual a substance even in the Aristotelian sense. Though we can attach predicate after predicate to it, its ultimate nature remains only a matter of content. Being a member of an organic whole, it is through and through pierced by others. That is why Bradley says that even spatial and temporal changes produce corresponding changes in the individual's nature. Bradley and Bosanquet make the Absolute the ultimate subject of every predicate, though they have no objection in keeping the individual as a proximate subject. According to them, the Absolute is the only real individual, and from the metaphysical point of view, we, as finite centres of experience, are its adjectives. And they are justified in their conclusions.

To avoid the above consequences, philosophers like McTaggart assert the ultimate and metaphysical substantiality of the individual. It is "a substance existing in its own right." Says McTaggart, "if the opponent should remind me of the notorious imperfections in the

[1] *The Idea of God*, pp. 270–1.

present lives of each of us, I should point out that every self is in reality eternal, and that its true qualities are only seen in so far as it is considered as eternal. *Sub specie aeternitatis* every self is perfect. *Sub specie temporis*, it is progressing towards a perfection as yet unattained."[1] But as a Hegelian, McTaggart cannot dispense with the organic conception. The Absolute is the unity of the selves, and the unity is not external to them. "The unity must be completely in each individual, yet it must also be the bond which unites them. But to attain such a unity the selves must be internally related to each other. It is not enough to say that all the selves form a complete whole. There must be something in the constitution of each self to be a member of a perfect system. Even pre-established harmony, as in Leibnitz, cannot explain the fact. The nature of the individual must be able to provide for such a harmony. The theory of internal relations is therefore indispensable. The result will be that no individual can exist in its own right. We cannot have both a plurality of self-dependent substances and an essential unity between them.

Besides, if there is an individual who can exist and act in his own right, there must be scope for possibilities in the universe. They must be due to the freedom of the individual. But Bradley is forced by the logic of his position to remove the difference between the possible and the actual. In the metaphysical sense, the possible and the actual are the same. "Chance is the given fact which falls outside of some given whole or system."[2] But actually there is nothing which can fall outside the harmonious system of the Absolute. Hence there is no chance. The conclusion strictly follows from the Hegelian view which cannot allow the individual the freedom even to err. Joachim in his *Nature of Truth* tacitly admits the charge. To call freedom self-determination in no way strengthens the position.

The Hegelians are obsessed by the principle *ex nihilo nihil fit*. Any action proceeding from an individual must have a cause. In order to save his freedom, the cause is regarded not as external to him, but as his very nature. Yet his nature is formed by the externality, the rest of the universe. In it lies the final explanation of his actions. Freedom is freedom of self-determination, but the self is determined by the not-self. So all that issues from the individual is already there in the rest of the world. Whatever be the causes that led the ancient philosophers to formulate the principle *ex nihilo nihil fit*, it is called in question recently. Even realists like Russell disbelieve in it. In Indian philosophy, Sankara too questioned its validity. Satkāryavāda, according to him, is not valid in the metaphysical sense. And his followers cite as an instance the ordinary fact that out of cowdung scorpions are born. Whether we accept the

[1] *Mind*, N.S., Vol. XI, p. 388.
[2] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 388.

principle at the empirical level or not, it should not be applied in determining the nature of the individual, and must be considered invalid for the purpose.

Let us now examine Sankara's theory. We have seen that the chief condition of individuality is some unique indivisibility. Sankara's conception of jīva satisfies this condition in one way. On the principle of māyā, Sankara need not hold the theory of internal relations. They do not constitute the individual's nature. When one jīva is affected in one way, there is no corresponding change in others. Though his lower Brahman can be more or less compared to Rāmānuja's Īswara or Hegel's Absolute, Sankara asserts that the admission of its existence is only a compromise to some people's demand that philosophy should satisfy our religious instinct. In criticizing the Sānkhya conception of the oneness of Prakṛti on the ground that when one purusha (self) is liberated, all the rest also should be, the Sankarites point out that their māyā can be many.[1] On one's own avidyā ceasing to exist, those of the rest need not. Māyā can be one with regard to Īswara, and many for the jīvas. So far every jīva may be unique. It does not lose the quality in spite of the vāsanās and samskāras which are gathered through the round of deaths and births and enter into its nature.

Yet Sankara would say that our analysis is not complete. Though what is contributed by māyā for the jīva is unique, its contribution forms only a part of jīva's nature. The jīva owes its consciousness to Brahman. Ultimately both are identical. Brahman is the highest universal. Without it the jīva could not have the sense of "I." So, as regards its conscious nature, it is not unique. Hence, on Sankara's view, the jīva, though unique phenomenally, is not so noumenally. There is no personal immortality, but only impersonal. Immortality for the jīva means realizing its own identity with Brahman, and thus losing its own personality.

Sankara's conception of Brahman satisfies our condition of individuality to the full. In the sense of being one among many, his Brahman is not an individual. But we have seen above in examining the view of McTaggart that a one among many cannot be an individual if the many are to be essentially interrelated. Bradley says that a plurality of reals is not possible, for each would be disturbed by the external influences which would create internal discrepancy, and, again, a plurality of reals cannot be reconciled with their independence. But it is obvious that the assertion holds good only when essential interconnection between the reals is posited. To put Bradley's view more concretely, an essential relation is constitutive, and thus each real can be explained in terms of others, and is determined by them. Each loses its uniqueness and becomes

[1] Saravadarsana Samgraha.

merely a form in which any content may be packed. But if the reals are not thus related, if the relations of each to others are external, they do not form members of a system, and each becomes independent. The external influences cannot create internal discrepancies, and a plurality of reals cannot be inconsistent with their independence. Pluralists with a realistic bent of mind hold exactly such a view. But here we are not concerned with them, but with the idealists of the Hegelian type.

Nor is Sankara's Brahman an individual in the Bradleyan sense. It is true that Bradley and Bosanquet are more logical and advanced than the other Hegelians. They have shown that the individual selves as members of an organism cannot retain their uniqueness. The individuals somehow transform each other, blend with each other, and form the Absolute which is the real individual. Thus they are lost in it.

A few steps can easily lead us from Bradley to Sankara. According to the former, the many as such are lost in the Absolute. They all blend and together form the ONE. If so, they cannot remain there as many. They lose their many-ness or bahutva in it. Strictly speaking, the Sankarites assert that the Absolute cannot be said to be the ONE. If many-ness disappears in the Absolute, one-ness also goes with it. They are categories of thought, but the Absolute is above thought, or, in Bradley's terms, more than thought. If thought as such disappears in the Absolute, the categories cannot exist. Hence, Brahman is regarded as indescribable, anirvachanīya. Bradley says that it is inexplicable how the appearances blend in the Absolute, and how they issue forth from it. It is this principle of inexplicability that Sankara calls māyā.

In this connection Bradley seems to occupy a position between Rāmānuja and Sankara, and is thus a little in advance of the former. It is true that what he rejected as appearances he reclaimed as forming part of reality. Also, his Absolute, like Rāmānuja's, is a one in many, an organic whole. The finite centres of experience or the jīvas are the adjectives of the Absolute in both. But Bradley seems to have recognized and to have been more impressed by the self-contradictory nature of our finite existence than Rāmānuja. The former points out that the finite selves are riddled with contradictions, and hence cannot exist as such in the Absolute. They must blend and undergo complete transformation. But in Rāmānuja there is no such conception. Had Bradley given up his Hegelian bias, rejected the appearances as in no way forming part of reality, and thus saved the eternal perfection of the Absolute, he would have joined hands with Sankara. Says Professor Radhakrishnan, "At the centre of Sankara's system is the eternal mystery of creation, a mystery in which every movement of life and every atom of the

world are implicated."[1] Bradley's philosophy also has this mystery in its "somehow," by which the appearances issue forth from the Absolute. But the mystery loses its force by his reclaiming the appearances as belonging to reality. It is only unwillingly, as it were, that he admits the impotency of thought to grapple with the mystery of creation and atonement. And the admission, therefore, remains a conspicuous inconsistency with the rest of his system.

The crux of all monism, says Professor Radhakrishnan, is the relation of the finite to the infinite.[2] And Sankara seems to be the most successful in defining the relation. He has saved the individuality of the finite self both in its phenomenal and noumenal aspects. It is sufficiently unique in both. Phenomenally the individual self is māyā. But māyā can be many for the jīvas. On the liberation of any jīva, its own māyā vanishes. Hence each jīva is unique so far. Noumenally, every jīva is the Brahman which is without a second. So it is also unique, and thus an individual, though much more. Sankara has also overcome the difficulty—which McTaggart could not—of bringing the different selves existing in their own right into essential unity. Both make a distinction between the eternal and temporal aspects. But Sankara makes all the selves identical, *sub specie aeternitatis*, and many *sub specie temporis*. Māyā permits them as much individuality as is necessary, and in no way impairs it in uniting them. In their eternal aspect the jīvas are one, and the problem of uniting them does not arise for Sankara at all.

[1] *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 656. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 715.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE

M. LE ROY ON INTUITIVE THOUGHT

In his two volumes on *Intuitive Thought*[1] Professor Edouard Le Roy continues his idealistic interpretation of spiritual creativity, and turns from its 'products' manifested in biological and human evolution[2] to consider its most intimate character, as it is 'lived through' or directly experienced in intuitive and inventive thinking. The whole plan and its execution are determined by two characteristic themes of Bergsonism—intuition and the dynamical schema—though these are *repensés* in a quite original way. "Intuitive thought" and "metaphysical thought," M. Le Roy affirms in the preface, are "one and the same"; the latter is condemned only by those who misconceive the former. So by correcting misunderstandings he seeks to vindicate the method of intuition which Bergson advocated, and begins by attempting to elicit what is distinctive in philosophy. Its scope and character cannot be indicated with the same ease and sufficiency as those of any positive science. Once a field of objects, or a "subject-matter" is assigned, the construction of its science develops by procedures which involve abstracting from, and partitioning of, that field. Discovery of a new entity or adoption of a new point of view towards entities already known is sufficient to determine straightway a new science; the existence of the entity or the fruitfulness of the point of view entailing the legitimacy of that science. But what is most valuable and distinctive in philosophy cannot be conveyed in a similar way, by assigning some separate field of data. Its very history shows that there can be philosophy of any object whatever; any material admits of being studied philosophically. What is specific to the discipline, then, is a certain attitude or intent—"une disposition de l'âme"—which is "primarily a certain way of perceiving and thinking," hence, a "spirit" rather than a special content or 'private preserve.' The word properly denotes an activity or exercise, and not a structure of co-ordinated propositions. All philosophical thinking, no matter about what object, is "absolute thinking"; thinking not from this or that perspective, nor towards one or another restricted end, but thinking "dans une perspective d'unification intégrale." The single and vast problem confronting the philosopher, taken up by no special scientist, is "résorber la nature et l'histoire dans un éclair de conscience qui soit indivisiblement une vision et un acte." No one of the characterizations usually proposed adequately determines the nature of philosophical activity. To be sure, the philosopher is he who contends continually against imprisonment in any sort of prejudice; one who, in seeking simply to know, thereby liberates himself from every concern other than that of attaining full and certain knowledge, and one who aspires after a synthesis so synoptic and extensive that nothing of the wealth of thought and experience is sacrificed

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[1] Edouard Le Roy, *La Pensée intuitive: I—Au delà du Discours* (pp. 204; Fr. 15): *II—Invention et Vérification* (pp. 296; Fr. 20), both in the collection "Bibliothèque de la Revue des Cours et Conférences." Paris: Boivin.

[2] Cf. "M. Le Roy's Interpretation of Evolution," *Philosophy*, IX, 33, January 1934, pp. 89–93.

or compromised. He is, moreover, one in whom reason has become, as with the ancients, "habitude souveraine et vertu efficace," and one who is particularly sensitive to spiritual realities and values. All three characteristics are indispensable to designate the peculiar nature of philosophic exercise, for its practice is a threefold effort of criticism, speculation, and wisdom.

Science furnishes materials for the assay of knowledge, the "ballast for speculation," for it is the data and findings of the natural and social sciences which nourish and sustain philosophy. But science, reciprocally, has need of philosophy, if it is to understand itself as being the "work of the mind" that it is. So, though the sciences give philosophy "weight and substance," it is through philosophy alone that science can liberate and illuminate. One intrinsic limitation of science, however, lies in its inability to pass beyond the confines of organized and transformed experience, effected in accordance with the utilitarian needs of common sense. For, though widening the range of normal perception, science exaggerates its precision and acuity. All-absorbed in its objects, it ignores the contributions made by the interpreting subject. It ignores, too, that 'parcelling out' (morcelage) of experience which really derives from the analytic and abstracting character of our understanding, and errs precisely in taking this *parcelled* experience as the given, and as therefore both a material and a model for its operations. Science receives and utilizes, ready-made and without antecedent criticism, certain postulates or forms into which it forces experience in its effort to interpret it—thus remaining inescapably 'relative,' but without taking account of the fact. Thinking as restricted at the common-sense and scientific levels is incapable of grasping change in its very essence, "dans sa mobilité même"; its rôle is the auxiliary one of contributing to satisfy the demands of action and discursive reasoning, and it is in consequence more concerned with *states* than *transitions*—with that which is comparatively definite, stable, and suitable for utilization in discursive and industrial interests (thing, product, or effect) than with attaining a direct perception of the existent in its "immediate purity," freed from all "relativity" to perspective and situation, or to symbolic translation or utilitarian purpose. This "immediacy" we can never attain by thinking organized and limited as it is at the ordinary and scientific stages of cognitive evolution. Though the positive sciences (which are but an extension and refinement of common sense) do, indeed, aspire to theoretical disinterestedness, they must nevertheless remain, from their very procedure —by piecemeal revision, approximation, and partial self-correction—tributary to the anterior methods and habits of common sense. In sum, then, although it increases in precision and extent, correcting errors inherent in our perception and inference, science only succeeds in substituting for the "morcelage commun" another, more subtle and souple "morcelage," though no less infected with its own special 'relativity.' A critical revision of scientific results is therefore imperative. It must be a revision or substitution which shall correct the inherent tendency of science to immobilize and reify reality in its primitive fluidity, and, in order to disengage its "authentic essence," will institute what Bergson called "une recherche d'immédiat." In this search, no direct use can be made of the symbolism and devices found indispensable in action and discourse, and in this sense, intuitive thought which attains immediacy will be thinking "au delà du discours." Intuition alone can give "complete satisfaction to all the legitimate requirements of reason." It was Kant's erroneous assumption that in order to come by knowledge of ultimate reality a faculty independent of sensation and thought was required, and, failing to find such faculty, falsely inferred that no disclosure of ultimate reality was possible to minds constituted as ours. M. Le Roy maintains

against this that perception can attain to ultimate reality, and that this conclusion is free from the objections to which Kant's is exposed, precisely because Bergsonian intuition is not independent but emphatically dependent on sensation, and is immanent in the very conceptual nature of our discursive thinking. "Pensée vivante" is essentially "history" or becoming, dynamically continuous—"an uninterrupted growth of vital maturation"—and no mere conjunction of images and concepts. Consequently it is not these into which it can be analysed without remainder; for in so resolving it what is essentially the thinking will escape us. To characterize this process from which images and concepts flow—"la réalité vécue"—M. Le Roy introduces the dynamic schema, which is in fact "idée en marche." The notion is a difficult one and is elucidated by reference to William James's distinction[1] between "substantive parts" and "transitive parts" in the stream of thought. In a flow of actual thinking, the images, the concepts and their verbal expressions, which we retain, dwell attentively upon and abstract, are merely stopping stages ("stations conceptuelles," "époques d'arrêt") which we habitually mistake or substitute for real thinking activity. To conceive it so is to misrepresent it. For in attending to a set of interconnected concepts, we are no more attending to *thinking*, than in attending to several points on a curve already drawn we are attending to the *motion* of the body whose trajectory that curve describes. To overlook this is to confound the steps of a staircase with the action of ascending it. What such a description leaves out is just the content of the intervals between the successive awarenesses of concepts. And that content is not, indeed, just more 'filling' of the same kind (conceptual, imaginative), but that from which the "substantive parts," conceptual and sensory, arise, and therefore something prior to them. This underlying process, thinking "prise sur le vif," is that dynamic schema which Bergson describes as "développable en images ou concepts multiples sous forme implicite et potentielle." It is upon the dynamic schema in activity that an act of creative thought (intuition) so intervenes as to complete it. Since, in speaking of the dynamic schema we are speaking of the "transitive" and not of the "substantive" parts of 'la pensée vivante,' its character cannot be defined by concepts and through discourse, but only indicated indirectly. Examples of its presence, however, are plentiful; as, *e.g.*, when Racine declared "ma tragédie est faite," though not a line of it was written; when, trying to recall a name which is 'on our lips' yet does not come, we reject wrong names suggested but cannot utter the right one; wherever, in short, there is a "démarche de pensée productrice" creative of hypothesis, as in playing at chess, there is the dynamic schema in activity.

In view of this account of dynamic schematism and of the aim of philosophic practice, we are now in a position to understand in what "the return to immediacy" consists. As I understand it, it consists in intervening in any stream of discursive thinking, piercing through its conceptual contexture to the dynamic schema itself, and experiencing the content of the lived moment on which is overlaid the interpretation that we read off conceptually at the next instant (*i.e.* "avant que la tension intérieure de l'invention s'y soit cristallisée en résultat formulable"). It is to the 'cogito' that return must always be made. Plainly, then, the intuition in question is not the 'intuition in imagination' of Kant, nor the 'intuition of simple natures' of Descartes. Immediacy is evinced at two levels in epistemological evolution. At the earlier, before the continuous real has been broken apart and parcelled-out in thought in deference to the utilitarian motives of common sense and

[1] William James, *Principles of Psychology*, I, ch. ix, especially pp. 243–244.

science, it is exemplified in a less pure form, as co-existent with, but opposed to, the conceptual and imaginative contents of thinking. Immediacy occurs again, in a purer form, at the term of our discursive thinking, where it is disclosed in a genuinely creative act—purified from all the incrustations, conceptual, sensory, verbal, that concealed it in the meantime—as the fruition of a long and arduous process of discourse, analytic and symbolic, and therefore both posterior and superior to the discursive process from which it has issued. At its reappearance, it transcends not only the discursive process but also that opposition which discourse institutes and which its conceptual description presupposes—the distinction between subject and object, the knower and the known—so that conscious activity and creativity are ultimately seen to be one and the same. At the moment of insight there is no distinction of knower and known, then nascent reality in its primitive fluidity is *vécue*—hence the idealist character of M. Le Roy's philosophy. Full intuition is one with absolute existence, for these are simply two descriptions of a single process which is reality, the 'duality' of the descriptions corresponding to nothing in that unbroken reality itself, but only to something ineradicable from our *conception* of what it is to 'know reality.'

It remains to notice briefly the consequences, practical and theoretical, of this theory of intuitive thinking. Intuition is always in some degree inventive, and never is there invention in any field that does not issue in an act of insight. Here, as before, to comprehend the inventive character of thought is to know its *démarches*, not its *œuvres*. Life and thought are a gradual realization, not a summed reality, and philosophy is simply the spirit of invention become cognizant of its own initiatives and powers. The whole material of the sciences—its propositions, laws, principles of inference no less than its objects and facts—are through and through relative. What is at one date regarded as 'a fact' becomes modified by subsequent theory and inventive 'discovery.' Thus the whole practice of positive science is a process in which revision continually supersedes revision. Any one such revision is essentially a new vision of old facts in a new arrangement, and successful rearrangement is the discovery of new truth. But no new reorganization is ever a final and absolute arrangement, it marks only a stage towards some still further revision; hence any arrangement is a "verification" of some further revision, in the sense that it was solely from *that* arrangement a passage to the subsequent revision was possible. Invention and discovery consist, then, not simply in the perception of a 'new fact' ("substantive part"), nor simply in imagining a fresh arrangement of facts with which we are already familiar. There is no hard and fast division between 'fact' and 'form of organization.' An 'already-known fact' can only be a constellation of certain concepts organized in a certain way; discovery of a 'new fact' can be nothing but a more suggestive and fruitful *re*-conception of what was reified in our previous concepts, or a new *organization* of such re-conceptions. Novelty is in that sense relative. In so far as our present thinking about a field of 'parcelled-out' objects continues to employ or to presuppose the same fundamental concepts as our earlier thinking about that field, this present thinking only *develops their consequences*, and so far has not the character of genuine discovery or innovation. Only when the former field is contemplated under new concepts which themselves 'innovate' a new distribution, and a new definition, of the objects of the former field, have we discovery. And innovating imagination ("imagination novatrice") cannot operate until the former field has become so familiar that we can experiment in imagination upon it, dissociating at will what we had accepted as conjoined, and come in this way to envisage alternative possible systematiza-

tions. There must elapse a period of 'incubation,' during which all possible organizations are contemplated but none is chosen. Soon or late there then issues an anticipation or vision of the potential development of one, as against the other alternatives, and therewith its provisional and temporary acceptance. The whole process is continuous, the attainment of one organization of concepts being but a resting-stage and starting-point for the transition to another. Thus the processes of discovery and verification are themselves but "transitive parts" in thc continuous stream of intuitive thinking or actual becoming.

S. V. KEELING.

PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY

THE main interest of BERNARD BAVINK'S book on *Discoveries and Problems of the Natural Sciences*[1] lies in his comprehensive survey of scientific theories and his consideration of philosophical problems in relation to these theories. His method is to raise philosophical problems after presenting the scientific views which give rise to them. And accordingly it is unjust to concentrate on his philosophical opinions, as I intend to do. One can roughly indicate these opinions by saying that he believes the philosophy of science to be concerned with facts about existent things, and not with *a priori* forms of thought, nor with conventions adopted for convenience. He believes in *"metaphysics a posteriori."*

The book is divided into four sections dealing with chemistry, physics, astronomy, biology, psychology, and the sociological sciences. I shall only consider two of these sections—Section 1 (concerned with chemistry and physics) and Section 3 (concerned with biology)—so the reader must realize that the book contains a great many more problems than are here considered.

In Section 1 Bavink raises a number of philosophical problems, in particular about scientific hypotheses, substance and causality. He maintains that our view of these must depend on physical discoveries, and that we shall see when we consider the course of physical development that philosophy should change its beliefs as a result of changes in physics. Accordingly he gives a detailed survey of the development in physical views, considering first the classical mechanistic theories (*e.g.* of Newton and Laplace), then passing to such later developments as the kinetic theory of temperature and the electromagnetic theory of light, and coming finally to the theories of relativity and quanta.

How do these changes affect the philosophic view of hypotheses, substance and causality? Let us first consider hypotheses. The main question Bavink wishes to raise about these is, How do they differ from statements asserting some fact? Is it simply that we are certain of the latter but not of the former? or is the difference more radical—are hypotheses simply "conventions" or "pictures" which enable us to predict facts? If now we consider the development of physics, we shall see that certain hypotheses have been verified, and this will help us to answer these questions. Bavink takes the atomic theory as an example. This remained an hypothesis for a long time, as there was little experimental evidence to support it. But experimental evidence increased to such an extent that now, so he believes, it is certain

[1] *Ergebnisse und Probleme der Naturwissenschaften.* S. Hirzel. Leipzig. 1933. 5th edition. Pp. xii + 650.

that atoms exist—they are real as water waves are real, and the proposition "matter consists of atoms" is of the same kind as "plants consist of cells." The fact that no one has ever seen an individual atom is irrelevant, for we should not take sight as the only criterion of existence. We can see its action, and this is a sufficient criterion for its existence. And what, in Bavink's view, does this prove about hypotheses? It proves that an hypothesis only differs from a statement about fact because we are not certain that what it supposes is true. It proves that an hypothesis is not merely a "convention" which enables us to predict.

Bavink then considers substance. The traditional philosophical view drew a sharp distinction between substance as that which filled space and the changes it underwent, which occurred in time and required "forces" to bring them about. This view conformed with the classical view of physics. Laplace regarded the world as an enormous system of particles whose only property was inertia, and which were related to each other by measurable forces acting as attracting and repelling agents. But modern physics does not distinguish between space-filling substances and their temporal changes. Its elements are four-dimensional quanta, and these are ordered in certain ways, *e.g.* to form electrons, atoms, molecules, etc.—the "eternal substances" of the classical view are replaced by four-dimensional events. And thus philosophy, basing itself on physics, must abandon the traditional distinction between substance and its changes.

And for similar reasons philosophy must abandon causality. Here again its traditional view agreed with the classical theory of physics. According to Laplace, if anyone knew the exact positions and momenta of every particle at a given instant, and knew also all the causal laws determining their interactions, he would be able to overlook all past, present, and future events with absolute precision. It was obvious, of course, that no one did know these laws, but such knowledge was the ideal which physics put before itself. Now, however, physics believes that the world consists of quanta, not of particles, and it is nonsensical, not merely practically impossible, to obtain exact measurement of the place and momentum of a quantum at a given instant. The "initial condition" which Laplace presupposed simply doesn't exist. Physics, accordingly, is giving up its old ideal and looking for statistical instead of causal laws. Such laws allow the physicist to make very exact statements about collective wholes formed by large quantities of electrons and occurring frequently—and this explains why we can predict so accurately both in science and ordinary life—but they do not permit of any such accuracy in statements about an individual electron or about a collection of any electrons which is too complicated to recur. Thus we have to choose between two types of explanation—causal or statistical. It is quite wrong to suppose that statistical laws alone do not provide an explanation or that they imply chaos or free will or miraculous intervention. And physics must determine our choice. In Bavink's view the physics of to-day leads to the statistical explanation. It now appears that the world is ordered according to statistical and not according to causal laws. And we must realize that we are simply deciding about a question of fact—we are neither asking whether one hypothesis is more convenient than another nor discussing *a priori* forms of thought.

In the third section Bavink considers among other things the biological experiments which bear on the controversy between mechanists and vitalists. Here, too, the issue has been changed by recent developments. When the classical view prevailed in physics, it was thought that such processes as nutrition, growth, and reproduction could be explained in the same way as

material processes. But it is now realized that living bodies are not machines, and that the laws which explain them, even if chemico-physical, must differ from the laws that explain material processes.

The main point in the controversy is whether vital phenomena involve only a new and peculiar combination of physical factors, or whether they involve an altogether new kind of factor. Bavink cannot agree entirely with one side or the other. Within the last thirty years there has been a great deal of experimental work which bears on the subject, and which Bavink reviews in considerable detail. We know, for example, that the individual cells of an embryo usually have the capacity to develop along several different lines—transplantation of cells from one part to another has revealed most startling results—and tremendous progress has been made in giving these and similar phenomena a chemico-physical explanation. But, on the other hand, there is no doubt that vital processes in most cases are purposive—they subserve the preservation of the individual or species; and this fact is the best defence of the vitalists' case. Another point in their favour, Bavink thinks, is the difficulty of explaining the original appearance of life in purely chemico-physical terms. Finally, however, he suggests a third alternative, based on the belief that both mechanists and vitalists are taking a wrong view of chemico-physical explanation. Both have taken such explanation to be strictly causal. The vitalists have assumed additional causal factors, entelechies, which fill up the gaps left by chemico-physical explanation, and they have not been successful in showing how entelechies are related to chemico-physical processes. But we must bear two points in mind: first, that causal explanation is ceasing to be the physicist's ideal, and, secondly, that biological phenomena are certainly determined through being parts of an organized whole. It may be that the ideal of chemico-physical explanation will alter to such an extent that it embraces determination through organized wholes. And so, Bavink thinks, the controversy may be settled through a difference in the conception of chemico-physical explanation. But he admits that he can only give the vaguest idea of what this difference would be like.

HELEN KNIGHT.

NEW BOOKS

An Essay on Philosophical Method. By R. G. Collingwood. (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. xii + 226. Price 10s.)

Mr. Collingwood's discourse on method is different from that of Descartes. Descartes expounds his method by applying it to clear up various metaphysical problems. Mr. Collingwood expounds his by applying it to clear up the problem of method. Thus his book is an application of philosophical method to the problem of philosophical method. It appears to owe a good deal to the Crocification of Hegel.

If philosophical method is to be different from scientific method, this must be because philosophical concepts are different from scientific concepts: and this is the first point to which Mr. Collingwood attends. He starts with the fact that any general concept has various specifications, which are its kinds. In the case of scientific concepts, such, *e.g.*, as lines and triangles, the kinds are mutually exclusive. If a line is straight it is not curved. If a triangle is scalene it is not equilateral. The case of philosophical concepts is quite different. It is not possible, *e.g.*, to separate affirmative and negative judgments as mutually exclusive kinds. Think out the nature of affirmation and you will see that it involves an element of negation; again, negation involves an element of affirmation. Similarly we cannot regard the pleasant, the expedient, and the right as mutually exclusive kinds of good. It cannot be said that whatever is pleasant is both inexpedient and wrong, or that what is right is both unpleasant and inexpedient.

This difference between scientific and philosophical concepts Mr. Collingwood expresses by saying that philosophical concepts involve overlap of classes, scientific concepts do not. And it seems that he intends this distinction to be a precise and universal distinction between philosophical and non-philosophical concepts. Where there is overlap the concepts belong to philosophy and not to any other study. Where there is no overlap the concepts belong to some other study and not to philosophy (54). [If so, then the classification of concepts into those belonging to philosophy and those not belonging to philosophy is itself one where there is no overlap, and therefore one which does not belong to philosophy, even though philosophical method essentially depends on it.] If there are any concepts that seem to belong both to philosophy and to some other study, close investigation will show that they are interpreted so as to show overlap in philosophy and not to show it in the other study (35).

What Mr. Collingwood's positive conception of overlap involves is not clear, I think, from his chapter on overlap, where on the whole it seems to have primarily negative rather than positive significance; and it is necessary to proceed to the next chapter, on the Scale of Forms, for further information. Here the writer is concerned in the first instance with a further difference between scientific and philosophical concepts [this difference again showing no overlap and therefore not belonging to philosophy].

The kinds of a particular concept can differ in degree as well as in kind. Thus ice water and steam are all kinds of H_2O, differing in degree of heat. In the case of philosophical concepts the kinds not only can differ in degree,

but must do so. And in their case the different kinds falling under the concept are different degrees of the concept itself. *E.g.*, the pleasant, the expedient, and the right are kinds of good, and they differ in degree of goodness. Ice water and steam do not differ in degree of H_2O: they are all equally H_2O. The pleasant, the expedient, and the right are not all equally good.

Mr. Collingwood expresses this by saying that in a scientific concept the variable is extraneous to the essence of the concept, while in a philosophical concept the variable is identical with the essence. And he generalizes and says that all philosophical concepts have this character: their kinds are not coordinate kinds, all equally specifications of their concept, but they differ in the degree to which they are specifications of their concept. Thus, *e.g.*, pleasure is only in a low degree good; it is not as good a kind of goodness as is rightness, which is good in a higher degree. Nevertheless pleasure is a distinct kind of good (73–4).

Mr. Collingwood brings out the peculiar relations involved in philosophical concepts by distinguishing between "opposition" and "distinction" in regard to kinds. By "mere opposition" he appears to mean the relation between different instances, when these instances differ only in degree and not in kind. As, *e.g.*, hot and cold water are not different in kind, but only in degree of heat. Since with philosophical concepts difference of degree is always also difference of kind, it follows that in regard to them opposition is always at the same time distinction; it cannot be "mere opposition." Good and bad are different degrees of goodness, and hence opposed. But they are also distinct. Badness is a definite kind of goodness, as well as being opposed to other kinds. So error and truth are different degrees of truth, and hence opposed. But error is not merely the absence of more of something, whose presence would be greater truth; it is also a distinct and positive kind of truth.

Thus a philosophical concept gives rise to a scale of forms which differ at once in degree and in kind, the difference in degree being inseparable from the difference in kind. Each form is at once opposed to and distinct from all the rest. But there is thoroughgoing overlap, since that in respect of which the forms vary is the essence of them all. The kinds of truth differ in degree of truth. The kinds of reality differ in degree of reality. The kinds of pleasure differ in degree of pleasure. The kinds of beauty differ in degree of beauty. [And so on indefinitely. The kinds of overlap differ in degree of overlap. The kinds of philosophical concept differ in degree of philosophical conceptuality. The kinds of philosophical problem differ in degree of philosophical problematicness; so that some concepts and some problems belong to philosophy in a higher degree than others. Thus if scientific concepts only overlapped a little with philosophic concepts, we could allow the distinction between scientific and philosophic concepts to be at least to a low degree a philosophical one].

Mr. Collingwood interprets this general situation in a special way. Pleasures which are different in degree of pleasure he regards as pleasures which are different in the adequacy with which they embody or exhibit the essence of pleasure. Beauties which differ in degree of beauty, he takes as beauties which differ in the adequacy with which they embody the essence of beauty. And so in general. Each kind, of a philosophical concept, is trying with all its might to shine forth as the whole essence of the concept, but succeeding only to a degree of adequacy.

This generalization leads at once to the determination of the method proper to philosophy. For it is clear that the proper method of dealing with concepts, whose essential differences are differences in the adequacy with which

they express the nature of the concept of which they are the different kinds, will be to put them in the setting of the scale of forms, and see them as marking a point of achievement on that scale with respect to all the forms lower down, and a point of failure with respect to all the forms higher up.

Again, philosophical inquiry will not be a process of adding new knowledge to old, but one of passing from less to more adequate knowledge. Its affirmations will be negations as well. Indeed, each affirmation will mark the occupation of a point on the scale of forms, by being a rejection of all the occupants of points lower in the scale, and especially the rejection of the occupant of the point just lower in the scale, while being an affirmation in a more adequate way of what they were managing less adequately to affirm. The affirmations of philosophy, again, will not be merely hypothetical, but hypothetical and categorical at once, with the categorical predominating, since this is the more adequate form.

Further consequences of all this in regard to philosophical method become clear in Chapters VIII and IX. There is a final chapter on philosophy as a branch of literature. I have no space to discuss these chapters, but the result is to justify the method of studying philosophy by studying the philosophic tradition through the history of philosophy, and thinking out the degrees to which the various types of philosophy (which are not mutually exclusive, but overlap, are not only opposed, but distinct, having their proper places on the scale of forms) succeed in being adequate embodiments of philosophy. With luck the student should (at least occasionally) succeed in showing that some of the great philosophers of the past were trying to say inadequately what he is saying much better (even though what they said was a different kind of thing).

L. J. Russell.

Hobbes. By John Laird. (Leaders of Philosophy Series.) (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd. 1934. Pp. xii + 324. Price 12s. 6d.)

An intelligent reader of Professor Laird's earlier books would have expected from him an excellent volume on Hobbes, and the expectation is amply fulfilled. The book presents the same combination of appreciation, critical shrewdness, and wide erudition which marked the author's earlier work on Hume, and should take a permanent place henceforth as a worthy companion by the side of Croom Robertson's little monograph, so long recognized in this country as a model of all that a work of this kind ought to be. To be sure, no production of man is flawless, and I trust Mr. Laird will not take it ill if I mention a few points in which I think his admirable book might have been made even better than it is. There are the inevitable errors of the press which have escaped detection. Most of them are trivial and easily remedied, but it is unfortunate that some of them occur in the dating of events in the hero's life. Thus (p. 11, last line) 1664, as the context shows, means 1646; the date given on p. 21 for Sorbière's visit to England should be 1663 (not 1653); the statement on p. 48 that Descartes's *Monde* was written "about 1634" is refuted by its own context, since the condemnation of Galileo, which led Descartes to suppress the book, and Galileo's abjuration took place in 1633. I could wish to be sure whether the author has verified the name of the Nottinghamshire gentleman to whose son Hobbes acted as tutor (p. 6). He, like Leslie Stephen, gives it as Cl*i*nton, but in the *Vita* and *Auctarium* it appears as Cl*i*fton; which is the true form? The printer has played Mr. Laird a worse trick at p. 111, where Hobbes is said to have hesitated between

defining force as v or as mv; the words of the text show that v here should have been v^2.

In his generosity to the reader, Mr. Laird has documented his statements and quotations very fully. But I fear his methods of reference, as described in the *Prefatory Note* on p. xii, may too often prove baffling. Since his habit is on the first mention of a book to introduce an arbitrary abbreviation of its title for use in all subsequent citations, there should obviously have been a complete list of these *compendia* given, either after p. xii or at the end of the volume; without such a list no one can be expected to recognize the numerous recurring abbreviations. And perhaps other readers may, like myself, be a little annoyed by the trick of constantly referring to really famous books merely by the volume and page of some standard edition of *Complete Works*. It is difficult to remember throughout 300 pages exactly what writings of Hobbes himself are contained in each of the volumes of Molesworth, and confusing to find Bacon's *Advancement of Learning* disguised as *E. and S. III*. Again, it is not easy to check references to Galileo's *Dialogo* when they are given by the pages of the seventeenth-century English version, a book few of us are likely to have at hand. But these are, of course, very minor faults.

A "devil's advocate" might make more of the point that Mr. Laird here, as in his book on Hume, suffers from a certain inability or disinclination to tell a simple tale in the simplest way. He likes to tell his story by indirect allusion, and has a fondness for epigrammatic "point" which is the more irritating that the epigrams often refuse to "come off." One example shall suffice. We are told (p. 17) of Seth Ward that he said "he had rather be the author of one of Mr. Hobbes's books than be King of England," by which, Mr. Laird added, "Ward did not mean that he would rather be dead." Now what is the drift of this facetious comment? As the remark was made—if it ever was made—under the Commonwealth, I can only conjecture that the meaning may be that Ward was looking forward to a possible Restoration, and showed it by the implication that there was still a "rightful King." But if this is what Mr. Laird means, he has chosen a curiously obscure way of saying it; point is bought too dear at this price.

For the amazing industry with which Mr. Laird seems to have read everything which might throw any light on Hobbes there can be nothing but grateful admiration. I am particularly grateful myself for what I have learned from him about some of Hobbes's opponents who had hitherto been to me mere names, or not even names. But the very range of this multifarious reading has, I think, inevitably led to occasional misunderstanding of authors quoted for comparison. To take a striking example, we are told (p. 112) that Galileo (a reference is given to the opening pages of his *Dialogo*) "had held with Aristotle that circular motion, being 'perfect,' could alone be 'natural.' " The very passage to which Mr. Laird sends us is enough to show that Galileo did *not* "agree with Aristotle." Aristotle is there adversely criticized for his well-known doctrine that there are *two* "natural" motions, circular revolution of the celestial spheres and rectilinear uniform ascent and descent of the "elements." Galileo's own point is not, as Mr. Laird's language would suggest, that there are no rectilinear motions in nature, but that those there are are *accelerated*.

Probably Mr. Laird's inspection of Galileo was too hasty, since he goes on to tell us (p. 113 *n*.) that possibly Galileo never contemplated genuine continuity of acceleration. Yet in the very context to which he has referred, Galileo says in so many words that in passing from one velocity to another an accelerated motion *traverses all intermediate velocities without remaining*

in any of them. Again, at p. 164, *n.* 2, I remark a curious but palpable error, plainly due to hurried reading, about Aristotle's view of appetitions. It is said that Aristotle held that ὄρεξις is always for the agreeable, and we are referred to *De Anima*, 414b, 6, where what is really said is something quite different; that concupiscence, ἐπιθυμία, is always for the agreeable because this (αὕτη)—viz. concupiscence—is ὄρεξις of the pleasant. It really looks as though Mr. Laird has misread the αὕτη in this phrase as αὐτῇ and mistranslated "ὄρεξις itself is for the pleasant." It is notorious that Aristotle's view was that ὄρεξις may be for any one of three things, the *honestum*, the *utile*, the *dulce*. Similarly there are one or two remarks about the schoolmen which would not perhaps stand pressing. We are told (p. 155) that "even an Aristotelian like Suarez" maintained that reasoning proceeds by "compounding and dividing," as though this were something exceptional about Suarez. But since "compounding and dividing" was the standing description of affirmation and negation, it is hard to see how any "Aristotelian" could have spoken differently. On the other hand, should not the sweeping statement that *most* "scholastics" regarded "phantasms" as quasi-corporeal be better supported than by a solitary reference to Suarez? And should the statement that Bacon believed in the possibility of *vacua* be made without justification, on the strength of *N.O.* II. 48, when Bacon elsewhere in the same work "denies the fact"?

These are all comparatively small points, and I only mention them because they do suggest to me a doubt how far one can rely implicitly on other statements about writers whom I have not read, when the passages referred to are not quoted at some length.

I may now proceed to the much pleasanter task of expressing my high appreciation of Mr. Laird's positive achievements. His book falls into three main divisions dealing respectively with the life of Hobbes, with his doctrines, and with his influence. In all of them, with some allowance for a certain carelessness about dates in the first section, due presumably to hurried proof-correction, the work is of a very high order. The biography calls for particular commendation on its successful vindication not merely of the respectability, but of the real honesty and attractiveness of a character systematically maligned by opponents. (They had, however, the excuse that Hobbes was, after all, the aggressor by his derision of the Universities and the clergy, and an aggressor with a sharp and not too scrupulous tongue.) The whole account of Hobbes's philosophy is admirably done, and will, I think, take rank as the best exposition we have so far in the English language. It is conscientious and careful, and there is no serious attempt either to blink the contradictions in which Hobbes entangled himself by his stubborn corporealism, or to exaggerate them. Indeed, I think when Mr. Laird pleads that there is no real inconsistency between the materialism of the theory and its phenomenalism, he is probably letting Hobbes off rather too good-naturedly. This seems to me at least a hard saying, and I doubt whether it can be defended without a more elaborate examination than Mr. Laird has been able to bestow on the point. I had also hoped that the next monograph on Hobbes might contain a brief but serious account of his singular excursions into geometry. I should have liked some account of the methods by which he squared the circle and duplicated the cube, and some illustrations of the genuine acumen of many of his observations about the principles of mathematics, rightly commended by De Morgan. Even without such going into detail, the reader might have been informed that the value on which Hobbes finally pitched for $\pi(\pi = \sqrt{10})$ is by no means peculiar to himself, and that the remarks so highly appreciated by De Morgan are a protest against that illogical

recognition of "real infinitesimals," which was an unfortunate, though perhaps inevitable, stage in the development of the Calculus, so that the old circle-squarer is also a sort of distant precursor of Weierstrass. But I suppose the limitations of space imposed by the character of the series to which Mr. Laird's book belongs compelled the exclusion of this interesting matter. A critical study of Hobbes as would-be mathematician is still *à faire*, and might be an excellent subject for a Ph.D. thesis.

For Mr. Laird's treatment of the *historically* important thing in Hobbes, his ethical and political thought, I have nothing but praise. I fully agree with him that the whole theory can only be properly estimated in the light of "scholastic" political philosophy, and in his view that the schoolmen are the best political theorists modern Europe has ever seen. It is most refreshing to read his admirable demonstration that Hobbes was intensely in earnest in insisting on the necessity of a morality not merely of justice but of mercy and benevolence, and equally sincere in his conviction that the "sovereign" is morally bound to strict observance of the "law of nature." Hobbes's principles, therefore, as Mr. Laird rightly says, are absolutely opposed to the "Machiavellianism" sometimes loosely imputed to him, and they were never meant as an excuse for "libertines." Indeed, as Mr. Laird observes, the great difference between Spinoza and Hobbes as political theorists is that Spinoza really does teach an immoral "Machiavellianism" (when, for example, he denies that a State has any obligations of good faith), and Hobbes does not. The contempt of the modern *Realpolitiker* for "scraps of paper" is Spinozistic and Machiavellian; it is condemned altogether by Hobbes's view that the *sovereign* is obliged "before God" to fulfil the "natural law," and that it is "natural law" that covenants must be kept. In view of the deification of Spinoza by his devotees, I think another remark of Mr. Laird's as pertinent as true, that (p. 303) Hobbes had a very strong sense of duty, though he tended too much to identify duty *in the subject* with the mere keeping of the civil law; while Spinoza, for all his appreciation of "values," writes as though he had no sense of duty at all. (This is, in fact, exactly what the worthy Blyenbergh found wanting in his doctrine, and it is significant that though the *Ethics* has some excellent things to say about certain virtues, it never once mentions duty.)

I am particularly glad that Mr. Laird has given a fairly full account of the dispute between Hobbes and Bramhall about Liberty and Necessity, which, as he says, is one of the best pieces of philosophical controversy in any language. I am not *quite* so sure as Mr. Laird that Hobbes would have been pronounced the victor if the issue had been decided "on points." Much depends, I should say, on how the points are to be counted. In view of the simple-minded faith of Leslie Stephen, the last English historian of the controversy, in "scientific determinism," it is to the good that the matter had been reviewed by a philosopher who is neither wedded to determinism nor under the delusion that because Bramhall was a trained "scholastic" his views must be philosophically negligible. In the main I think I agree with Mr. Laird that Bramhall did not fully make out his own case, chiefly because he was not quite clear what his case was. But I think that Hobbes's identification (forced on him by his obstinate corporealism) of all determination with determination from *outside*—an identification freely confessed by Mr. Laird—made his position frankly absurd, and that Bramhall fairly exposed the absurdity. So I suppose the "points" on which Hobbes is pronounced to have scored are those mentioned on p. 195 ff., as replies to Bramhall's ethical objections to determinism. I doubt if Hobbes was quite as successful on *all* these points as Mr. Laird thinks. "Determinism does not

imply that praise and dispraise are meaningless." Perhaps, but does it not imply that the meaning to which they owe most of their effectiveness is *false*? The very reason why they work on us so powerfully is that they are understood to imply recognition of good or ill *desert*, and is *desert* more than an illusion on a determinist theory? And I should think Mr. Laird himself, on reflection, would admit that "the right to destroy what is noxious" is a dubious basis for a sane theory of punishment.

Hobbes's general social theory is so well known that it is unnecessary to follow Mr. Laird in his careful and lucid exposition of it. I would merely direct attention to the excellent remark that the whole conception of man as a calculating egoist, on which the doctrine is based, is ruined if we take Hobbes's account of determination as purely *extrinsic* seriously. (Commonly the materialism and the egoism are spoken of as inseparable; as Mr. Laird rightly points out, the one, in fact, destroys the other.)

The account of Hobbes's opponents and critics is full of interest. I think I agree with what is clearly the author's view that of all the better known British opponents Cumberland is the best, as well as with his high estimate of the criticisms of Pufendorf, who can hardly be called an opponent at all. But I think some of Hobbes's Anglican critics are disposed of rather too summarily. I do not believe it a sufficient reply to Cudworth to argue (p. 274) that even if a moral law *is* simply an enactment, it is "eternally" what it is, viz. an enactment. This does not seem to me any rejoinder to Cudworth's contention that no arbitrary enactment can make that *good* which is not antecedently good in its own nature. Butler, in particular, I fear, gets much less than justice. In view of the language used about the services of Shaftesbury to ethics in the Preface to the *Sermons*, it strikes one as hard to accuse the Bishop (p. 283) of being "tepid" in his acknowledgments, and to explain that the "tepidity" is accounted for by the Deism of Shaftesbury (who always professed to be a "Broad Church" Anglican). Nor do I believe Butler would have found any difficulty in answering the question (p. 284) why, if *all* "passions" are alike "disinterested," a man is not free to stop being benevolent, as he is to stop drinking his wine, as soon as benevolence ceases to please him. It is not its disinterestedness but the fact that conscience enjoins it which, according to Butler, makes benevolence a duty. Conscience requires me to go on being benevolent; it does not require me to drink a second glass of wine if I will to leave off after the first. And to say that Butler "conceded the point" in the well-known paragraph at the end of the eleventh *Sermon* is, I am sure, to miss Butler's grave irony. A man does not introduce a statement of his own principles with a "let it be conceded that." The meaning plainly is "*even though* we were to concede, as I do not, that self-interest must be paramount, a man would still be wise, even from this point of view, in taking the trouble to be benevolent."

To conclude with a passing reference to two very minor matters: If Disraeli's reference to "Hobbism" in *Vivian Gray* is to be chronicled (p. 247 *n.*), why is Fielding's Parson Barnabas, with his horror of the *Leviathan*, forgotten? And why does Mr. Laird think that the "Cimon" of Berkeley's *Alciphron* should be Hobbes? (Locke's Archelaus, I may remark, ought not to have been honoured with inverted commas on p. 281; he was, of course, an historical man, a disciple of Anaxagoras, and the teacher of Socrates.)

A. E. Taylor.

Experience and its Modes. By M. Oakeshott, Fellow of Gonville and Caius College. (London: Cambridge University Press. 1933. Pp. viii + 359. Price 15s.)

In size and quality of writing this is as considerable an essay in idealism as we have had from a native in recent years. Mr. Oakeshott ascribes his indebtedness chiefly to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* and to Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, the impress of the latter being the more obvious. His most general principles are that all experience involves judgment (which passes into the assertion that all experience, even volition, *is* judgment), that in consequence it consists of ideas, and that these ideas demand to be made coherent. Since reality is something judged it must be experience, but experience as a "world." If we could attain to it we would find it to be a complete experience completely organized in terms of coherence, but as none of us can attain to it we may define reality formally as the ground, immanent in experience itself, of our demand for coherence, or of the aptitude of ideas to expand into a system. This effort after coherence, however, has a tendency to run into blind alleys, to seek limited unifications, and—which is worse—to rest content with one or other of these as final. The limitation is one not of extension but of initial categories: each unification is an interpretation of the whole, but in terms of an arbitrarily restricted set of notions. Such a unification is called by the author, doubtless for lack of a better word, a "mode" of experience. Three modes—historical, scientific, and practical experience—are examined in turn at some length, the main purpose being to exhibit their formal characteristics and show that these disqualify the respective mode from being a satisfactory synthesis of all experience.

Historical experience is a mode because it is not a mere series but a "world," for the process of criticism by which it is constructed determines the temporal order by a non-temporal one: nothing is admitted as historical fact until, through being evidenced, it is integrated with what is really a logical scheme. And it is a mode of *experience* because every element of it, being the product of a judgment, is an idea, an idea being, of course, inseparable from experience. (Mr. Oakeshott's odd charge that some historians make independence of *all* experience the criterion of objectivity both imputes to historians a philosophical sophistication which they neither have nor want to have, and implies that they are too stupid to know that experiences *eo nomine* form a great part of their subject-matter.) History is the past considered in its pastness; any motive or consideration that relates to the bearing of the past on the present is an intrusion from the side of practical experience, harmful, as well as irrelevant, to the historical judgment. Nevertheless, just because it is experience it is a *present* world of ideas, and its being a present which is conceived as past is the contradiction, or one of the contradictions, that should prevent us from regarding historical experience as the completely "satisfactory" experience.

Science is defined as "the attempt to think a common, uniform, and impersonal world," the mark of scientific ideas being "absolute communicability." The only type of idea that has this mark is the idea of quantity, or rather quantity in the specific form of motion. Hence science is the interpretation of the whole of experience as mechanical, so that "science and physics are identical." Being constituted as well as defined by the category, it has no differences of subject-matter; it is just a body of coherent ideas of quantity. Neither past nor future (that is, neither history nor prediction) enters into it, nor even present events as perceived (that is, there is no such thing as experimental verification). It is incurably though quite consistently abstract. Con-

sequently it cannot lay any pretensions to being that coherent whole of experience which is perforce concrete.

Practical experience is all experience regarded as alterable by the action of will, and since volition is concerned with the present as present and always involves judgment, practical experience is the "world" of present fact or ideas made coherent with a view to action. Art falls within it, and religion is its fullest expression. It is not, indeed, the world of value, but since this is limited by the nature of the practical world within which it is to be actualized, the two worlds are inseparably linked. But even in their conjunction they have no claim to be, or to be able to become, that coherent totality which thought in its integrity demands, the reason being that the detailed transformation of the "ought to be" into the "is" is essentially an endless and therefore an ever-incomplete process.

We have, then, at least three "modes" of experience, each, because experience, composed of ideas; each a "world" of homogeneous ideas because defined and organized by a single category; each therefore logically distinct from and consequently irrelevant to the others; each autonomous; and each displaying some essential abstractness, incompleteness, or contradiction when put forward as the total outline or ground of experience.

Despite my sympathy with certain aspects of Mr. Oakeshott's idealism, I have to admit that I find his exposition unhelpful. One reason is that, like his master Bradley, he is more expansive in criticism than in construction. Certainly his primary affirmations are left undeveloped. The inseparability of reality from experience needs to be safeguarded *argumentatively* from solipsism. To *say* that "all experience is somebody's experience," "but no experience is merely the experience of a particular mind as such," is to state, not to solve, the problem. There are many thinkers who are convinced that what makes experience experience is precisely its being somebody's, so that when its particularity is removed what is left has no title to the term. But Mr. Oakeshott's position appears to be that what makes my experience more than mine is judgment, and this leads to the coherence theory of truth. This too, unfortunately, is reaffirmed rather than reargued, and reaffirmed without any appreciation of the difficulties which realists have found in it. The author's tendency is to suppose that it is established by exposing the difficulties of the correspondence theory; and the theory so defended is characterized much more vaguely than the theory attacked. One would have welcomed an attempt to define exactly what sort of coherence is meant, and to explain why, if there is never datum but only inference, completion of inference has to wait for further experience in any sense that retains the notes of immediacy and novelty. Do we need the future to provide only more time for reflection, not more data? Are incoherencies removed and gaps filled by further experiences when these are construed as judgments without data? These may be imperfect questions, since the case really rests on the *inseparability* of datum and inference, of matter and form, but they are the kind of question which Mr. Oakeshott's emphatic affirmations provoke, and I am sorry, for the sake of idealism, that he holds his idealism so serenely that he has failed to gauge the strength and quality of the realist reaction to the coherence theory.

The doctrine of modes is peculiar. Most philosophers would agree that science, etc., are products of different categorial selection from concrete experience, and are therefore inevitably partial, but few would conclude that they have nothing to give to philosophy. But the most peculiar feature is Mr. Oakeshott's way of designating each mode by a familiar term which he redefines with a narrowness for which I can find no warrant. For example, science is defined as the study of motion; consequently it has nothing to do

with the past; consequently cosmogony and biology are not science but "natural history." Whatever they are they are connected very massively with experience and therefore deserve to be examined; merely to note their categorial difference from mechanics and ignore their profound similarity of attitude and method is not quite in keeping with the concreteness which Mr. Oakeshott's idealism desiderates. Moreover, the reduction of physics to theoretical mechanics comes ill from Cambridge, which has done so much to dissolve mechanical physics into an electromagnetic theory for which motion is a secondary concept. On the other fields of experience also he dogmatizes, though always brilliantly, almost aphoristically. The assertion on pp. 98–9, repeated in a sequence of beautifully turned but synonymous sentences, that many historians suppose that every new fact is just added fact, not one that may call for a drastic overhaul of other facts, is a case in point. Damning charges of this sort should give names, to enable us to discover the real culprits. A whole paragraph (p. 112) on Bury's judgment on Gibbon is a plain caricature of it. The statement (p. 309) that no one "aware of the conflict involved" is likely to try to establish both the practical and the ultimate truth of religious ideas is a high-handed condemnation of all theologians and of many very able philosophers. It is a rhetorician, not a philosopher, who writes (p. 129) that the battle of Salamis and the birth of Christ fall outside history because, having considerable human importance, they fall under the category of practical experience; that science is "a folly to be fled from" (p. 219); that consequently the task of thought is not the "synthesizing of its own indiscretions" (p. 218); and that "all attempts to find some practical justification for philosophical thought . . . must be set on one side as misguided" (p. 355). There is something elusive, elusive because indeterminate, about an ultimate truth that is unrelated to history, science, and the inevitable needs of living —for, again, one of the author's cardinal contentions is that the "modes" are not only irrelevant to one another, but also have no contribution to make to the whole truth.

Mr. Oakeshott was moved to write by the neglect into which idealism in this country has fallen. That we have not refuted idealism but only dodged it, and that either the rearguing or the refutation of it is needed to give life to our current discussions, is my own conviction. If the book helps to revive the problems which idealism formulated it will be of great value. But I doubt if it will make converts. The general attitude and principles which it restates are presented with that superior certainty and highly polished verbal indirectness which robbed some of the older idealists of the influence which they might have exerted. It is not conciliating to be liberal with terms of disparagement like "confusion," "nonsense," "gross," and "grotesque," even when they have been shorn of vulgarity by the literary refinement of their setting; and sentences like the following show a concern for verbal effect at the expense of simplicity and directness of thought: "What is achieved in experience . . . not in the sense that it is ever actually achieved"; "Fact is not what is given. Or, rather, fact is given (because there is nothing given which is not made)"; "To know in part is at once to know something less than the whole and to know it imperfectly." Stylistically the writing is brilliant throughout, but the beautiful sentences are spoiled with an emphasis and a balance that arise more out of preoccupation with literary craftsmanship than out of the meaning to be expressed. I believe that the quite remarkable repetitiousness of the book, which could be cut down by half with great gain, is connected with this interest in and truly high capacity for literary art. To this capacity I gladly pay a very respectful tribute; my regret is that it has too often thwarted instead of serving Mr. Oakeshott's able philosophical thinking.

T. E. Jessop.

Descartes. By S. V. KEELING, M.A., D.-ès-L., Officer d'Académie. (London: Ernest Benn Ltd. 1934. Pp. xi + 282. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

This original and scholarly work is written for the "Leaders of Philosophy" series, and both the author and the editor are to be congratulated on its conspicuous freedom from the faults usual in works written for a series. It is neither hospitably eclectic nor amiably superficial, and it scorns the tepid affectation of impersonality. It is closely knit and closely argued, it is definite and consistent in its point of view, and its whole approach to the subject is strongly individual. More than once it throws new light on the most familiar positions of Descartes by "snapping" them from an unfamiliar angle. Its sufficiently methodical exposition is varied by cross-vistas, which are among its chief attractions, and constitute a notable tribute to Dr. Keeling's intimacy with the mind of Descartes.

It is Dr. Keeling's avowed intention (p. ix) to restate Cartesian problems in modern terms, and he has succeeded in doing so without allowing his interpretation to be influenced by modern analogies. By this device he enables the modern reader to review Descartes without anyone's prepossessions except his own, and in particular to escape from the "history of philosophy" tradition, which has thrown across all the pre-critical philosophers the omnivorous shadow of German Idealism. Occasionally, as in the discussion of substance, a more historical treatment might be helpful; but it must be admitted that the modernity of presentation contributes largely to the freshness of insight which is Dr. Keeling's most valuable quality.

The book falls into three parts: a historical and biographical introduction, an analytic and comparative exposition, and a critical epilogue concerned partly with the later history of Cartesianism, and partly with its philosophical importance. Of these the second, which is by far the largest, seems to me to be also the best. As an interpreter Dr. Keeling has all the virtues: he has a complete mastery of his material, and his selection is therefore extremely apposite; and he follows the affiliations of his main themes into the remoter parts of the Cartesian system with insight and pertinacity. His review of Descartes's successors is of necessity condensed, though it is detailed enough to reveal his scholarly aversion from obvious (and fallacious) interpretations; as in his discussion of Arnauld's alleged neo-realism (p. 220). His critical estimate is so condensed as to leave little room for subtleties which he could certainly have handled with distinction, and at times is distinctly summary both in form and content. This is doubtless his misfortune rather than his fault, and it is good news that he has in preparation a volume of Cartesian studies in which he will be able to expand at leisure.

I should wish to preface the statement of my disagreements from Dr. Keeling, which in any case I submit in the spirit of dialectic rather than by way of censure, by recording my admiration of his achievement, and also my conviction that the main body of his results is substantiated beyond dispute, and that not least when he is most original. Particularly compelling and suggestive are his distinction between experimental and methodical doubt (p. 80); the contrast between Descartes's "qualitative dualism" and his "existential pluralism" (p. 117); and his most acute and revealing discussion of "simple natures" (p. 68 ff.). His work, moreover, abounds in felicitous summary: for example, the deft formula, applied against Leibniz, that theism combined with monism inevitably turns to pantheism (p. 227). But there are several contentions of importance in which I cannot follow him, and as his exposition is splendidly homogeneous, they are for the most part interconnected.

(i) Dr. Keeling complains (p. 236) that both Descartes and his commentators lay stress on his doctrine of "simple natures" while expounding his method, and ignore it when they come to deal with his metaphysics. There are quite good reasons for this procedure. As Dr. Keeling points out (it is a most important contribution to the subject), "the initial terms of a series are its 'absolute terms,' and these may or may not be also 'simple natures' " (p. 69); and as he further points out (pp. 90–91), the *cogito* is not the expression of a "simple nature" being composed (p. 94) of the simple nature of "existence" and the "thing which thinks." The *cogito*, on the other hand, *is* "an ultimate limit of formal analysis," in which thinking is recognized as the sort of attribute which belongs to, and characterizes, a substance. Now it is largely with substances and their characters that Descartes's metaphysics are concerned, and as, for example, the clear and distinct conceptions of mind and extension are none the less clear and distinct for our failure to analyse their constituent "simple natures," our tendency is to leave the question of simple natures behind us. Dr. Keeling's treatment seems to me to slur this change of emphasis, and thus, though he admirably stresses (p. 121, cf. p. 223) the supremacy of "metaphysics" over "physics" in Descartes's "philosophy," he does not quite bring out the discontinuity of the two sets of conceptions, or the conflict implied in it between mediaeval influences and those of seventeenth-century science.

(ii) There is a remarkable, and perhaps a significant, omission in Dr. Keeling's account of Descartes's proofs of the existence of God. In addition to the proof from the existence of the idea of God in the human mind, and the proof from the very nature of the idea of God, both of which Dr. Keeling describes, Descartes introduces, as an addendum to the former (à quoi j'ajoutaï, . . . *Discours*, Adam et Tannery, VI. 34), what is really a third proof, which starts from the real existence of the thinking self. This proof Dr. Keeling completely omits, both in exposition (p. 107) and in criticism (pp. 240–245), presumably because he is pressed for space and does not regard it as significant. It has, however, this importance: that it alone passes from reality to reality and not from idea to reality, and thus presents as a relevant factor the qualitative continuity of the self which exists and the God whose existence is to be proved. The reason why I stress this point is that it is for me the only consistently acceptable indication in Descartes's own writings of a way of escape from the Cartesian circle. It is doubtless less interesting to Dr. Keeling for the reason that he does not believe in the Cartesian circle.

(iii) Dr. Keeling denies the circularity of the argument for the existence of God on the grounds (*a*) that the *cogito* is in itself a final criterion of truth, competent to deliver all ideas of equal clarity and distinctness from the wicked genius without the intervention of God, and (*b*) that the guarantee of God applies only to the *memory* of an intuition, and not to the truth of the intuition at the moment of its occurrence (pp. 245–248). The nerve of the whole argument is (*b*), for if (*b*) is not true (*a*) cannot be true either, even though Descartes may think it to be true, as he sometimes undoubtedly does. Now (*b*) is really not true. No doubt the guarantee of God *is* required for memory, as only under God are the moments of time continuous; and, further, in reply to objections on the score of circularity, this is the point which Descartes stresses, presumably because he sees, like Dr. Keeling, that if the guarantee were required only for memory there would be no circle. But Descartes also wrote: "If we did not know that everything which is true and real in us comes from a perfect and infinite being, however clear and distinct our ideas might be, we should have no reason to assure us that

they had the perfection of being true" (*Discours*, A.T., VI., 39). That is to say, the guarantee of God is required to sustain the truth of clear and distinct ideas, not merely to vouch for their clarity and distinctness; and I cannot admit that this plain reading of a plain text rests on a "careless misinterpretation." But if this is so, argument (*a*), that the *cogito* alone suffices, is untenable, and the circle is closed; for unless clear and distinct conceptions are finally certified as true before they are relied on in the proofs of God's existence, we assume in our argument what only the conclusion of the argument can justify.

Descartes, however, does accept (*a*) in so many words: "Having noticed that there is nothing at all in the formula, 'I think, therefore I am,' to assure me that I am telling the truth, except that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to be, I concluded that I could take it as a general rule that the things we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true" (*Discours*, A.T., VI. 32). If, then, we could afford to ignore his denial of (*b*), there would be no circle, and Dr. Keeling would be right without qualification. But such a simplification of the issue seems to me unwarranted, especially as the denial of (*b*) is bound up closely with Descartes's cherished doctrine that God is supreme over the eternal verities. There are, in fact, two inconsistent tendencies in Descartes's thought, of which Dr. Keeling recognizes only one; and the one which he overlooks, while it involves Descartes in the Cartesian circle, which he can then escape only by stressing the implicit apprehension of God in the *cogito*, has the advantage of being consistent with the extreme Cartesian theory of divine omnipotence, and of giving the wicked genius the extended trial which he surely deserves if he is to be invoked at all.

(iv) Dr. Keeling rightly observes (p. 57) that the boundary between metaphysics and theology is determined for Descartes by the mode in which propositions about God and the world are certificated. But he alludes so rarely to the details of Descartes's religious metaphysics that the reader might be forgiven for supposing that much more was made over from reason to revelation than is actually the case. Some of the discussions on the attributes of God (*e.g.*, the distinction of the infinite from the indefinite, the insistence on God's "positive amplitude," and His supremacy over the eternal verities) are more closely affiliated to his philosophy as a whole than Dr. Keeling indicates.

This list of objections must appear somewhat churlish, so I hasten to affirm again my admiration of Dr. Keeling's cogency and originality, and to acknowledge, as a fellow-researcher, how much I owe to him.

A. Boyce Gibson.

The Nature of Mathematics: A Critical Survey. By Max Black. (International Library of Psychology and Philosophy. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1933. Pp. xiv + 219. Price 10s. 6d.)

The two aims of Mr. Black's book on *The Nature of Mathematics*, to give a critical exposition of *Principia Mathematica* and to report and criticize the analysis of mathematics made by the formalist and intuitionist schools of mathematicians, are more adequately realized in the first instance than in the second. In general, the book does not carry out the task of philosophy, "to clarify by criticizing knowledge . . . organized into systems",[1] in nearly

[1] P. 1.

as deep-going fashion as the author's sense of the problems involved gives promise. We shall take up in order the three views discussed, beginning with the "logistic" thesis (A) of *Principia Mathematica* that pure mathematics is a branch of logic. Mr. Black traces the historical development of logic through to the stage when it became amenable for use in analysis of mathematics, and describes the attempts by Dedekind, Frege, Peano, and Whitehead and Russell to analyse the concepts of arithmetic and theory of functions. "Philosophic" analysis in its double aspect of analysing meanings, and, when necessary, altering these to avoid contradictions connected with the continuum, and "formal" analysis which replaces the concepts with a new set having the same interconnections, are suggested methods of approaching the important problems for the philosophy of mathematics still unsolved, namely, analyses of the notion of natural number and of the mathematical continuum (neither of which Mr. Black quite succeeds in treating adequately). The description of types of analysis is followed by a chapter on "logical" analysis, important in itself but not clearly related to what precedes it. Mr. Black's account states that "the materials for the actual practice of logical analysis are partly available in the propositional calculus and calculus of relations, . . ."[1] without carefully setting out to which parts of mathematical symbolism the described aims of logical analysis, namely, exhibition of structure, distinctions in significance, and multiplicity, are relevant. Instead, the further treatment of pure mathematics is of a subject-matter amenable to formal analysis. "The theorems of pure mathematics are true of any objects and relations which satisfy the axioms. . . .[2] All that needs to be known of these objects is stated in the axioms. . . ."[2] One only wishes that some further account of the "objects" of such a formal system had been provided in explanation of the claim that mathematical symbols had a "reference"[3] to a "subject-matter",[3] and some hint at this point as to the ground for the important limitation set to the adequacy of formal analysis: (1) because natural numbers occur as constants in all axiom systems and are therefore to be understood in a different sense from terms occurring in special branches only; (2) because no complete axiom system can be provided for real numbers.

The propositional calculus, as foundation for the logistic construction of real number and prerequisite for the proof of the logistic thesis, Mr. Black rather awkwardly introduces as "the appropriate symbolism for all statements of how propositions can be deduced from other propositions by reason of their logical form, together with the appropriate rules for manipulating such statements. . . ."[4] Important relations between propositions are described, the use of the entailment relation in the development of a calculus is discarded in favour of the implication relation (one needs here a description of the sort of difficulty which the former relation is claimed to introduce), and tautologies are supposedly defined. That the analysis of the latter is inadequate shows up forcibly in the analogous definition of tautologies in the algebra of propositional functions as "propositions . . . [which are] . . . true whatever propositional functions are substituted (just as the tautologies of the propositional calculus yielded true propositions for all values of p, q, etc.)."[5] A clear and simple description of the principles of manipulation used in the propositional calculus of *Principia Mathematica* completes the account of this calculus, and then as a preliminary to an account of the calculus of propositional functions contained there, Mr. Black discusses the variables and functions occurring in mathematics, in analogy with which

[1] P. 36. [2] Pp. 39, 38, respectively. [3] P. 37. [4] Pp. 42–43. [5] P. 66.

latter propositional functions are introduced into the logistic system. The various usages of variables are tabulated as "illustrative", "formal", "determinative", and "apparent", the first three being innovations on *Principia*. In particular, the determinative use seems important, but is unclear.

Definitions of mathematical functions, extensional and intensional, are then described, with mention of the difficulties in the former where correlations between infinite fields of variation are required. An intensional definition of a mathematical function which "regards the use of variables as fundamental"[1] is then formulated: "A *symbol* is . . . said to be a function of a second symbol if it contains the second symbol as part of itself, *e.g.*, the symbol x^2 is a function of the symbol x."[2] This calls for a further explanation of the notion of "containing". The asserted relevance of the type-token ambiguity of the word "function" to the various views of functions is left in obscurity, and one cannot gauge the seriousness of the criticism of Russell for considering the function x as a function of one argument instead of two, as Mr. Black holds.

From this point forward we have a critical exposition of the functional calculus of *Principia Mathematica*: (1) of the symbols (x) and $(\mathrm{E}x)$, "descriptions", and "incomplete symbols"; (2) of the theory of types and the axiom of infinity; and (3) of the axiom of reducibility. In (1) the derivation of mathematical functions and classes from descriptive phrases as part of the logistic scheme is traced through, and the difficulty in the notion of identity used in analysing propositions in which descriptive phrases occur is remarked. It seems unfair, in light of the discussion in *Principia* of the contexts in which symbols for classes could be used in the relations "is a member of" and "contains," to hold as Mr. Black does, that limitations on its uses are not discussed. The claim that the ground for this supposed omission is "insufficient recognition of the distinction between formal and non-formal analysis"[3] is obscure.

Views on the ontological status of classes have affected logistic developments: (1) so long as symbols for classes were considered to denote real things, by requiring an axiom asserting the infinity of such objects (to permit the definition of natural numbers); (2) when such symbols came to be considered meaningless in isolation, by shifting emphasis to the consistency of their use. Mr. Black suggests the possibility of the contradictoriness of their use unless the system proves, as *Principia Mathematica* does not, that in general (and not only in the cases where the theory of types has already been seen to be necessary) a contradiction is impossible. The difficulty of establishing this he considers due to the vagueness of the notion of propositional function, but the precise source of difficulty is not clear.

An interesting section tracing the historical development of the notions of continuity and real number shows how the logistic construction culminates in confusion of "types" in certain general theorems about collections of real numbers defined by Dedekindian section. Discussion of the different kinds of logistico-mathematical contradictions and their solution through limiting the field of variation of the variable concerned follows. Mr. Black criticizes the attempt in *Principia* to remedy the inadequacy of the theory of types by the introduction of a hierarchy of orders among functions of the same type, and suggests as an alternative to the latter an alteration in the conception of propositional function in accordance with the intensional definition given above. But it remains obscure how this, as is claimed, ensures absence of circularity.

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[1] P. 56. [2] P. 57. [3] P. 73.

In forbidding the treatment of symbols of different types as though they had the same type in such cases as the proof of a least upper bound to an aggregate of real numbers, the theory of types makes the proof impossible without a supplementary axiom asserting the existence of a propositional function of lower type to which the given function is formally equivalent. As Mr. Black points out, previous difficulties over the meaning of "existence of real numbers," seemingly eliminated by Russell's construction of real numbers from the rationals (as against Dedekind's "postulation" of them) recur now over the existence of a propositional function asserted by the above formulated axiom of reducibility. He has in an interesting analysis shown that if the existence of the real numbers is to be secured, this axiom must assert the existence of a non-denumerable infinity of propositional functions, and the axiom of infinity, in securing the existence of the integers, a denumerable infinity. A suggested means of eliminating the theory of types is the employment of symbols themselves *showing* how such symbols may be combined, *e.g.*, a system of wooden rings (for propositional functions) showing that no ring of given radius could fit into another of the same or lesser radius (functions of the same or lower type). Similar considerations are tentatively suggested for the elimination of the axiom of infinity, though the way of effecting this is not clear. The axiom of reducibility, however, as yet defies elimination. And the proofs of Ramsey and Waismann that it is a contingent proposition are held to be fallacious, and its logistic derivation is as yet unaccomplished.

The conclusions drawn concerning the logistic system in *Principia Mathematica* are: (1) that a distinction between the philosophic and systematic (non-formal and formal) aspects of the calculus is necessary. In the former aspects symbols are used as words with meanings, but the calculus is to be developed formally, using symbols as "substitute signs"[1] without meaning. This involves discarding the view in *Principia* that certain formulae are primitive, and in consequence (2) that the logistic notion of deducing mathematics from logic must be abandoned. The relation of mathematics to logic is that in its systematic aspect mathematics must be used in the latter's development. In its philosophic aspect mathemetics is "the syntax of all organized systems [and logic] the syntax of possible states of affairs".[2] This thesis would bear further elucidation. (3) That the axiom of reducibility in its assertion of existence is to be considered a meta-mathematical statement that the addition of a new symbol will not produce contradiction.

(B) The formalist view of mathematics is that it is concerned with the structural properties of symbols independent of their meaning, at any rate that its theorems have their meaning only in exhibiting the structure of indeterminate systems. Meaningful statements about these systems belong to "meta-mathematics". This view leaves unexplained the nature of the initial axioms and the reason for their choice. If the interpretation of the "ideal elements" which occur in these is to be ignored, a meta-mathematical proof of their consistency must be provided. With Gödel's proof that any proof of the non-contradictoriness of the entire calculus of functions itself leads to a contradiction, the hope of complete formalization seems to collapse.

(C) The clarity and simplicity of this too brief section on formalism is rather offset by the mistaken emphasis one feels to be present in the exposition of the intuitionist view. As an *attitude* toward mathematics ("dynamic" as against "static") and as an analysis of social origins of

[1] P. 142. P. 144.

mathematics, one feels that considerations are stressed which, in formalist language, describe neither mathematics not meta-mathematics but something several removes from both. Certainly the responsibility for this lies originally with Brouwer, but one wishes that less space had been devoted to the "basic intuition", which is claimed to generate the natural numbers, and more to the actual demands *within* mathematics supposedly actuated by it, *e.g.*, that the objects denoted by the subjects of general and existential statements be "constructible" if the latter are to be properly significant, that argument in accordance with the law of excluded mean is sometimes impracticable, that the integers cannot be formally grounded, that certain processes and axioms in the theory of point sets and the theory of transfinite ordinals and cardinals must be abandoned. In the history of intuitionism which Mr. Black gives, discussion of such strictly mathematical considerations does appear. The relationship of Brouwer's views to Kant's, in the grounding of the natural number series on the "basal intuition" of the multiplicity of the intervals of time, stands in need of further elucidation from Brouwer and criticism from Mr. Black. The latter holds this view to involve that mathematical judgments are synthetic and *a priori*, but such a claim is obscure in general. It is important to see, as Mr. Black has done, that Brouwer's "denial" of the law of excluded mean is not properly a denial, but expresses a requirement that mathematical statements shall have a clear meaning guaranteed by the constructibility of the concepts about which the statements are made. But exactly what constitutes constructibility, what meaning for general and existential statements is secured thereby, how this meaning is bound up with a finite method of verification —all such underlying questions are left almost untouched. Accounts of the intuitionist construction of a real number as an arbitrary choice-sequence, the denial of significance to general statements about the continuum (constructed from such choice sequences), and illustrations of propositions in the position of being neither true nor false are suggestive; but no adequate treatment of them throws light on the above questions. Mr. Black has succeeded in providing a simple and clear summary of Heyting's intuitional calculus of logic (in which $--a \supset a$ cannot be proved from the axioms nor the symbols (x) and (Ex) defined in terms of each other) and of the difficult view of sets. One could wish, however, that the way in which sets are constructed precludes the classical axiom of inclusion and thereby Burali-Forti's contradiction had been made a bit clearer; and also precisely how the denumerably infinite cardinal $\aleph_0$, the number of any set whose ordinal is ω, can be accepted on the intuitionist view as having a definite meaning, and why, if so much is admitted, a cardinal number corresponding to a denumerably infinite set of denumerably infinite ordinals to which a new denumerably infinite ordinal may always be assigned, cannot also be admitted. But for students without great knowledge of the subjects treated in this book, and for whom the book was intended, the broad analysis given is on the whole appropriate.

ALICE AMBROSE.

Religion and Theism. By CLEMENT C. J. WEBB, F.B.A. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1934. Pp. 160. Price 4s. 6d. net.)

This volume consists of "the Forwood Lectures delivered at Liverpool University, 1933, together with a chapter on 'The Psychological Accounts of the Origin of Belief in God.' " It has all the qualities of lucid and attractive

style, orderly arrangement, consistent argument, and assured conviction which one has learned to expect from the author.

The four Forwood Lectures deal with the relation of Religion and Theism, and the added chapter which follows the third lecture, though not part of the original argument, is quite relevant to it and consistent with it. Paradoxical as the phrase, "a religion without God," sounds, the author in the first chapter admits the possibility of a religious attitude to the world and life which stops short of any belief in God, and cites Buddhism in its earlier form, Confucianism, and the piety of Spinoza as instances. What is common to these instances and theistic faiths is provisionally described by him as *ultimacy* and *intimacy*, the inmost life of man relates itself to what is recognized as the inmost reality even if not called God; but this is a divorce of two elements usually united, the *subjective* fact of religion, the *objective* fact of God, the second not being an inference from the first but the content of it. Man apprehends God in religion, and does not infer His existence from it; but the apprehension of some sort of reality may persist, even when the content becomes indefinite. Theism, as a philosophical doctrine about God, may be held even where no religion corresponds, and so religion may survive even where theism has been abandoned.

The second lecture deals with Naturalism as a religion without Theism, and mainly consists of an examination of Professor Julian Huxley's *Religion without Revelation*. Its intentions may be stated in the author's own words: "I shall attempt in my following remarks to show (1) that Professor Huxley's own account of religious experience rather suggests a theistic background than is intrinsically inconsistent with it; (2) that his contrary belief is based upon a misapprehension of what is meant by Theism as a philosophical theory; and (3) that the 'Humanism,' as we may call it—although Professor Huxley does not use the word, and although his objections to Theism are based rather upon its supposed incongruity with our knowledge of Nature than upon its alleged incompatibility with the dignity of Man—this Humanism, which is implied in his own alternative theory of the nature of religious experience, is itself by no means easily reconcilable with his own account of that experience, or with his general philosophical position" (pp. 41–42). In my judgment the intention is excellently fulfilled.

In the third lecture the author turns to Humanism as represented by Mr. Walter Lippmann's *Preface to Ethics* and the *Ethics* of Professor Nicolai Hartmann. Of the first he says that it "is the work of an American author who reflects a mood of the moment without, I venture to think, evincing either an adequate apprehension of the difficulties inherent in the position which he defends, or such knowledge of what has in the past been thought upon the subject of his choice as might have emancipated him from what may perhaps be called without offence a journalistic pride in his modernity." Of the second he says that it "is, on the other hand, a highly important contribution to the literature of moral philosophy, combining learning with originality and acute criticism with genuine insight into moral experience" (pp. 60–61). His judgment of the former author commands my assent; as regards the latter, he argues that his rejection of Christian theism is due to an inconsistency in not recognizing that the 'eternal values' of reverence and gratitude he recognizes demand a personal God as their object (p. 74), and to a misunderstanding of what Christian theism is, and its consistency with an ethical view of the world (p. 75). On page 80 there is an obvious misprint, *majority* for *majesty*. The inserted chapter need not detain us, as it covers familiar ground; it is an acute criticism of the views of Leuba and Freud and Jung.

The fourth lecture which then follows is a vindication of theism. The argument is thus summarized by the author himself: "I shall, then, only endeavour to suggest that, the religious consciousness being taken as a normal feature of human life, the interpretation thereof as a consciousness of the presence of a Being with whom what we may naturally call personal relations are possible is not only the most obvious interpretation but also one which there is no necessity laid upon us to reject on either of the two main grounds which we have seen to underlie current criticisms of theistic language and doctrine. On the other hand, I am convinced that neither of the suggested alternatives, a religion of 'cosmic emotion,' or a religion of what may be called in a general way 'humanism'—though this may take more than one form—can so well satisfy as does Theism the actual demands of the religious consciousness in its maturer forms" (p. 131). The author does succeed in showing that a properly understood theism, in which the immediate object of the religious consciousness, God Himself, has been intelligibly related by reason to the world and life is not inconsistent with either the interpretation of the world to which science leads or the position of significance which humanism assigns to man, and that it is in such a personal relation to that personal object that the needs of the religious consciousness are met, as they cannot be in any substitution for God of the universe itself or of humanity within it. For the misunderstanding of theism by naturalism and humanism, I may add, the opponents of theism must bear some of the blame, as they direct their criticism against popular misconceptions rather than competent expositions of Theism; and the Church must share some of that blame so far as it preserves and diffuses inadequate and superseded representations of the belief in God. It is a tragedy that through mistakes on either side, insufficiently appreciative scrutiny of the conception Theism offers and insufficiently critical presentation, any believers in religion should be denied the full satisfaction which belief in God can offer. The author deserves the gratitude of all who desire this conflict to be closed for his candid and considerate *eirenikon*.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

Idealistic Logic: A Study of its Aim, Method, and Achievement. By C. R. MORRIS, M.A. (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1933. Pp. x + 338. Price 12s. 6d.)

This is a useful and timely book. Mr. Morris is in sympathy with the aim of Idealistic logic, but he is not blind to some of its deficiencies, and, following Cook-Wilson, he has much to say of the inadequacy of its method and achievements.

No one to-day would agree with Kant's famous statement, namely, "Since Aristotle, Logic has not had to retract a single step and to the present day has not been able to make one step in advance." During the last hundred and fifty years two widely opposed conceptions of the nature of logic—each somewhat unfortunately dubbed "modern logic"—have been developed; Idealistic logic and mathematical, or symbolic, logic. Whilst the germ of the latter may be found in the logical doctrines of Aristotle himself, the former marks a sharp reaction against the traditional logic, a reaction initiated by Kant, whom Mr. Morris regards as "the founder of Idealistic logic."

Mr. Morris agrees with the Idealists in regarding logic as the theory of the forms of thought. "Logic," he says, "seeks to discover certain forms within the process of experience determining the structure of that experience"

(p. 317). He attempts to distinguish clearly between the province of logic and that of psychology, whilst at the same time insisting that "it is vital to the Idealistic logic to maintain that there is only one experience, and that all experience is one. Unless this is the case, logic, arguing as it does from the possibility of unity, has no method left to it, and therefore no existence. Logic cannot allow that there are two *kinds* of real experiences: thinking or apprehending, which it is the province of logic to investigate, and other experiences, such as imagining or dreaming, on which empirical psychology may try its hand" (p. 319). Logic and psychology are held to examine "different *aspects* of one and the same experience." It is from this point of view that Mr. Morris considers the deficiencies of pre-Kantian logic.

After two brief introductory chapters dealing respectively with the Aim and the Method of Logic, Mr. Morris gives an extremely good account of the traditional logic as derived from Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. He suggests that "Aristotle caught a theory of Plato's at a moment of arrested development, as it were, and perpetuated it in essentials in a logic which no subsequent philosopher for two thousand years felt the necessity of criticizing in its fundamentals" (p. 35). This theory is that the act of knowing is always the recognizing of a universal in a particular. Hence the traditional logic laid stress upon the search for definitions, and was led to regard every statement as asserting an attribute of a subject. Closely associated with this is the doctrine that all thinking is syllogistic. Thus thought was taken to be "*deductive*, in the sense of drawing out conclusions from simple, general, true premisses" (p. 76). Mr. Morris contends that Hume tacitly accepted this view and was thus forced to become a sceptic since he could not find the required fundamental first principle or premiss. The traditional logic was fashioned to fit the theory of knowledge put forward by Socrates and Plato and handed on by Aristotle; it does not fit the Idealist theory of knowledge, since the Idealist regards thinking as discursive, denies that any judgment can be incorrigible, and insists that the mind is spontaneously active in *producing* a systematic unity. Mr. Morris recognizes the difficulty of explaining how mind can be thus spontaneously active and at the same time capable of knowing a world independent, in some sense, of the thinker. He has many illuminating things to say about Kant's theory of judgment (Chapter VI) and about the transcendental unity of apperception (Chapter VII). He gives a useful account of inference in the Idealistic logic (Chapter IX) and an interesting criticism of the coherence theory of truth (Chapter X).

The grounds of Mr. Morris's own dissatisfaction with the Idealistic logic are set forth in two chapters (XII and XIII) dealing with the "reactionary criticism" of Cook-Wilson. He argues that Idealistic logic, taking its starting-point from Kant, has analysed the actual operations of thought in physics, but has reached conclusions concerning the necessary forms of thought which are not in conformity with the thinking exemplified in non-mathematical sciences such as biology. In particular, Idealistic logic must be criticized for leaving unexplained the element of immediacy in knowledge. "The arguments of the Idealistic logic," Mr. Morris says, "are not competent to refute the contention that there is an element of immediacy in knowledge, so long as it is not maintained that the faculty of immediacy can of itself alone contribute *statements* which are pure statements of knowledge, carrying the guarantee of immediate apprehension" (p. 314). His conclusion is that the large claims of Idealistic logic to establish *a priori* how the character of experience is determined by the forms of thought must be abandoned. He maintains that its achievement lies in its having provided a defence against the scepticism of Hume, which scepticism—so Mr. Morris seems to believe—was the inevitable

outcome of the traditional logic and the theory of knowledge upon which that logic rested. This contention cannot, in the opinion of the present reviewer, be admitted. But every logician should be grateful to Mr. Morris for his clear and interesting presentation of the Idealistic attitude to those problems which are traditionally regarded as constituting the subject-matter of logic.

L. Susan Stebbing.

Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism. By C. D. Broad, M.A., Litt.D. (Cambridge: at the University Press. 1934. Pp. 48. Price 2s. 6d. net.)

This pamphlet constitutes the inaugural lecture given by Professor Broad on his appointment to the Chair of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge. He has chosen as his subject the timeworn but still acute problem of moral freedom, and while he does not claim to provide a solution for it he states the problem in a way which will make it much clearer to many readers,—I do not say "to all" simply because the same way of statement is not likely to suit everybody, and the analytic, formal way common at Cambridge, while providing perhaps the best possible method for very many readers, may somewhat repel and mystify others. When I have said this I have said that the pamphlet has done as much as any single discussion of the problem is likely to do, especially when confined to 48 short pages. It is well worthy of the reputation of the author and of his previous works, and ought to be read by all serious students of the problem.

Professor Broad makes it clear that the question is not whether "ought" entails "can," for that it does so *in some sense* is universally admitted,—a point often forgotten by indeterminists,—but *what* sense of "can" it entails. (In discussing this problem "ought" itself is throughout used in the sense in which it entails moral responsibility, but on pp. 21–24 there is a most illuminating account of other senses of "ought.") Again, it is generally admitted that it can never be true that I ought to have acted differently from the way in which I did act where it is the case that the action in fact performed would have taken place however strongly I had willed not to perform it, as, *e.g.*, in a case of really uncontrollable sneezing. In this sense, as the author points out, "ought" clearly entails "can." But suppose, although I could have avoided doing it *if* I had willed sufficiently strongly, I could not at the time have willed as strongly as that? In that case again Professor Broad is almost certain that it could not be true that I "ought" to have acted differently from the way in which I did act. Nor, he urges, is the difficulty removed by saying that I should have then willed otherwise than I did if my volitions on previous occasions had been different from what they were in fact. Consequently he concludes that "could" in the sense in which it is entailed by "ought" cannot be reduced to "would have if." While this seems clearly true, I am not altogether satisfied with Professor Broad's assumption that the determinist really must analyse "could" as "would have if." Might not the latter, while denying that a different action was ever possible if you take all conditions into account, hold that it was possible relatively to certain conditions (*i.e.* all the conditions except some of the psychological ones), and effect the analysis in terms of this relative possibility? He might thus say, "A could have acted differently" means "a different action would have been possible though all conditions except A's state of will remained the same." In that case "I could have willed harder than I did" would become "it would have been possible

for me to will harder though all conditions except my immediately precedent state of will remained the same," which may well be true according to many forms of determinism. There would still be cases in which a person wills with the maximum degree of strength compatible with other conditions, and other cases where he does not; and in the latter cases he might still perhaps be held to be morally responsible despite determinism if a wrong action occurred through his not having willed more strongly, but not in the former. Again, some determinists, *e.g.*, I think, Locke, would say that the question whether a man could have willed otherwise than he did is meaningless because it implies that a man can will to will, which is impossible, and that therefore the distinction made by Professor Broad between, *e.g.*, the man who is just beginning to adopt the drug habit and the same man when his will has already been undermined by the drugs so that he "cannot" resist them, must be analysed in some different way.

Professor Broad then proceeds to analyse further the alternative "indeterminist" view, according to which the degree of the agent's "desire" (I am not clear why he now ceases to talk of "will" and starts talking about "desire") is not completely determined by the laws of nature and other facts about events, dispositions, and "background conditions." But he is inclined to think that, besides this negative condition of indeterminism, a second, positive condition is necessary if an action is to be morally obligatory, for otherwise the action would be a mere accident. The view which admits both negative and positive conditions he calls "Libertarianism," and defines as follows: "(i) Some (and it may be all) voluntary actions have a causal ancestor which contains as a cause-factor the putting-forth of an effort which is not completely determined in direction and intensity by occurrent causation. (ii) In such cases the direction and the intensity of the effort are completely determined by non-occurrent causation, in which the self or agent, taken as a substance or continuant, is the non-occurrent total cause." Against this view Professor Broad raises the objection that, if an event is to be determined at all, it must be at least partly determined by precedent events; but I should have liked him to discuss the reply that the advocate of "Libertarianism" need not claim that even the direction and intensity of the effort are *wholly* determined by the self, but only that they are *partly* so determined, and expressly point out the difficulties in this rejoinder. But there is so much for which to be thankful in this last pamphlet that it is perhaps ungrateful to ask for more.

A. C. Ewing.

History and the Self: A Study in the Roots of History and the Relations of History and Ethics. By Hilda D. Oakeley, M.A., D.Lit. (London: Williams & Norgate Ltd. 1934. Pp. 286. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

It is in accordance not only with the recent trend of speculative thought, but with the still more recent course of political events, that we should envisage the task and nature of philosophy historically, and that our most urgent problem should be the relation of the individual self to the supra-individual concepts of the nation, and of civilization, and of reality itself. Dr. Hilda Oakeley states that she was urged to the writing of her book by "an intense impression of the paradox of our contrasting attitudes in historical and in ethical interest and judgments," and by dissatisfaction with the historical doctrine of the Hegelian tradition. That, presumably, was before the triumph of Hitlerism in Germany, which has provided most of us with a still stronger 'practical argument' against the submergence of individual

personality in the Idea. It is a prime merit of Dr. Oakeley's volume that one feels this sense of vital issues underlying the course of her argument.

She starts by making pluralism axiomatic. The experience of the individual is the primary material of history, and the bases of knowledge and ethics are in the recognition of the *Thou*, over against the *I*. "An idealistic interpretation (of history), far from implying, is incompatible with monism." But how is this plurality of individual selves to be reconciled with the unity of history, a unity which the very term 'history' seems to postulate? The question is tackled on the several planes of epistemology, ontology, and ethics. On the first plane she distinguishes the self as subject, which, she declares, cannot be known directly, from the self as object of knowledge; and goes on to emphasize the limitations and defects of our historical knowledge, such as the loss of the actual experience of past individuals, which is history in the primary sense; the relativity of the categories of objective history (race, nations, institutions) which we substitute for the actual individual or event; the animistic attribution of personality to the non-human elements in history. An example of this animism she finds in Croce's identification of the Spirit with history. Turning then to the 'substance of history' she discusses the relation of personal activity and purpose to the blind factor of chance, and to the life of nations, institutions, and 'historical forces.' Her conclusion is that "the blind factors in human history may partly proceed from the minds of men themselves," and that "if there could be banished from the process of events all that we have discussed under chance . . . there remain in the very sanctuary of history the creative mind itself, possible sources of impediment to human progress." Individual freedom she assumes to be of the very nature of personality; but (she argues) without some transcendent principle history loses its meaning, and our freedom is of no avail. This principle she finds, though recognizing that all ethical systems are historically relative, and that the Platonic type of ethical objectivity involves a kind of animistic personification, "in the idea of a future united with that of the creativity of selves which lends it its value." "In the illimitable future . . . the dualism inseparable from history would not be eliminated, but . . . its unfavourable effects might be incalculably diminished." This conclusion is supported by the postulation of a supreme person who is *not* equivalent to the All, and whose nature supplies "a necessary principle of order in our idea of history."

The book is written with sober fullness and good sense: there is no attempt at metaphysical sublety or obscurity, and some interesting points are made. But I cannot help feeling that the argument as a whole is lacking in logical coherence, and this lack of clearness and coherence is reflected in the frequent clumsiness of her English style. It seems to me that Dr. Oakeley as a pluralist is still too much of a monist, and that a far more radical analysis of historical concepts is needed if the discussion is to escape verbalism and ambiguity. For instance, the word 'chance' has two opposite and contradictory senses according as it is contrasted with the abstract logical scheme of an *onlooker*, or with the individual purpose and foresight of an *agent*; and any argument which fails to analyse this distinction must fall to the ground in logical vagueness. Again, the claim that there must be a transcendent principle in history is surely to accept a postulate from which the whole system of Crocean monism necessarily follows. In general I think there is a failure adequately to distinguish the category of history as thought from the category of history as lived, or actuality. On the denial and the confusion of that distinction monism rests, and on the analysis of it pluralism must rest. Dr. Oakeley refers more than once to that great-hearted doer and thinker, Dr. Albert Schweitzer;

but she does not notice the summarizing sentence of his autobiography: "To the question whether I am a pessimist or an optimist, I answer that my knowledge is pessimistic, but my willing and hoping are optimistic."

ADRIAN COATES.

Speech Disorders: A Psychological Study of the Various Defects of Speech. By SARAH STINCHFIELD, Ph.D. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1933. Pp. xii + 341. Price 15s.)

This book is a conglomerate of miscellaneous information, nomenclature, and statistics relating principally to the handling of Defective Speech in America.

Of its three hundred and twenty-four pages, the first twenty-four are devoted to a sort of general "talk" on the Speech of Infancy, then come about forty pages on the Common Speech Difficulties of Childhood, followed by ninety pages of descriptive pathology bristling with nomenclature, hopeless prognosis, and, naturally and sadly enough, very little either about cases or treatment.

That makes up half the book. Part II (157 pages) contains six chapters of miscellaneous statistics for the most part inconclusive even for America, and of doubtful relevance elsewhere.

The sketch outline of the book given above is sufficient to indicate that the sub-title is something of a misnomer. It is "various" enough, but it is not a psychological study.

Nevertheless, Miss Stinchfield's general principles, as far as one can be sure about them, are sound. Her fundamental general description of language as a mode of behaviour shows the right attitude and is in harmony for instance with the views of Professor Karl Goldstein, who insists that the human organism functions as a whole, and that to treat a Speech Defect you have to treat the whole man. Many patients with speech defects are *malades*, and any treatment they are subjected to must be clinically above suspicion.

As Miss Stinchfield points out, the child's speech efforts are "socially motivated," and "an expression of his various activities or responses to environment." Speech has almost magical effects on those around him, and he either gets what he wants, or what he deserves. Words work wonders. Speech becomes integrated with the whole of his social behaviour and the expression of his social personality. Hence the importance of studying not merely the local disturbance of speech, but the whole patient in his habitat. This is particularly important in stammering or stuttering.

In this connection the author also asks the highly important question, "What is the child's native tongue?" but she apparently underestimates the importance of the speech habits formed before the age of seven. Speech it is true is dynamic, changing to serve changing needs, "subject to change without notice," but there remains the dialect of home, village, community, and class, closely correlated with the socio-economic organization in which the speaker functions in his various rôles. It is becoming increasingly clear that the democratization of the culture and speech of the upper classes by downward infiltration and progressive dilution, eventually reaches a stage when a sort of normal line has to be drawn and the whole wretched crop of defectives, deficients, and delinquents has to be reaped. It is also more than likely that a considerable amount of nervous strain or at any rate unhealthy reactions are caused by the impact of the native culture and speech with a more successful or alien culture. This is certainly true of "native" races, and probably also of the lower middle and more ambitious working classes who

propose to make use of the "educational ladder." A great deal of emotional instability, cultural and linguistic sterility, widespread negative attitudes and cynicism must be put down to the downward democratization of national and imperial cultures.

And here some of the tables in Part II are suggestive. About one-third of the students in groups at Mount Holyoke College "expressed themselves as dissatisfied with their speech." They were asked to describe the chief characteristics of cultured speech and evaluate their own. They were asked such questions as: "Are you a leader in your social group?" "Have you ever felt inferior because of poor speech?" "Is your accent and pronunciation like that of most of your friends?" It is enlightening to consider the cultural background of such questions as these, and to imagine the sort of answers you might get from the products of our big public schools, from secondary school-boys in Bolton, Bradford, Burslem, and Bangor, from elementary school teachers, people in evening classes all over the country, and the pundits of culture democratization at the B.B.C. It is also significant that in the speech correction groups of two colleges more students came from the semi-professional classes than any other. In Hunter College 45 per cent. were of semi-professional and 55 per cent. skilled occupational origin—only 5 per cent. professional.

Miss Stinchfield finds it surprising that in the correction groups there should be more girls from homes with some pretensions to culture than from lower-class homes with no such pretension. It would appear to be a natural consequence. It can be an awful strain to have to look up to people, but it is some compensation to have people to look down upon. If you have nobody but a moron to look down on it's no good looking at the ladder. But with organized democratization of culture downwards you must beware of the dividing line; a whole army of "deficiency" specialists with highly systematized "deficiency" techniques have grown up on the frontiers. It is to be hoped we shall someday be able to do without them, as they are the scourge of all public education.

On a very much larger scale there is the lively interest we take in "backward" and "inferior" races, and quite recently the measure of "fitness" for citizenship has been found in nordicism, which means very little in itself, but something quite definite when taken with its correlative opposite—the second-class citizen or subman.

There are many speech disorders which are not attributable to functional disturbances, but we know so little about the whole mechanism of speech, that the classificatory nomenclature of this book cannot be said to rest on or to correspond to any scientific systematized knowledge. These labels in "pathological" Greek are little more than convenient temporary trade names —rather like the abracadabra of the apothecary. For example, if you have a provincial or foreign accent, according to this American measure, you are not "normal," you are "suffering" from *Dysrhythmia barbaralalia*. Among the more unpleasant vocal disturbances you will recognize the virago in *paraphonia amazonica*, and the lemon-coloured voice in the *eunochoidia* type. And then there are the very prevalent complaints of *polylogia* or *logorrhea*.

At the present moment there is a semi-official committee deliberating on Speech Training and Speech Defects. It is to be hoped they will realize, with Miss Stinchfield, that some of these disorders "may appear for the first time in early childhood, or in later childhood, or in adolescence, *but the majority of speech disturbances of remedial type appear in childhood.*"

It is mainly a social and educational problem. Of the many Speech Disorders in which the prognosis is definitely bad, there is little if anything to be said except sympathy and mercy.

This is a very American book. In Part II there are chapter headings like

"Personality Schedules" and "Trait Inventory." And—as one has come to expect in this twentieth century with its "A1–C3" problem—there are speech tests.

And yet, in spite of its special American appeal, the book is a valuable one. Speech disorders are described, and the importance of regarding them as disturbances of personality with due regard to heredity and environment, fully recognized. Every Speech Teacher should have it, and it is to be hoped in the near future he will be better qualified to assess its real value and use it with discretion.

J. R. Firth.

God or Man? A Study of the Value of God to Man. By James H. Leuba. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1934. Pp. xii + 338. Price 10s. 6d.)

Professor Leuba is concerned (and who is not?) for the moral, and incidentally for the social and physical betterment of man, and he feels that the chief hindrance lies in the pre-occupation of men with Gods. Instead of resorting to psychologists for psycho-therapy, they continue to pour out time, money, and strength in seeking benefits from the "God of the religions." Now for this God, conceived as a being with whom social relationships are sought and enjoyed, there is—the Professor holds—no shred of evidence: a vaguely defined "Life Urge" somehow involved in man's ideals he can concede as scientifically respectable, and hence as perhaps existing. The benefits, however, are admittedly forthcoming, but they are really due to men, and not to God; they might more advantageously and less expensively be had from Professor Leuba. To this disadvantage must be added grave positive evils attendant upon religion as such which far outweigh its benefits. Religion (we are informed) opposes or neglects knowledge, encourages prejudice and hypocrisy, saps self-determination and self-help: notably (a chapter being devoted to this) it spreads, "False teaching concerning the source of the virtues." In the past religion was useful, and Professor Leuba is not ungrateful for having been brought up in it, but he judges that it should now give way to clinics and (perhaps) ethical societies.

The author eschews ultimate questions (while by suggestion dealing with them) in order to remain "within the range of human knowledge," but he does not seriously consider whether or not this range is truly taken. So far as there is an argument running through the book it is this: men have taken themselves to be healed, strengthened, inspired by God, but scientific psychology has shown that these effects are explicable (and repeatable) in terms of normal human psychic forces; therefore belief in the existence of God is very probably false and incidentally a nuisance.

Since Professor Leuba quotes (p. 199) a Lambeth Committee as conceding the factual position of his book, namely, that "spiritual healing" is not an ecclesiastical monopoly, the reviewer is moved to wonder at his uncritical confidence concerning the interpretation he builds upon these facts.

As against some excessive erotic mysticism and much prevailing anthropocentrism in religion his strictures are timely. But religion is essentially *theocentric*. It is not founded in the satisfaction of man's needs, except in so far as it satisfies what the author describes as the "appalling desire" for God for His own sake. Thus the utilitarian attack upon religion is wide of the mark. No religious man would think of asking Professor Leuba's question,

"Of what value is God to man?" The question which puzzles him is, "Of what value is man to God?"

The Christian doctrines of the Incarnation and the Holy Trinity are shortly dubbed "all that abracadabra." Perhaps it is not astonishing that one able to judge thus can also see the Church as "drunk with lust for power" (p. 328) simply because Pope Gregory VIII "claimed the right of sitting in judgment upon the conduct of kings . . .," when what the Pope was rightly claiming —namely, that man's spiritual life is the end of his civil life—Professor Leuba, in his own terms, would assuredly insist upon.

The author contrasts Christianity with "The noble and simple religion of Christ." Has he noticed how radically non-utilitarian Christ's religion is? or how deeply it is rooted in the religion of Israel? or how essential to it is communion with God? In sum, has he noticed that the religion he admires involves the denial of what he asserts, the assertion of what he denies?

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

Counter Attack from the East. By C. E. M. JOAD. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1933. Pp. 269. Price 7s. 6d.)

The attraction which military metaphors have for so many ardent votaries of peace has led Mr. Joad to misname his latest book. It should have been rather "Sanity from the East," or even "Salvation from the East." For he is concerned to argue that what contemporary Western civilization needs, if it is to escape from its profound inner malaise, from its futilities and frustrations, and the jeopardy into which they have brought the world, is the recovery of the sense of values which can only (it seems to be implied) be learned from the philosophy of Hinduism as expounded by Professor Radhakrishnan. In this remarkable personality and gifted thinker Mr. Joad sees a "liaison officer" uniquely fitted to interpret the West and the East to each other, and with a message of hope which the West cannot afford to ignore. Apart from a vigorous prologue and epilogue in which the moral is applied, the whole book is occupied with expounding Radhakrishnan's philosophy, and draws copiously upon his writings, especially the Hibbert Lectures, *An Idealist View of Life*. Out of some 160 citations from Radhakrishnan nearly a hundred are from this book.

Mr. Joad remarks that "it is a defect of his method that the reader is sometimes not as clear as he would like to be, whether Radhakrishnan is speaking his own mind or revealing the mind of others." The same criticism must certainly be made upon this book. Occasionally the author interposes an explicit caveat or frank note of dissent. More often we are left rather vague as to how far he accepts the contentions he states with such lucidity. In the main, however, he clearly does accept much of the Indian thinker's philosophy as of particular importance and relevance to-day.

Many readers will feel that Mr. Joad has exaggerated, if not the importance, at any rate the novelty of his discovery. That Radhakrishnan's philosophy is original in the best sense of the word, that is, a piece of thinking at first hand, it would be an impertinence to question. But that many of the positions he has reached, and which are here proclaimed as a gospel for our times, are new to Western thought even in the expressions that clothe them is far from obvious. The symbolic nature of religious creeds; the reconciliation of God and the Absolute; the treatment of the problem of evil and the problem of freedom; the validity in principle of religious knowledge; on these and other

matters Mr. Joad surely did not need to go so far east in order to find the doctrines he so much appreciates.

What is more, he is most grotesquely unfair to the philosophy of the Christian religion, which he appears indeed never to have attempted to study sympathetically (*e.g.* see two foolish comments, pp. 91, 208). Nor for that matter is he fair to Christianity as a whole, which seems to mean to him chiefly the Inquisition and the wars of religion. It is very different with Hinduism. Apart from a few perfunctory references to its perverted and debased features, we are asked to judge it from the exalted eclectic idealism of Radhakrishnan. Western sectarian intolerance is then effectively, and easily, contrasted with "the Hindu theory that every human being, every group, and every nation has an individuality worthy of reverence." When we look eastwards we are, it appears, to ignore such practical comments upon this theory as temple prostitution and untouchability, just as when we look at the West we are to ignore the interpretation of the meaning of Christianity of a Francis or a John Woolman. But in truth there is something meretricious about this sharp contrast of West and East. Mr. Joad, obsessed with contemporary tendencies, simplifies his chiaroscuro altogether too drastically. Monism since the time of Parmenides has been as native to the West as pluralism; and very naturally, for it expresses one of the most fundamental human needs. It is certainly *not* "obvious" (p. 142) that the affirmation of an unchangeable reality "comes from the East."

On the whole the book does more credit to the author's enthusiasm than to his judgment. It seems to have been written in a hurry and contains some hasty comments which the author would probably admit were inaccurate, *e.g.* the linking of "theories of the Alexander or Bergson type," on p. 142, or the reference to Plato, on p. 136. Yet, when all is said, the author is, if he will pardon a figure of speech so flagrantly Christian, upon the side of the angels. And for his pungent comments upon "the need of the West" many readers will be grateful.

J. W. Harvey.

Goldsworthy Lowes Dickenson. By E. M. Forster. (London: E. Arnold & Co. 1934. Pp. x + 277. Price 10s. 6d.)

Mr. Forster has produced a singularly interesting portrait of his friend, one of the most considerable thinkers and writers of the age. In what sense was he a philosopher? Throughout his life, inspired first by Shelley, then by Plato and Goethe, he brooded over what may be termed the deeper problems of man in the universe, diving into them by various approaches, the ordered reasoning of his friend McTaggart, the mysticism of Plotinus, the values disclosed by poetry, music, and painting, with more timid glances at the sciences of physics and psychology. He never attained, or believed in, the possibility of winning a philosophic system, was not concerned with the absolute or ultimates. He realized himself as a questioner in a changing world, unlikely to get full satisfaction to questions the validity of which was always qualified by the limitations of his nature and understanding. When young "I thought that there must be some way of reaching ultimate truths (or perhaps I should say ultimate experience) by some short cut. I suppose the principal thing that happened to me, in the course of my life, was the disappearance of this idea" (p. 229). " The world is incomprehensible, and must remain so to us animalcules, though the best thing about it is our shots to comprehend it" (p. 231).

It is significant that most of his early writings as a young Cambridge Don were poems, usually sonnets. For this meant that imagination, kindled by emotion, was to him a better mode of self-realization than reasoning in getting at the values of life. But he was capable of close, clear thinking, with a wonderful vigour and beauty of expression in the fields of personal and social conduct, as illustrated in his dialogues in *The Meaning of Good, A Modern Symposium*, and *Justice and Liberty*.

But a deep concern (in the Quaker sense) for civilization drew him out of his donnish seclusion. *The Letters from John Chinaman* won him a wide acceptance as a critic, and his tours in America and in Asia opened new vistas of experience to his sensitive mind. He began to feel an obligation to turn his studies of history and political institutions to practical utility for the education of a wider public opinion. Though continuing to write on "The Greek View of Life" and on religious topics, he found himself drawn into the political field as new issues of Peace and Liberty came up. When the immediate shock of the War subsided, he set himself with courage and pertinacity to plan for the salvation of the world by means of a League of Nations. The so-called "Bryce scheme" for internationalism was mainly his production, and he lent his mind and pen for years to the furtherance of this policy, subordinating to it all other interests. His great book, *The International Anarchy, 1904–1914*, published in 1926, is the most powerful exposition of the deeper causes of the War that has appeared. In the last years of his life, he returned to Plato and Goethe, even putting Plato for the first time on "the wireless."

He had a free, rich, shy, but truly social nature, with great tolerance and a faith in the goodness and reasonability of man sufficient to warrant a belief in human progress.

J. A. Hobson.

Religion and History. By James Clark McKerrow, M.B. (London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1934. Pp. ix + 193. Price 6s. net.)

The two essays which make up the volume do not fulfil the expectation which the title awakens, that there will be an adequate consideration of the influence of religion on history, or of history as a factor in religion; nor have they the close connection with one another that the words on the paper cover suggest: "Two essays, one dealing with religious history from a secular point of view, the other with secular history from a religious point of view." The first is a sociological study of the evolution of society in history, and religion is mentioned as one element in the evolution; the second is a theory, not original, for similar views have been before advanced, but eccentric, of the origin of Christianity; the first is decidedly the better, though much the shorter of the two, as it offers an interesting discussion of the *Principles of Sociology*. The author rejects the view of Sociology as a study of the relations of individuals in a society, and insists on the unity of society as an organism, a body, and a mind. He describes two types of social bodies, the *polities* (Greek) and the *economies* (the older empires); he recognizes that society has a "mental" aspect, which is not to be identified with its civilization. He maintains that in society there is an economic evolution, and that there is continuity in evolution. The economic evolution is towards a world-economy, a mutual dependence in this sphere of all nations, but on the mental side he does not expect an international evolution, but closes with a discussion of national economy. His attitude is that of naturalism; he recognizes

causality, but not teleology. Changes simply "happen." Evolution produces persons and events, and not the reverse, and we should offer no judgment on them.

The second essay is entitled *Evolution in the Light of Religion*; but this title has no necessary relations with the contents. The thesis maintained is that there never was actually an Apostolic Age, that Christianity began between A.D. 70 and 135 in Gnostic Christianity, a blending of pagan philosophy with Jewish Messianism, that for the cultured the ideal Saviour sufficed, but for the simple folk belief in a historical personality was necessary; that Catholic Christianity emerged out of the Gnostic, but turned against it, and claimed a basis in an Apostolic Age. He maintains that Christ is "mythical," not an historical figure, that "modernist" criticism has not left much of the historical Jesus, that "whether Christian doctrine and legend crystallized about a real person of that name (Jesus) is a matter of some historical interest, but of no importance for Christianity whatever; a mere man cannot be the Saviour." "What is important for those who have the cause of religion, which is the cause of humanity, at heart, is the ever-increasing scepticism among the educated—and we are all educated now—as to the alleged historical basis of Christianity. The hungry sheep look up to hireling shepherds (pp. 88–89). This statement which offers the reason for the reconstruction of history which follows calls for comment. There is a large number of competent, responsible scholars who would deny the negative position of extreme modernism in regard to the historical Jesus; it is simply not true that there is "an ever-increasing scepticism among the educated," if among the educated are included all Christian scholars and thinkers; to describe the ministers of the Christian religion as "hirelings" is not evidence, but abuse, which discredits the writer himself. He expresses his concern for religion, and does on several occasions mention God; but on page 56 he omits from the quotation from Micah the words "with thy God," in view of the doubtful convenience of the fiction of a corporate religious consciousness in modern, as contrasted with ancient societies, and seems to regard theism as unnecessary. His theory cannot be combated in detail in the pages of PHILOSOPHY; but even were his theory not as arbitrary as it is, he does not show the competence of knowledge which would justify the confidence of judgment he allows himself; assumptions for the most part usurp the place of argument. His essay can claim no value as a contribution to the discussion of a subject of so great importance.

A. E. GARVIE.

Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Pierce. Vol. III. Exact Logic (Published Papers). Edited by CHARLES HARTSHORN and PAUL WEISS. (Cambridge, U.S.A.: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. xiv + 433. Price $5; 24s. 6d. nett.)

These collected papers are concerned in the main with the logic of relations, the logic of mathematics, the devising of a suitable symbolism for dealing with both, and the ultimate analysis or philosophy of symbolism, mathematical proof, and the forms of facts.

Most of the book is now of mainly historical interest, showing how Pierce, starting with the work of Boole, "developed the logic of propositions, propositional functions, and the logic of relations, up to the point where these approximate to a calculus which is adequate to the actual deductive procedures exemplified by mathematics."[1]

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[1] Lewis and Langford, *Symbolic Logic*, p. 16.

The editors' claim that Boole was one of the most original and prolific logicians of the nineteenth century is well substantiated; apart from the developments mentioned above, one is constantly surprised by remarks which anticipate the best modern work. See for example 20 on the logic of mathematics, and 361, 418, and 419 on the diagrammatic function of language.[1]

Although Pierce accepts with an unquestioning *naïveté* characteristic of the symbolic logician "an ideal world of which the real world is but a fragment" (527), yet on the whole he is anxious to remove the superfluous; sometimes he believes symbols to illuminate more than they do (*e.g.* 444); but his faith is not blind (*e.g.* 515).

Pierce was not merely a man of great ability. He thought afresh. And it is worth reminding oneself at the present time that the study of first-rate and first-hand thinkers of the past is often very fruitful even when they were concerned with subjects in which advances have since been made.

Besides a table of contents and general index, the editors have provided a list of topics of historical interest and another list of topics of general interest. The latter should, I think, have included *Propositional Function 420, 421,* and *Material Implication 374, 441 f.* Pierce is illuminating on the propositional function and thus on the variable, though *Nature of the Variable 94* is pretty useless. *Demonstrative Symbols and Hecceities (particulars) are mentioned in 361, 419, and 460.* A more complete table of references to topics of general interest would have been welcome in view of the disjointed presentation entailed by the chronological order.

JOHN WISDOM.

Books received also:—

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INSTITUTE NOTES

THE syllabus for the Session 1934–35 is in course of preparation, and copies will be sent to all members in September.

During the Session which has just closed members have again been privileged to listen to many distinguished lecturers in the various branches of philosophy. Both in regard to the Lecture Courses and Evening Meetings the Session has been successful.

The Annual General Meeting will be held on Wednesday, July 4th, at University Hall, 14, Gordon Square, London, W.C. 1, at 5.30 p.m. Short speeches will be made by the President, the Chairman of the Institute, and Professor John Macmurray.

The Editor begs leave to remind all interested in the work of the Institute that donations of any amount, to supplement the inadequate income from subscriptions, will be greatly appreciated by the Council of the Institute.

EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

The Eighth International Congress of Philosophy will be held this year at Prague in Czecho-Slovakia from 2nd to 7th September, as announced in *Mind* (July 1933) and in *Philosophy* (October 1933). Anyone desiring to attend should communicate with Professor Radl, Charles University, Prague, who will send him an official invitation and information regarding the proceedings.

In order to facilitate the work of the British Organizing Committee, those attending the Conference should also acquaint Professor J. H. Muirhead, at Dyke End, Rotherfield, Sussex, of their intention.

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